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The first word of the chapter is a commentary upon the concluding observations of the last: ὑποκείσθω, ‘let us assume’, as a definition, ‘take it for granted’: there is no occasion to enter into details, or attempt to prove that it is what I am about to describe. Similarly ἔστω, 5. 3, 6. 2, 7. 2, 10. 3.

On the terms of this definition, and the comparison of it with other doctrines held by Aristotle himself and other critics on the same subject, see Introduction, Appendix D to Bk. I, p. 234 seq.

κατάστασιν...εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν] This characteristic of pleasure, ‘the resettlement of the soul’, i.e. the vital and sensitive system, ‘into its normal state’ after a disturbance of the balance or harmony, which is pain, reappears in one of the special forms of pleasure, § 21, ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι. So that learning, as a pleasure, like pleasure in general, is, according to this view, the filling up of a vacuum, the supply of a want, the satisfaction of a craving, the restoration of a balance of the system, the re-establishment of a broken harmony. This is the Platonic conception of pleasure; not, so far as I remember, of learning in particular. See Appendix, p. 234. Lucretius takes the same view of pleasure, de Rer. Nat. II 963 (there quoted).

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