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θυμός and ὀργή. Ib. p. 231.—τὰ τιμωρητικά, ‘acts and feelings of revenge, are prompted by passion and anger’. I have translated θυμός ‘passion’ and ὀργή ‘anger’ to express the distinction that the one is a more general, the other a more precise and definite, term. Besides this, θυμός being the older and Homeric term to represent anger might by that very fact have conveyed to the ears of the more modern Greek a difference of meaning which had no real existence. ὀργή, if Damm's Lexicon is to be trusted, never occurs in Homer; [the word is not to be found in Mr G. L. Prendergast's (unpublished) Concordance to the Iliad. s.] Both of the terms as applied to emotions are in fact modifications and limitations of more general notions—θυμός the life or soul (Hom.) is limited to the most prominent and impressive outward manifestation of it, the expression of passion: ὀργή ‘anger’ is one, the most striking, of a class of animal impulses, ὀργαί. In Aristotle's psychology, the θυμός is one of the impulsive faculties (ὀρέξεις), together with the appetites and the (deliberate) wish, de Anima B 3, 414 b 2, and in the Platonic scheme the θυμός or θυμοειδές represents a whole class of impulses of which no doubt ὀργή is one—it is in fact the impulsive element of the human soul. On the difference of τιμωρία and κόλασις, see Introd. p. 232. Compare I 14. 2. Of this theory of punishment as a preventive, a very good account is given by Protagoras, Plat. Protag. 324 B. Comp. also Eth. N. II 2, 1104 b 16, αἱ κολάσεις...ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.
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