previous next

‘Now injury, and injury against one's will, being both of them necessary to the notion of injustice or wrong, it will be clear from what has preceded, what the injuries are (αἱ βλάβαι the injuries of different kinds which are contained in the notion); for things good and bad in themselves (as opposed to the comparative goods of c. 7) have been previously analysed (in c. 6), and of things voluntary it has been stated (c. 10 § 3) that they are things done with the full knowledge’ (of the special circumstances of the case. Eth. Nic. III 2). Spengel has adopted εἴρηται from MS A^{c}, for διῄρηται the Vulg., which Bekker retains.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.

An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.

hide Display Preferences
Greek Display:
Arabic Display:
View by Default:
Browse Bar: