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‘So that all charges (accusations, complaints of wrong) of every kind must be referred to two different distinctions, the first that of the persons offended, whether individuals and private persons, or the community at large; and the second ( καί, ‘or again’), in the nature of the act, whether it was done in ignorance or unintentionally (i.e. under compulsion, by a superior external force), or intentionally and with full knowledge; and of these last (ἑκόντος καὶ εἰδότος) either with deliberate purpose, malice prepense, or under the influence of passion or excited feeling’. Bekker and Spengel have omitted καί with MSS Q, Y^{b}, Z^{b}, before ἀγνοοῦντος, or rather changed the order of καί into καὶ , and substituted καί for after ἀγνοοῦντος. This is certainly unnecessary, though perhaps preferable. The sense is perfectly good as I have translated, following MS A^{c}, which appears to give the vulg. reading. The first καί is ‘again’, the second distinction: ἀγνοοῦντος of course corresponds to ἑκόντος: ἀγνοοῦντος ἄκοντος is quite defensible, the two don't always go together; τὸ ἀκούσιον includes other things besides ignorance, ὄντος τοῦ ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δἰ ἄγνοιαν, Eth. N. III 3 init., the involuntary is due to external force or compulsion as well as to ignorance. This does not apply to ἕκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, because knowledge and voluntary action always do go together; voluntary action implies full knowledge of the circumstances of the case, τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς πρᾶξις. Eth. N., u. s., and see the preceding chapter on ignorance as the justification of an act. Of the two last classes of acts liable to ἐγκλήματα, τὰ προελομένου and τὰ διὰ πάθος, the former are acts done with προαίρεσις, the deliberate purpose or enlightened and deliberate intention which alone gives them their virtuous or vicious character, and stamps them as morally good or bad; the latter are acts due to the two impulses, here called πάθος, appetite and desire (ἐπιθυμία), and ‘passion’, any sudden and violent, especially angry, excitement (θυμός). Acts of this latter kind cannot properly be said to be involuntary, οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν δἰ ἐπιθυμίαν, Eth. N. III 3, 1111 a 24, because though they are done in ignorance (ἀγνοῶν πράττει), or in the temporary blindness of a fit of passion, they are not due to ignorance, δἰ ἄγνοιαν, ignorance is in no sense the cause of them, and therefore no justification, Ib. III 2. These are in fact the four degrees of criminality of Eth. Nic. V 10, on which, and on this subject in general, see Introd. p. 181—9. They are afterwards reduced to the ordinary three in § 16, infra.

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