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κειμένους νόμους] κεῖσθαι and some of its compounds are often convertible with the passive of τιθέναι. κεῖσθαι itself ‘to be placed, fixed, established’=τίθεσθαι; συγκεῖσθαι ‘to be put together or composed’=συντίθεσθαι; διακεῖσθαι ‘to be disposed’=διατίθεσθαι; ποκεῖσθαι (as I 2 13) ‘to be assumed’=ὑποτίθεσθαι or ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι. [κεῖμαι is constantly borrowed as a perfect passive to τίθημι, while τέθειμαι is almost invariably used as a deponent perfect. Thus the usage of the perfect in the best writers would be: ὁ νομοθέτης τέθεικε τὸν νόμον. ἡ πόλις τέθειται τὸν νόμον: ὁ νόμος κεῖται (Dem. Or. 46 § 12 note). infra chap. 15 § 23 τοῖς νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὦσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, Plato Leg. p. 793 B (νόμων) τῶν ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντων τε καὶ κειμένων καὶ τῶν ἔτι τεθησομένων. See also Cobet's variae lectiones p. 311. S.] τοῖς κρίνουσι, κρίσεις, τοὺς κρίνοντας] On the different senses of κρίνειν and κριτής as applied to the different branches of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 137 note I: and on the necessary imperfections of laws in their application to particular cases, the consequent introduction of ἐπιείκεια to modify them and adapt them to the circumstances of the case, and Plato's opinion, on the authority of laws, see p. 138 note I. ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι] ἐπί resting, and so depending, upon; hence penes, in the power of, at the discretion of. § 8 ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν. This primary, literal, and physical sense of ἐπί, (in this application of it, which represents the object of the preposition as the basis on which something stands or rests, and therefore depends upon), of the half dozen Grammars and Lexicons, which, after forming my own opinion, I have consulted on the point, is to be found distinctly stated only in that of Rost and Palm, where it lurks hardly discoverable, amidst the enormous mass of illustrations of the various usages of ἐπί accumulated in Vol. I pp. 1032 —1045, in p. 1038, col. 2. αἱ νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεψαμένων γίνονται] ‘legislation arises from (is the work of men after) long previous consideration’. Thuc. I 58, ἐκ πολλοῦ πράσσοντες οὐδὲν εὕροντο ἐπιτήδειον. ἐξ ὑπογυίου] (retained by Bekker; Gaisford not. var. prefers ὑπογύου, and so L. Dindorf, on Xen. Cyr. VI 1, 43.) ὑπόγυιον: πρὸ μικροῦ γεγονός, Hesychius. ἐξ ὑπογύου: παρ᾽ αὐτά, ἀπερισκέπτως, ἐκ τῶν σύνεγγυς, Suidas. By the Scholiast on Arist. Nub. 145, in Suidas v. ἀρτί (Gaisf.), ἐξ ὑπογυίου λέγειν is interpreted by αὐτοσχεδιάζειν; and in Eustath. (ap. eund.) it is said to be derived from γυῖον in the sense of χείρ, (compare Theocr. Idyl. XXII 81 and 121; the ‘hand’ is the member, par excellence), from which likewise he deduces ἐγγύη, ἐγγυᾷν, and ἐγγυαλίζειν; and ὑπόγυον, ὃ καὶ ἐξ ὑπογύου λέγεται, τὸ ἐγγύς φασι προσδόκιμον, ἢ παραυτίκα γεγονός, καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν πρόχειρον, ἢ μᾶλλον ὑποχείριον. Examples may be found, all bearing much the same sense, in Koch's note on Moeris Lex. p. 343, and a still larger list in Rost and Palm's Lex. s.v., to which add Rhet. II 22, 11; Pol. VII (VI) 8, 1321 b 17. ὑπογυιότατον (the readiest way or means) πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν. Isocr. Paneg. § 13. Menand. ap. Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 391. In Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδ. § 4, and Epist. 6. 2, p. 418 B, it stands for ‘close at hand’, ἤδη ὑπογυίου μοι τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς οὔσης, and similarly Ar. Eth. Nic. III 9 (Bekk.) sub fin., ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπογυῖα ὄντα. It appears from all this that ὑπογυῖον means ‘under the hand’, as an unfinished or just finished work, fresh and recent, πρόσφατον (so Rhet. II 3, 12) as Moeris explains it: and ἐξ ὑπογυίου, ‘from under the hand’, corresponds to our ‘off-hand’, or ‘out of hand’, and is used to express anything ‘sudden and unexpected’ or ‘unpremeditated’, ‘extemporaneous’ a signification which appears in all the examples. Similarly ἐκ χειρός, ἀπὸ χειρο<*>ς, ‘off-hand’. ἀποδιδόναι] a