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καὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμία ἐνῇ] Anything is pleasant of which the desire is innate in us, ‘the object of any of our natural desires or appetites’, the definition of desire being ‘an impulse towards pleasure’. de Anima B 3. 2, 414 b 2, ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, b 5, τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη ( ἐπιθυμία). Ib. Γ 10. 4, 433 a 25, γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξίς τις ἐστιν; and compare the following sections on ἐπιθυμία and its congeners. Eth. N. III 15, 1119 b 6, κατ᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις. Similarly Plato speaks of desire as naturally associated with pleasure, Phaedrus 237 D, ἔμφυτος οὖσα ἐπιθυμία η<*>δονῶν.

This leads to a distinction of desires into rational and irrational, corresponding severally to the two parts of our moral and intellectual nature, the λόγον ἔχον and the ἄλογον—the latter division is attributed to Plato by the author of Magna Moralia, I 1. 7, 1182 a 23.

The irrational appetites, the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν (Republic), are those which are not accompanied or guided by reason, which act naturally or by a physical necessity, ὅσαι λέγονται φύσει, (these are Plato's ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιθυμίαι; Rep. VIII 554 A, 558 D, 559 A, B, see the whole passage, IX 572 C, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίους, ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἕνεκα γιγνομένας; and have corresponding ἡδοναί, Rep. VIII 558 D, Phileb. 72 E), and are not prompted by any ‘supposition’, ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν τι, any suggestion of ulterior advantage of any kind thereby accruing, but are forced upon us by the imperious demands of nature; such as bodily appetites (those which we have, which come to us, through the channel or medium of (διά) the body, sensual, αἱ σωματικαί, Eth. N. VI 6, sub init. ἀναγκαῖα τὰ σωματικά, compare the whole passage), for instance, that of food, thirst, and hunger, and the (special) desires of particular kinds of food (special tastes leading to particular kinds of pleasure); and those connected with taste in general, and with sex, and universally with touch (which includes taste, ‘gustus’, with feeling in general, τὸ δὲ γευστὸν ἁπτόν τι, de Anima B 10 init.), and with smell (of fragrance), and hearing and sight. The rational, those which are accompanied with reason, are such as owe their origin to ‘persuasion’ of some kind—these are artificial and acquired tastes, as opposed to the natural and inborn τὰ ἔνοντα, φυσικά—because the hearing (things praised and admired by others) and persuasion in general (the influence of fashion and association and instruction as well as direct persuasion) suggest to us a taste for, or desire of, seeing and possessing things.

The division accordingly resolves itself into (1) natural and necessary, (2) artificial and acquired, desires and tastes.

ὅσας ἐπιθυμοῦσιν] sc. ἐπιθυμίας, is a cognate accusative; ἐπιθυμεῖν is construed only with the genitive case and infinitive mood.

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