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We now pass on to the treatment of the dicastic or forensic branch of Rhetoric, which occupies the remainder of the book; the ἄτεχνοι πίστεις, being peculiar to this branch, (ἴδιαι τῶν δικανικῶν), 15. 1, are added as an appendix in the fifteenth chapter. For the general connexion of the contents of these chapters, and the illustration of some special subjects which seemed to require a more detailed explanation, I refer to the ana lysis of the Introduction, pp. 185—207, and the Appendixes to Bk. I, C. D. E.

The first subject of inquiry in this branch is the number and nature (quantity and quality) of the materials or propositions (the premisses) of which our ‘syllogisms’ are to be constructed, in accusation and defence, the two functions of the dicastic branch of Rhetoric.

Schrader draws attention to the term ‘syllogisms’ as marking the especially logical character of the arguments which are employed in this branch as compared with the other two. On syllogism for enthymeme, see note on I 1. 11, p. 19.

There are three subjects to be considered and analysed in order to furnish topics for the pleader's use; first, the number and nature of the motives and causes of injustice; secondly, the dispositions of the wrongdoers themselves; and thirdly, what characters and dispositions render men most liable to wrong and injustice.

The first thing is to define justice, then to proceed with the rest in order.—ἔστω, of a popular or merely provisional definition; comp. 5. 3; 6. 2; 7. 2.

‘Wrong’ or ‘injustice’ is defined ‘a voluntary injury contrary to law’. The two leading characteristics of a crime or punishable offence which are here brought into view are, that it is an act in violation of the law of the land—this is the political view of injustice—and that to be a crime the act must be intentional, done with malice prepense, and with full knowledge of the circumstances of the case and the probable effect of the action. It is thus distinguished from a merely accidental injury or harm done, which can hardly be considered voluntary at all, and again from a mere mistake or error of judgment arising from ignorance, not of universals, or general moral principles, but of the particular circumstances of the case (as of the absence of the button of the foil) where there is no evil or malicious purpose, no bad προαίρεσις, which constitutes the immorality of the act. See Eth. N. III 2, V 10. Rhet. I 13. 16.

νόμος δ᾽ ἐστὶν μὲν ἴδιος δὲ κοινός] Comp. 13. 2, 11, 12, and Introd. p. 239, Append. E. to Bk. I.

λέγω δὲ ἴδιον κ.τ.λ.] ‘by special1 law I mean the written law under which the government is conducted and the citizens live’, the laws and institutions—which direct the policy of the government and the conduct of the citizens—the positive, written, law of the particular state: this is human, as opposed to divine and natural, law: ‘by common (universal) law (I mean) all the unwritten principles that are supposed to be universally admitted’. This is the usual distinction taken between the two: these κοινά, ἄγραφα, are described, Introd. p. 239 seq.; for the further subdivision adopted in c. 13. 2, see Ib. p. 242.

ἑκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα κ.τ.λ.] ‘a voluntary act is characterised by knowledge, and the absence of all external force and compulsion’. Eth. N. III 3, init. ὄντος δ᾽ ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δἰ ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκαύσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ̓ ἔκαστα (i.e. with special knowledge of the particular circumstances) ἐν οἷς πρᾶξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν δἰ ἐπιθυμίαν. I 13. 6, τὰ ἑκούσια, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὅσα εἰδότες.

ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἑκόντες κ.τ.λ.] ‘now all voluntary actions are not done with (do not imply) deliberate moral purpose, but all acts done with such a purpose imply knowledge, because no one can be ignorant of what he purposes’. Eth. N. III 4, 1111 b 7, προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον: τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ̓ οὔ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ̓ οὔ. Actions, for example, done under the impulse of violent excitement or passion, διὰ θυμόν, or of appetite, δἰ ἐπιθυμίαν, are voluntary, but not κατὰ προαίρεσιν.

δἰ δὲ προαιροῦνται κ.τ.λ.] ‘The impelling motive, cause, of this purpose to do mischievous and vicious acts in violation of the law, is vice and want of self-control. This general vicious habit takes various forms in particular cases, and shews itself in different special vices according to the circumstances which call it forth at the time, and give it its special direction. Thus vice and wrong (μοχθηρία καὶ ἀδικία) may take the form of illiberality in money matters, licentiousness in pleasure, effeminacy in respect of ease and comfort (ῥᾳθυμία), cowardice in danger (when, for instance, the coward leaves his comrades in the lurch, and runs away out of mere terror); similarly the vice of ambition is shewn in the undue pursuit of honour, the passionate irascible temper in the over indulgence of angry feeling; victory is the motive to wrong in one that is over eager for victory, revenge with the vindictive; folly (the want of φρόνησις, practical wisdom, the special moral faculty) shews itself in the inability to distinguish (the liability to be deceived in distinctions of) right and wrong, the vice of the shameless man appears in his reckless disregard of the opinion of others’.—ὀξύθυμος ‘quick-tempered’, ‘hasty’.