word of very frequent use in Aristotle, has for one of its elementary senses that of ‘to give back’, reddere; ἀπό as in ἀπονέμειν, ἀπολαμβάνειν, ἀπαιτεῖν, ἀπόπλους, ἀποπλεῖν (see Sturz. Lex. Xenoph.), from which all the other senses in which at least Aristotle employs it may be deduced. Another of the original senses of the word is ‘to give forth’, or ‘produce’, as the earth produces her fruits, and this also might be applied to the interpretation of it in several of its various uses. But as this signification is likewise deducible from the other—for production, as when the earth produces her fruits, may be regarded as a payment or restoration, or ‘return’ of something as due—it may perhaps be better to refer them all to the one original signification, reddere. So in Eth. N. II 1, 1103, a 27, b 22, τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδιδόναι is not simply ‘to produce’, but to produce energies that are due to the system, energies corresponding to the faculties from which they spring. So Trendelenburg, El. Log. Arist. § 55, p. 132, ‘ἀποδιδόναι proprie est reddere, unde ex suum cuique tribuendi significatione facile orta est declarandi vis (declarare is the sense which the word bears in the passage specially referred to, Top. A 5, 102 a 3) nihil enim est aliud quam logice suam cuique naturam reddere.’ ἀποδιδόναι is therefore (1) to give back, restore, repay, render, always implying some kind of obligation, (2) to render as a due, ‘assign’ (which best represents it in the majority of cases in Aristotle); of due distribution, suum cuique; hence (3) of the due fulfilment of any office or duty, as ἀποδιδόναι λόγον, ‘to render an account’, to explain, or set forth, any statement or doctrine, ἀποφαίνεσθαι, declarare. To one or the other of these I believe all the multifarious uses of the word may be referred. I will add a few examples in the way of illustration:—Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 638 § 56, τοὺς ἐχθρὰ ποιοῦντας ἐν ἐχθροῦ μέρει κολάζειν ἀπέδωκεν (assigns as a due) ὁ νόμος; and elsewhere. Plat. Phaed. 71 E (a good example), οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν (pay back in return), ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ (mutilated, defective, lopsided, single where all the rest are pairs) ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι κ.τ.λ. de Anima I 1, 403 b 1, τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ‘assigns’ or ‘applies’, that is, to the definition, which is the thing in question, to which it assigns matter as the sole element: comp. c. 4, 408 a 3; and ἀπονέμειν, in precisely the same sense, ib. V 1, and Pl. Tim. 34 A. ἀποδιδῶσι make to correspond, bring into comparison, Rhet. III 11, 13. ἀποδ. λειτουργίαν de part. An. III 14, 9, ‘duly to fulfil certain functions (services)’. Ib. II 14, 5, (ἡ φύσις) πανταχοῦ ἀποδίδωσι (makes due compensation, duly assigns) λαβοῦσα ἑτέρωθεν πρὸς ἄλλο μόριον. Top. Δ 1, 121 a 15, et passim, τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος, ἀποδιδόναι γένος. Top. A 18, 108 b 9, τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τῶν ὁρισμῶν, the rendering, or due preparation, production, of definitions: and so elsewhere. de part. An. III 7, 18, ἀποδ. τὸ ἔργον of the due performance of the work. Ib. I 1, 43 ἀποδ. τὸ ὀστοῦν τί ἐστι, to state, give a sufficient account or explanation. Phys. I 6, 1, 189 a 16, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πάντα ἀποδιδόναι (to produce, effect everything) οἴεται ὅσαπερ Ἀναξ. ἐκ τῶν ἀπείρων. Eth. Nic. III 1, 110 b 8, ποῖα δὲ...οὐ ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι, to give an account, explain. So here ἀποδιδόναι is ‘duly to assign, distribute, or apportion’ and again I 2, 5, ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις ‘we render our judgments’. These same applications of the word occur likewise in Plato, as Rep. 379 A, (to represent), Ib. 472 D, VI 508 E, Phaedr. 237 C, Theaet. 175 D, Polit. 295 A. The precise opposite, ἀπολαμβάνειν, occurs with the same sense of ἀπό, I 11, 3. ἀπονέμειν is used in exactly the same sense, ‘to assign as a due’; see for instance Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 b 18, ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, Ib. V 35, τιμὴ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, Ib. 1124 a 9. ἤδη...