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τῶν ἡδέων] Note on I 11. 4.—ἄνεσις, ‘relaxation’, metaphor from unscrewing and thereby relaxing the strings of the lyre, and so lowering the tone; and ἐπίτασις the opposite: ἐπιτείνειν and ἀνιέναι are hence extended to denote ‘intensification’ and ‘relaxation’ in general. See note on I 4. 12. The undue propensity of people in general to the enjoyment of ‘the ridiculous’ is noticed in Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 13 (on εὐτραπελία the mean in the use of the γελοἶον), ἐπιπολάζοντας δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῄ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον δεῖ κ.τ.λ. The discussion of τὸ γελοῖον here referred to as existing in the Poetics, and again in Rhet. III 18. 7, where we are told that the ‘kinds’ of it are enumerated, cannot possibly mean the passage which we actually find there in c. 5. 2, which is a mere definition. The subject was probably treated in the second book of the two of which the Poetics originally consisted1; and most likely formed part of the treatise on Comedy, which the author promises at the commencement of the sixth chapter of the extant work. Such are the opinions of Heitz, the latest writer on the question; Verlorene Schriften Arist. pp. 87—103.

On the ‘ludicrous’, see Cicero de Orat. II 58 seq. de ridiculo; Quint. Inst. Orat. VI 3. Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας in the chapter—περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι χαρίτων, ap. Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 298 seq. Bain, On the Emotions and Will, pp. 282—285; and Herbert Spencer, Essays &c., 2nd Series, Essay III, The Physiology of Laughter.

εἰρήσθω] This is the first instance in the Rhetoric of the use of this most familiar Aristotelian form of expression (a verb in the third person of the imperative passive), which in some of his works occurs sometimes at the end of nearly every chapter. It expresses the completeness and sufficiency of any action or process, that a thing has been completely gone through and finished, and that that is sufficient, and no more need be said or done about it. Thus εἰρήσθω, ‘let so much have been said upon the subject’, means, let it suffice to have said so much, let this be considered sufficient, and the subject closed; and let us now ‘have done with it’, and go on to something else. It is not peculiar to Aristotle, though very much more common in him than in other writers. It occurs for instance in Xenophon, Mem. IV 2. 19, ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω μοι, ‘be satisfied with my saying so much’, let it suffice to have said so much: Plato, Phileb. 57 C, εἰρήσθω, ‘let it be said once for all’, and no more about it. Ib. 62 E, μεθείσθων, and Stallbaum's note on Phaedr. 278 B, πεπαίσθω, ‘enough of this joking’, Ib. 250 C, κεχαρίσθω, Theaet. 197 D, πεποιήσθω, Euthyd. 278 D, πεπαίσθω ὑμῖν, Rep. VIII 553 A, 562 A, IX 588 D, πεπλάσθω. Thucyd. I 71, ὡρίσθω, ‘let this definition suffice’. Ar. Eth. Nic. I 1 ult. πεφροιμιάσθω, ‘let so much suffice by way of preface’; Top. A 8, 103 b 1, and 13, 105 a 21, διωρίσθω: et passim.

This notion of a completed, perfected, concluded, fixed and permanent, and sufficient action, belongs to the perfect tense in general, and appears, not only in the imperative of the passive, but also in the indicative, perfect and future (the paulo post futurum, on which see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 498). Of the indicative, instances are, Soph. Trach. 586, μεμηχάνηται τοὔργον, Philoct. 1280, πέπαυμαι, Eur. Hippol. 1457, κεκαρτέρηται τἀμά, my powers of endurance are exhausted, the play is played out, all my endurance and sufferings are over, and this is the end: compare πεπόνθασι γάρ, Rhet. II 8. 2; Aesch. Eum. 680, and Aesch. S. c. T. 1050, διατετίμηται (Paley's notes on both passages). Fragm. Phryx (Fr. Aesch. 263), διαπεφρούρηται βίος. Eur. Orest. 1203, and Phoen. 1019, εἴρηται λόγος. Plat. Phileb. 62 D, μεθεῖνται. Ar. Rhet. I 14 ult. II 5 ult. καὶ περὶ μὲν φοβερῶν καὶ θαρραλέων εἴρηται, ‘so much for’, where the perf. ind. pass. in summing up at the end of the chapter, plainly differs only in form from the ordinary imperative. Troia fuit. Fuit Ilium.

Of the paulo post futurum a good instance occurs Theaet. 180 A, in the humorous description of the Heraclitean philosophers, ‘and if you look for an explanation of the meaning of the meaning of this, ἑτέρῳ πεπλήξει καινῶς μετωνομασμένῳ, you will be instantly shot with (lit. another phraselet, ῥηματίῳ) another brand new word coined for the occasion’, i. e. you will have been shot already, as it were; almost before you know where you are.

The observation on this use of the tense in Jelf's Gr. Gr. § 399, obs. 1, is quite inadequate, and not quite correct: Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 500, p. 841, is somewhat more satisfactory.

1 The two lists of the Aristotelian writings differ. Diogenes V. 26 has Ποιητικά. ά; the Anonymus, ap. Buhle, Vol. I p. 63, τέχνης ποιητικῆς, β́.

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