περὶ δὲ τοῦτο] Wolf, and with him Brandis, in Schneidewin's Philologus, IV i, p. 42, object to δέ, which is omitted by Brandis’ ‘anonymus’ and one MS. See the note on δῆλον δέ, I 1. 11, p. 20.

τὰ ῥᾴθυμα] are things and circumstances which tend to promote and encourage an easy, careless state of mind, ‘things comfortable’, which incline us to self-indulgence and inactivity. So ῥᾳστώνη in Plat. Gorg. 569 C, οὔκουν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη γίγνεται; ‘isn't it a great comfort...?’ Crit. 45 C, τὰ ῥᾳθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι, of ‘careless, easy-going, indifference’.

ἐγκαταλιμπάνειν, ‘to leave behind in the lurch’, desert a comrade in danger [Cf. II 4. 26, 5. 7; III 16. 5.]. ἐν sc. τῷ κινδύνῳ. Eupolis Δῆμοι Fragm. VI (Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Gr. II 458), of Pericles' eloquence, μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις, ‘to leave the sting behind in the wound’, (ἐν τῷ ἕλκει). Plat. Phaedo, 91 C, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.

πικρός] ‘Translato a tristi sapore nomine, πικροὺς Graeci appellant qui accepta iniuria non facile placantur sed diu simultatem gerunt, de quibus accuratius egit noster, Eth. Nic. IV (11, 1126 a 20), οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται: κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ: γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα.’ [Vict.] τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν: διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς, ἐν αὑτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖν εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. The Latin amarus, as Victorius points out, is used in much the same sense. The distinguishing characteristic of the Aristotelian πικρότης, in which the particular ‘bitterness’ of this form of ὀργή is shewn, is its lasting and enduring quality—the wrath is nursed ‘to keep it warm’ (πέψαι τὴν ὀργήν)—and this gives it a malignant, spiteful, implacable character, exactly opposite to that of Horace, the irascible temper, ὀργιλότης, irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem.

ἀπατᾶσθαι] Ignorance of moral distinctions, and consequent wrong action, may be regarded as a kind of ‘deception’ or ‘delusion’; when a man is too foolish (unwise) to be able to distinguish right from wrong, when <*>e does not know and cannot perceive the difference between them (has no φρόνησις). Victorius quotes Top. Z (9, 148 a 6), τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔχον ἐπιστήμην οὐ δοκεῖ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ διηπατημένον. Ignorance is not a mere στέρησις, the privation or absence of knowledge; which is shewn by our not applying the term ‘ignorant’ to inanimate objects and young children; it is something positive, and consists in a deception, mistaking one thing for another.

περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων] τὰ ὑποκείμενα, res subiectae, subiecta materies; things that fall under the same head or general notion, and so are members or species of the same genus: Eth. N. II 2, 1105 a 1, πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν, ‘all that fall under the choice’, as its objects, or matter to operate upon. These are the six things previously mentioned, καλόν, συμφέρον, ἡδύ, and their opposites.

And so for the rest, the same rule holds in the case of every vice, ‘each in the things which are specially subjected to it’, which come under that particular head, as money is the ‘subject-matter’ of illiberality, dangers of cowardice, anger of quick, irascible temper, and so on. Victorius understands it as the ‘object’ of the aim or desire of each.

ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰρημένων] sc. in c. 9; ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη ῥηθησομένων sc. in II cc. 2—11. ‘It remains now to describe the motives and dispositions or characters of wrong doers, and the dispositions and characters of their objects or victims’. In Polit. VI (IV) 11, 1295 b 9, there is a division of crimes based upon their respective magnitude or degree, into great and little, crimes on a great scale, acts of oppression, outrage, insolence, and crimes on a small scale, mean and paltry, which appear in fraud, cheating, and any paltry knavery or trickery. γίγνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρισταὶ καὶ μεγαλοπόνηροι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπόνηροι λίαν: τῶν δ᾽ ἀδικημάτων τὰ μὲν γίγνεται δἰ ὕβριν, τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν.

