This text is part of:
Table of Contents:
ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων] § 16, τῶν ἡδίστων, note on § 4 supra. τό τε γὰρ φιλεῖν ἡδύ...οἴνῳ] Friendship or a friend belongs to the class of pleasant things—the term φίλος or φιλεῖν, ‘to be fond of’ anything, implies pleasure; no one is said for instance to be fond of wine who does not take pleasure in it; and the converse, ‘to be liked’ is also pleasant— for here again comes in the ‘impression’ or fancy that the thing liked or loved (φιλεῖν has just the same double sense as the French aimer, the stronger ‘love’, and the feebler ‘liking’) must have some good in (belonging to) it, good in some form or other being the universal object of desire of all sentient beings; i.e. of all creatures that are capable of appetites and affections, which capacity depends on sensation, the power of feeling pleasure and pain, de Anima B 3, 414 b 1—5, line 4, ᾧ δ᾽ αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία: τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη. This φαντασία &c. belongs to, and is meant to illustrate, the active liking, τὸ φιλεῖν ἡδύ. Every one who likes anything always has the impression that the object of his liking has something good about it, which is the reason for his liking it, since good is the universal desire. ‘And being liked or loved is to be valued, esteemed, for one's own sake and for nothing else’. This is what may be called the ‘passive’ liking, said of the recipient of the action or liking; and is opposed to the active form of liking or love in this respect; that it is an end or ultimate object in itself, whereas the other looks to some further end beyond itself, namely, some good which it seems to see in the object of its affection. It is probable that little or no distinction is here intended to be made between φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾷν, since it is the end and not the process that is here in question, and they seem to be used pretty nearly as synonyms. They represent two different aspects of love, as a natural affection or emotion, and as an acquired value, which we express by ‘esteem’. See further, in Appendix A at the end of this Book.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.