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‘To be wronged then is to be unjustly treated by a voluntary agent, for to do wrong has been previously defined to be voluntary’, I 10. 3. And since ‘doing’ and ‘suffering’, action and passion, are opposites, and opposites fall under the same γένος, we may infer at once that if doing wrong is voluntary, suffering wrong is voluntary too—not in the patient of course, but in the agent. Comp. Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 a 15, ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων ἀδικεῖ μὲ̣̣ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ ὅταν ἑκών τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ: ὅταν δ᾽ ἄκων οὔτ̓ ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ̓ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ... ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ...ὥστ̓ ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν, ἀδίκημα δ̓ οὔπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῇ.
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