First we have to distinguish or analyse the various motives and incentives, whether in the way of pursuit or avoidance which lead men to attempt (to undertake, take in hand, ἐγχειρεῖν) wrong doing: for it is plainly the accuser's business to inquire (how many and which kinds.) the number and the kinds of these universal incentives to wrong doing to which the adversary, whom he charges with a crime, is liable: and of the defendant, how many and what sorts of them are not applicable to his case. ‘Hunc locum copiose persecutus est Cicero pro Milone et in crimi-nando Clodio et in Milone purgando: cuncta enim in Clodio fuisse ostendit quae persuadere ipsi potuerint ut insidias faceret Miloni; eademque a persona Milonis afuisse.’ Victorius.

This inquiry naturally leads to a classification of the sources or causes of human action, which are found to fall under seven heads; some of these have their origin in ourselves and are under our own control, others are external to us and independent of us, and exercise upon us and our actions the force of necessity and compulsion. To the causes whose origin is without us belong (1) chance or accident, (2) nature, and (3) ex-ternal force or compulsion; over these we have no control: the causes which spring from within us, and are therefore more or less in our power to master and overrule, are (4) habit, (5) reasoning or calculation, (6) passion, (7) appetite or desire. These seven incentives to action have been carefully examined, and compared with other doctrines and opinions elsewhere expressed by Aristotle on the same subjects, in Append. C to Bk. I, Introd. p. 218 seq., to which I refer for further illustration of them.

This same classification of the causes or sources of actions is indicated or alluded to elsewhere, but nowhere else so completely made out. See, for instance, Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 a 32, αἴτια γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δἰ ἀνθρώπου, and VI 4, in the definition of art, 1140 a 14, οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων γιγνόμενων τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν: ἐν αὑτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. And in I 10, 1099 b 20 seq. the same division is hinted at.

ἔστι δ᾽ μὲν βούλησις κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Eth. N. III 4, 1111 b 26, ἔτι δ᾽ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δἰ ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μὲν βουλόμεθα καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἁρμόζει: ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ̓ ἡμῖν εἶναι. This is a qualification of the too unlimited statement of the unscientific Rhetoric. ‘In English, unfortunately, we have no term capable of adequately expressing what is common both to will and desire; that is, the nisus or conatus—the tendency towards the realisation of their end. By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire a blind and fatal, tendency to action’. Sir W. Hamilton, Lect. on Metaph. XI Vol. I. p. 184—5. On this, the Editor refers in a note to this passage. But βούλησις here means not ‘will’, but ‘wish’, as appears from the defi-nition ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις—the ‘will’ is not always directed to good—and from the analysis of it in Eth. N. III 4. The term by which Sir W. H. proposes to designate the common quality of this family of faculties, and so separate them from the rest, is Conative. Impulsive means much the same thing, and has the advantage of being an English word.

οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται κ.τ.λ.] This question of the end and object of ‘the wish’ is discussed in Eth. Nic. III 6 (Bekk.), and the conclusion, 1113 a 23, is as follows: εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει (the two opposite views that it is τἀγαθόν and τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν), ἆρα φατέον ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ̓ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν.

τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.] What he says is superfluous (περίεργον) here, is actually done in the six ethical chapters, 12—17, of Bk. II, and this apparent contradiction has raised a su<*>icion that some error has crept into the text. There is however in reality no inconsistency between the theory here laid down and the actual practice in Book II. There the treatment of these ἤθη is appropriate, as supplementary to that of the πάθη: here it would be out of place, because the present subject of inquiry is about the causes of human action; and though these states and conditions, youth, age, wealth, poverty and the rest, are as a general rule attended and characterised by certain tendencies or πάθη, yet these latter can be by no means regarded as effects of causes, but are mere συμβεβηκότα, separable accidents, which do not invariably accompany the states that they characterise. Youth and age, wealth and poverty, are not the causes of any particular classes of actions; in so far as they do accompany them they are accidental, not essential.

ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν] These are thus defined by Plato, Rep. VIII 12, 558D, οὐκοῦν ἅς τε οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ᾽ εἶμεν ἀποτρέψαι δικαίως ἂν ἀναγκαῖαι καλοῖντο, καὶ ὅσαι ἀποτελούμεναι ὠφελοῦσιν ἡμᾶς; τούτων γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίεσθαι ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη, comp. Phileb. 72 E. They are therefore pleasures that are forced upon us by nature, and therefore ‘necessary’ or ‘indispensable’ to us. Of these the ‘bodily pleasures’, the gratification of the appetites, are the most necessary, and sometimes the latter are confined to them; for in Eth. N. VII 14, 1154 a the pleasures which are first called σωματικαί, in lines 7 and 9, afterwards, in line 11, receive the name of ἀναγκαῖαι, which is repeated in line 17. The Scholiast and Paraphrast both explain ἀναγκαῖαι by σωματικαί. Plato more frequently speaks of the ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιθυμίαι in the same sense.

Not however that I mean to deny—it does happen, συμβαίνει— that there is a connexion of certain particular results or qualities with particular moral states (but these classes and conditions of life are not ‘states’ in this sense): any virtue, I dare say, (ἴσως), as self-control, does generate a particular kind of opinions and desires about things pleasant, good ones namely; and the opposite vice of licentiousness the contrary in the same sphere.

This is a parenthetical note to avoid misunderstanding.

εὐθὺς...ἐπακολουθοῦσι] ‘there is at once, from the very first, an immediate and close connexion (or consequence) between the σώφρων in virtue of his self-control, and certain good opinions and desires in respect of pleasure’. εὐθύς in the sense of ‘at once’, ‘straight off’, and corresponding sometimes to the Latin statim and ultro, passes into a variety of significations which take their colour from the context. Eth. N. V 14, 1137 b 19, suapte natura, εὐθὺς τοιαύτη τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν; see Bonitz on Metaph. Γ 3, 1004 a 5, who cites Categ. 12, 14 a 32, Anal. Pr. I 16, 36 a 6, Eth. N. VI 5, 1140 b 18, εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται, omnino non apparet. Polit. III 4, 1277 a 15, τὴν παιδείαν εὐθὺς (from the very first) ἑτέραν. Ib. VI (IV) 11, 1295 b 16, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εὐθὺς οἴκοθεν ὑπάρχει παισὶν οὖσιν (from their very earliest home associations). Ib. VIII (V) 10, 1310 b 8, εὐθὺς ἐξ ἐναντίων (at once, from direct opposites). Ib. c. 10, ult. μὴ βουλομένων γὰρ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἔσται βασιλεύς (he won't be king at all, omnino). Eth. Eudem. II 5, 1222 a 37, διότι φύσις εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφέστηκε τοῦ μέσου. See Fritzsche, note ad loc. Phys. VII 4. 2, bis, 248 a 21, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη, and 23. Hist. Anim. II 13. 2, 17.7, κεῖται ὑπὸ τὸ διάζωμα εὐθύς, statim, at once, immediately under. V 17. 5, de Gen. et Corr. II 11. 2, de part. Anim. IV 5. 1. Like ἤδη its connotation is transferred from time, its natural and proper signification, to place.

‘And therefore’, (because they are inappropriate as not assigning causes of human action,) ‘such distinctions as these may be dismissed for the present; but still we are bound to inquire into the connexion which subsists between particular qualities and particular persons or classes’; (the general subject deserves investigation;) ‘for though in respect of the qualities black and white or tall and short there is no fixed succession or accompaniment’ (between them and any particular persons or classes), ‘yet when we come to the connexion of young or old men with justice or injustice, then (by this time) there is a difference’. That is to say, that although in certain connexions of particular qualities with particular classes the establishment of such would be worthless or impossible, yet there are other cases, as in that of moral qualities, where it would be worth while to establish such a connexion, if it were possible. ‘And in general, any accidental circumstance that makes a real difference in the characters of men; as the opinion a man has of his own wealth or poverty, or good or bad fortune, will make such a difference’. So after all it seems that it is possible to trace some such connexions between qualities and classes; but as this is not the proper place for such an inquiry—the reason being already given—‘we will postpone it for the present’, and wait till we come to the πάθη, where it will be in its proper place: ‘And now let us proceed to what remains’ of the subject on which we are at present engaged.

πλουτεῖν δοκῶν ἑαυτῷ is a reading of some MSS, followed by the old Latin Translation, and adopted by the recent Edd. The vulgate has πλουτεῖν δοκεῖ, which Buhle retains. δοκεῖ τῳ, a conjecture of Victorius, is also found in some MSS.

