This text is part of:
Table of Contents:
And (in the way of retaliation) those who have either already done, or have intended, or are intending, or will certainly do, us mischief: because this retaliation or compensation carries with it (ἔχει) not only pleasure (sensual or intellectual, chiefly the latter in this case) but also (a sense of) right (the moral object of conduct), and so it seems bordering upon almost no wrong at all. ‘Retaliation’ or ‘compensation’ is right upon principles of justice, τὸ δίκαιον; of which the ‘reciprocal’ or ‘retaliatory’ is one of the three kinds, Eth. Nic. v c. 5, arising from the subdivision of the original two, διανεμητική, ‘distributive’, and διορθωτική, ‘corrective’; the latter having two divisions, (1) rectification of, or compensation for, frauds and crimes, διορθωτική proper, and (2) τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός (c. 8) the justice that regulates exchanges and commercial transactions. The difference between this topic and that of § 23, καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἔχουσι —κήδονται is, according to Victorius, that the motive or occasion of the wrong in either case is not the same. In the one the wrong-doer seeks a pretence or pretext for injuring his neighbour, in the other the occasion comes unsought; the wrong would not have been done had it not been provoked by previous injury.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.