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For further particulars about ὀργή we are referred to the treatment of the πάθη in Bk. II: the chapter on anger is the second.

ἐπιθυμία. The last of the seven causes or stimulants of action is desire (Introd. p. 233), which excites all actions of which the object is pleasure. This pleasure may be either real or apparent, and therefore to include the latter we have ὅσα φαίνεται and not ἐστίν.

In the next two sentences the four incentives to action which originate in ourselves are shewn to be all referable in some sense to pleasure, real or apparent good, real or apparent as a motive cause. Of ἐπιθυμία it has been already stated that pleasure is the direct motive. Habit, again, is a kind of pleasure, for experience teaches that habituation and familiarity make actions not naturally agreeable pleasant to us—habit becomes a second nature. Of anger, revenge is the object, and revenge is proverbially sweet. And reasoning or calculation has always of course some good, real or supposed, for its object.

I have no doubt that Victorius is right in the distinction that he draws between σύνηθες and ἐθιστόν. The former represents a natural familiarity derived from familiar associations, with which, as I have pointed out on I 1. 2, the derivation, σὺν ἦθος, ‘the haunting, herding together’, the gregarious habit of some animals, is in exact accordance; so συνήθεις, of a man's ‘familiar associates, habitual companions’ I 11. 16; the other is an acquired habit, a practice to which you habituate yourself by study and attention; of which virtue the settled ἕξις formed by ἔθος is the best example. ‘In priore vero,’ says Victorius, ‘nulla industria aut cura, sed potius una cum aetate crevisse, eo verbo intelligitur; ut cum a puero quispiam in illis vixerit, inde factum sit ut ea ipsi iucunda videantur.’

ἐθισθῶσιν] Spengel has adopted συνεθισθῶσιν from συνεθίσωσιν, the reading of MS A^{c}. [‘ἐθισθῶσιν ceteri ut p. 1370, 13’ (c. II. 4). ‘Restitui passivum.’ Spengel.]

πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] ‘Perelegans est locus Agatharcidae p. 61 fragm. ed. H. Steph. οὕτως ἔχει τι φίλτρον μέγα πᾶσα συνήθεια: καὶ νικᾷ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος δυσχέρειαν χρόνος (it isn't the time, it is the association) τὴν πρώτην δεξάμενος εἰς τὸν βίον ἡλικίαν.’ Gaisford.

ὥστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν] The dative is explained by supplying an imaginary τινί, ‘as for one summing up to say’. An analogous phrase is ὡς συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, Xen. Mem. III 8. 10, IV 3. 7. See note on 1 7. 7, τὸ ποιητικῷ εἶναι, and Matth. Gr. Gr. § 388. Add Eth. N. 15, 1097 b 13, ἐπεκτείνοντι ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς...εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. In this and similar examples the dative may almost be regarded as an absolute case.

οὐχ ἑκόντες] Victorius here draws attention to Aristotle's well-known distinction, Eth. N. III 2, init., between οὐχ ἑκών and ἄκων. Acts due to ignorance, acts which would not have been done, had the doer been aware of all the circumstances of the case, cannot be called ἀκούσιοι, involuntary or unintentional, unless they bring after them regret or repentance; neither are they strictly speaking ἑκούσιαι, intentional, because no harm was intended; they lie between the two and must take the name of οὐχ ἑκούσιαι, ‘not-intentional’; neither intentional nor ‘unintentional’. I doubt if this distinction is applicable here; the only cases that it can be applied to are chance or accident, nature, and external compulsion, under which all actions are said to be involuntary, i.e. in which the will has no concern; and this is true. But in the Ethics, the actions there in question are not said to be involuntary—the doer meant to do what he did—but acting in ignorance, he acted unintentionally, in so far as he did not intend to do the mischief that followed. But this ignorance from which the unintentional character of the act is derived, essential in the Ethics, has no place here; ignorance is not included in an act done by chance, nature, or external compulsion.

Now as we act voluntarily in all these four cases in which the impulse is from within and action in our own power, it follows (from the preceding) that the object of all voluntary action is some form either of real or apparent good, or of real or apparent pleasure; including, in the good, real and apparent, the removal of evil and the substitution of a greater good for a less, because all these are αἱρετά (desirable), objects of choice; and in the case of pleasure, the entire removal of pain and the substitution of a less for a greater; both of which are like the others (ὡσαύτως) desirable in the sense of pleasurable.

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