κρίνουσιν] by this time, now that we have come to them, ‘they actually decide’ So in the next line, τὸ φιλεῖν ἤδη καὶ τὸ μισεῖν ‘this time’, in theircase, not in the former, of something new, special, and marked. ἤδη therefore in these cases is often translatable by a mere emphasis. The word is repeated so soon after, applied to the same persons, and expressing almost identically the same thing, that it is not improbable that Spengel may be right in his conjecture that the one or the other should be erased. Rhet. Gr. Vol. I. Pref. p. v. ‘paulo post alterutrum ἤδη abundat, puto prius.’ However there are two still closer together, II 25, 14. It may be worth while to say a few words on this very common usage of ἤδη and analogous particles of time, in the way of illustration and exemplification. Ἤδη and its analogues ἔτι, οὐκέτι, οὔπω, are used emphatically to mark a critical point, climax, degree attained, as deserving of special and particular attention, at the moment, and in reference to something else which is not equally remarkable. They are all particles of time, and derive this their secondary sense from the metaphorical application of this notion of ‘already’, a definite time which we have just reached: ‘point’, or ‘stage’, or ‘degree’ attained being substituted by the metaphor for ‘time’ in the original sense of the word. This will be best illustrated by a few examples. Arist. περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως c. 2. 16, ὥσπερ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος, ‘habit, already by this time, now that we have reached this point, has become a second nature’. Met. Δ 21, 1022 b 18, ἕνα δὲ [τρόπον πάθος λέγεται] τούτων ἐνέργειαι καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἤδη, ‘one sense of πάθος is, the actual energies and changes of these’. ἤδη, by the time that they have reached this stage or state, and have actually become what they are. Categ. c. 8, 9, a 4, ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύσοι, ‘which may now (at this stage) be fairly called a ἕξις’. περὶ ἑρμηνείας c. 9, 19, a 39, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν ἑτέραν, οὐ μέντοι ἤδη (not yet actually, not quite, not yet arrived at the stage of,) ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ. Polit. II 8, 1268 b 20, ἐκεῖνος ἤδη ἐπιορκεῖ. III 7, 1279 a 40, πλείους δ᾽ ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἠκριβῶσθαι. VIII (v) 8, 1308 a 15, ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ δῆμος ἤδη οἱ ὅμοιοι, i.e. though this may not be strictly true of all oligarchies, when we come to the ὅμοιοι, at this stage, by this time, it is now quite true that they may be regarded as a δῆμος. Eth. Nic. V 3, 1132 a 2, πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων, ‘when a man has come to be a ruler, he must then...’ in the case of others this perhaps is not necessarily true, but the ruler must, actually, live or act in relation to others and in society’. Rhet. I 6, 24, πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν. I 10, 11, ἤδη διαφέρει ‘it does make a difference’. c. 11 § 3, τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται. Ib. § 26, ἔργον ἤδη γίγνεται. II 6 § 12, and 25 § 14, bis. I have confined myself in these illustrations to examples from Aristotle; from the ordinary language, in which this usage is at least equally common, I will content myself with citing Herod. III 5, ἀπὸ ταύτης ἤδη Αἴγυπτος: and Eur. Hippol. 1195 (Monk) πρὸς πόντον ἤδη κειμένον Σαρωνικόν. It is found also in French, Italian and German—déjà, gia, schon. C'est déjà quelque chose, ‘and that's something’. das ist schon etwas. The Italian gia, when used as an expression of assent, may be similarly explained. The use of demum is precisely similar, and common in most Latin writers. Sallust, Cat. XX idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum (that and that alone) firma amicitia est. Quint. II 5, 1, artemque de qua loquimur bonis demum (to the good, and to them alone) tribui volunt. VII Praef. init. neque enim ea demum quae ad docendum pertinent exsecuti sumus. VII 2, 21, VIII Prooem. 