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The pleasure of conferring and receiving benefits and favours is made to arise, in the case of the reception of good, or good treatment, from the gratification of our desires which this implies, any gratification of a desire being pleasant, § 5; and the other, the pleasure of conferring favours, is due to the gratification of our love of power (Hobbes again, cf. p. 210); the power, namely, evinced in our having (ἔχειν) the means of bestowing them, and of shewing our superiority (ὑπερέχειν) by doing so. Aristotle, neither here nor elsewhere, takes any account of the benevolent affections as elements of human nature.

Similarly τὸ ἄρχειν is said to be ἥδιστον, § 27.

From the pleasure of doing service in general is derived the particular pleasure of ‘setting our neighbours right’ (rectifying, restoring their fallen fortunes or character to its normal or upright state) either in their property, when their affairs have gone wrong; or in their judgment, when they have made a mistake; or in their conduct, when they have deviated (παρεκβαίνειν) from the right path: and also of supplying their deficiencies (as before, pecuniary, intellectual, and moral) and bringing them up to a complete or satisfactory condition. ἐπιτελεῖν is ‘to put the end upon’, (as ἐπιστέφειν, ἐπισφραγίζειν, ἐπιγράφειν, ἐπιχρωματίζειν Plat. Rep. X 601 A, ἐπιτιθέναι, et sim.), hence, to finish, complete, or ‘fill up’.

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