On τύχη see Appendix C to Bk. I. Introd.; on αἰτία ἀόριστος see ib. p. 221 seq. ‘Illos eventus qui a causa quam nemo facile definiat oriuntur ad fortunam referimus. Arist. Phys. II 4, 196 b 6, εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἷς δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰτία μὲν τύχη, ἄδηλος δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ ὡς θεῖόν τι οὖσα καὶ δαιμονιώτερον.’ Schrader. (Schrader quotes this as Aristotle's own definition.)

καὶ (ὅσα) μὴ ἕνεκά του...μήτε τεταγμἐνως] ‘in any fixed, regular, prescribed order’.

φύσει] Introd. p. 224.— ἀεὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ‘either constantly, or as a general rule’: the latter alternative allows for the possible objection of τὰ παρὰ φύσιν to the perfect regularity of the operations of Nature.

καὶ τύχη αἰτία] The καί admits that chance as well as Nature may be the cause of these unaccountable monstra, these deviations from the ordinary laws of nature; but leaves the question unsettled.

βίᾳ] Introd. p. 225, anything that is done by our own instrumentality, but in opposition to our desires and calculations, may be said to be done βίᾳ, by compulsion.

ἔθει] Ib. p. 226—228.

λογισμόν] Ib. p. 229. Reasoning or calculation is a cause of action, when any of the goods already mentioned (c. 6) are presented to us as objects of our interest, as expedient and useful to us, (this is good under the aspect of utility; the other two forms of good are τὸ καλόν the moral end, ‘the right’, and τὸ ἡδύ: see Eth. Nic. II 2, 1104 b 30, τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις...καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος,) in the form of an end, or of means to that end; when, that is, good is the object of the action, (I add this qualification) because even the licentious (those who have lost all self-control, and therefore cannot act with a deliberate purpose to an end) do things that are expedient or for their interest, only not for that reason, but for mere pleasure.

θυμός and ὀργή. Ib. p. 231.—τὰ τιμωρητικά, ‘acts and feelings of revenge, are prompted by passion and anger’. I have translated θυμός ‘passion’ and ὀργή ‘anger’ to express the distinction that the one is a more general, the other a more precise and definite, term. Besides this, θυμός being the older and Homeric term to represent anger might by that very fact have conveyed to the ears of the more modern Greek a difference of meaning which had no real existence. ὀργή, if Damm's Lexicon is to be trusted, never occurs in Homer; [the word is not to be found in Mr G. L. Prendergast's (unpublished) Concordance to the Iliad. s.] Both of the terms as applied to emotions are in fact modifications and limitations of more general notions—θυμός the life or soul (Hom.) is limited to the most prominent and impressive outward manifestation of it, the expression of passion: ὀργή ‘anger’ is one, the most striking, of a class of animal impulses, ὀργαί. In Aristotle's psychology, the θυμός is one of the impulsive faculties (ὀρέξεις), together with the appetites and the (deliberate) wish, de Anima B 3, 414 b 2, and in the Platonic scheme the θυμός or θυμοειδές represents a whole class of impulses of which no doubt ὀργή is one—it is in fact the impulsive element of the human soul.

On the difference of τιμωρία and κόλασις, see Introd. p. 232. Compare I 14. 2. Of this theory of punishment as a preventive, a very good account is given by Protagoras, Plat. Protag. 324 B. Comp. also Eth. N. II 2, 1104 b 16, αἱ κολάσεις...ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.

For further particulars about ὀργή we are referred to the treatment of the πάθη in Bk. II: the chapter on anger is the second.

ἐπιθυμία. The last of the seven causes or stimulants of action is desire (Introd. p. 233), which excites all actions of which the object is pleasure. This pleasure may be either real or apparent, and therefore to include the latter we have ὅσα φαίνεται and not ἐστίν.

In the next two sentences the four incentives to action which originate in ourselves are shewn to be all referable in some sense to pleasure, real or apparent good, real or apparent as a motive cause. Of ἐπιθυμία it has been already stated that pleasure is the direct motive. Habit, again, is a kind of pleasure, for experience teaches that habituation and familiarity make actions not naturally agreeable pleasant to us—habit becomes a second nature. Of anger, revenge is the object, and revenge is proverbially sweet. And reasoning or calculation has always of course some good, real or supposed, for its object.