3, IV 5, 7, XI 1 § 44, 3 § 68, et passim. Cic. Tusc. Disp. I 19, 43, eaque ei demum naturalis est sedes, et seq., de Orat. II 30, 131, hi loci ei demum oratori prodesse possunt. Rarer is the analogous use of denique and tandem: Cic. de Orat. II 30, 131, c. 34, 146, tum denique scrutari locos, c. 75, 304, quantum est in eo tandem mali! c. 77, 315, hisce omnibus rebus consideratis, tum denique id... Hor. Ep. I 17, 2, quo tandem pacto... On iam in this same usage, see Munro, on Lucr. I 600, 613, II 314, 426; add, II 974, and Virg. Aen. V 179, iam senior, VI 304, VII 46, 735. Similarly in a negative sentence, οὔπω sometimes introduces the notion of time in estimating the amount or degree, Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 a 11, τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι οὔπω, ἀλλ᾽ ἄδικον. Ib. 23, ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δὲ οὔπω. Ib. b 24, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι —in the two former cases the unjust habit of mind is distinguished as ‘not yet amounting to’ the actual crime or unjust act; and in the third case this distinction is applied to the ἁμάρτημα, which, though a wrong in itself, has not yet reached the stage or degree of the vice, confirmed evil habit, of ἀδικία—also VI 10, 1142 b 14, αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις. Ib. 25, οὐδ᾽ αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, and 28. So also οὐκέτι, ‘no longer; not as before; not, now that we have reached this point’. Pol. V (VIII) 3, 1338 a 6. Rhet. I 2, 21, ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχῃ ἀρχαῖς οὐκέτι διαλεκτικὴ οὐδὲ ῥητορική, II 24, 3, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη κ.τ.λ. Ib. II 9, 3. de gen. et corr. I 2, 3, 315 b 3, πῶς δὲ τοῦτο οὐκέτι, Hist. Anim. I 6, 3, 490 b 16, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ζῴων οὐκέτι τὰ γένη μέγαλα, Ib. V 1 7, 539 a 30, τὰ δὲ θηλέα μέν ἐστιν, ἄρρενα δ᾽ οὐκέτι. Dem. de F. Leg. § 80, ὃν δ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὶ λάβητε μηκέτ̓ ἐκείνοις περὶ τούτου προστάττετε. Plat. Gorg. 503 A, οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς. Protag. 312 E. Xen. Oecon. 3. 1. Buttm. ad Mid. 13 a p. 528, ‘οὐκέτι proprie valet non ut antea, hinc non ut alias, non item, non iam.’ συνήρηται] (Bekker and Spengel. Alii συνήρτηται) ‘with whom are connected...’ In πρὸς οὕς, πρὸς expresses a mere general reference, ‘with respect to whom’, ‘in whose case’; and συνῄρηται ‘are often taken into, embraced in, the account’, σύν, together with their proper business, the mere facts of the case and the proof of them. I can find no sufficient authority for συναιρεῖν in this sense; the nearest approach to it is in Plat. Phaedr. 249 B, εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον, but even this is something different. Vater makes a similar observation. The interpretation also of πρός is certainly rather strained. Probably συνήρτηται is right. τὸ ἀληθές] No one is a fair judge, where his own passions or interests are concerned. Gaisford quotes appositely, Pol. III 16, 1287 a ult. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονταί γ᾽ ἐφ̓ ἑαυτοὺς οἱ ἰατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἰατρούς, καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυμναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. ἐπισκοτεῖν] ‘to bring darkness, throw a shadow over, overshadow’. Dem. c. Mid. 565, 25, οἰκίαν ᾠκοδόμηκεν ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι τοσαύτην ὥστε πᾶσιν ἐπισκοτεῖν τοῖς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ. Infr. III 3, 3. Plat. Euthyd. 274, ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐπεσκότει τῷ Κτησίππῳ τῆς θέας: an odd and unexplained use of this word. It seems to mean that Euthydemus, by bending forward and getting in the way, obscured or darkened Ctesippus—not however in the ordinary sense of the word, but in that of intercepting the object, and so darkening by throwing a cloud over, and thereby depriving him of his view (τῆς θέας gen. of deprivation, implied in the verb). In a metaphorical sense it occurs in Dem. Olynth. B 23, 26, Isocr. ad Dem. § 6, and in several fragments of the Comic Poets, (Ind. ad Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. Vol. v Pt. I p. 393,) for instance, Eubul. incert. Fr. 11 (Mein. III 267) τὸν οἶνον τῷ φρονεῖν ἐπισκοτεῖν; and in other authors. See also Victorius: and Gaisford in not. var. p. 18.
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