I have no doubt that Victorius is right in the distinction that he draws between σύνηθες and ἐθιστόν. The former represents a natural familiarity derived from familiar associations, with which, as I have pointed out on I 1. 2, the derivation, σὺν ἦθος, ‘the haunting, herding together’, the gregarious habit of some animals, is in exact accordance; so συνήθεις, of a man's ‘familiar associates, habitual companions’ I 11. 16; the other is an acquired habit, a practice to which you habituate yourself by study and attention; of which virtue the settled ἕξις formed by ἔθος is the best example. ‘In priore vero,’ says Victorius, ‘nulla industria aut cura, sed potius una cum aetate crevisse, eo verbo intelligitur; ut cum a puero quispiam in illis vixerit, inde factum sit ut ea ipsi iucunda videantur.’

ἐθισθῶσιν] Spengel has adopted συνεθισθῶσιν from συνεθίσωσιν, the reading of MS A^{c}. [‘ἐθισθῶσιν ceteri ut p. 1370, 13’ (c. II. 4). ‘Restitui passivum.’ Spengel.]

πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] ‘Perelegans est locus Agatharcidae p. 61 fragm. ed. H. Steph. οὕτως ἔχει τι φίλτρον μέγα πᾶσα συνήθεια: καὶ νικᾷ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος δυσχέρειαν χρόνος (it isn't the time, it is the association) τὴν πρώτην δεξάμενος εἰς τὸν βίον ἡλικίαν.’ Gaisford.

ὥστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν] The dative is explained by supplying an imaginary τινί, ‘as for one summing up to say’. An analogous phrase is ὡς συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, Xen. Mem. III 8. 10, IV 3. 7. See note on 1 7. 7, τὸ ποιητικῷ εἶναι, and Matth. Gr. Gr. § 388. Add Eth. N. 15, 1097 b 13, ἐπεκτείνοντι ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς...εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. In this and similar examples the dative may almost be regarded as an absolute case.

οὐχ ἑκόντες] Victorius here draws attention to Aristotle's well-known distinction, Eth. N. III 2, init., between οὐχ ἑκών and ἄκων. Acts due to ignorance, acts which would not have been done, had the doer been aware of all the circumstances of the case, cannot be called ἀκούσιοι, involuntary or unintentional, unless they bring after them regret or repentance; neither are they strictly speaking ἑκούσιαι, intentional, because no harm was intended; they lie between the two and must take the name of οὐχ ἑκούσιαι, ‘not-intentional’; neither intentional nor ‘unintentional’. I doubt if this distinction is applicable here; the only cases that it can be applied to are chance or accident, nature, and external compulsion, under which all actions are said to be involuntary, i.e. in which the will has no concern; and this is true. But in the Ethics, the actions there in question are not said to be involuntary—the doer meant to do what he did—but acting in ignorance, he acted unintentionally, in so far as he did not intend to do the mischief that followed. But this ignorance from which the unintentional character of the act is derived, essential in the Ethics, has no place here; ignorance is not included in an act done by chance, nature, or external compulsion.

Now as we act voluntarily in all these four cases in which the impulse is from within and action in our own power, it follows (from the preceding) that the object of all voluntary action is some form either of real or apparent good, or of real or apparent pleasure; including, in the good, real and apparent, the removal of evil and the substitution of a greater good for a less, because all these are αἱρετά (desirable), objects of choice; and in the case of pleasure, the entire removal of pain and the substitution of a less for a greater; both of which are like the others (ὡσαύτως) desirable in the sense of pleasurable.

It is therefore (from the preceding considerations) the rhetorician's business to discover the number and kinds (so Aristotle, but the number of kinds will be sufficient,) of good in the form of utility or expediency, and of pleasure. And as the first has been already examined and analysed under the head of deliberative Rhetoric (cc. 6, 7, good, absolute, and comparative), it remains for us to bestow a similar treatment on pleasure. Meanwhile we are not to forget that definitions for rhetorical purposes are sufficient, provided they are neither obscure nor over-exact: in the one case they are not understood, in the other they are also apt to be unintelligible by the popular apprehension, but besides this they trespass upon an alien province and method of reasoning, the scientific, namely, or philosophical, I 4. 4—6, &c. Accordingly,

1 This application of the term ἴδιος to νόμος is to be distinguished from the ordinary meaning of it in this combination, as, for instance, Dem. de Cor. § 211, where it stands simply for ius privatum, relating to private (as opposed to public) affairs.

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