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φανερὸν δ᾽ ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς] ‘It is plain that either kind of Rhetoric (the παραδειγματῶδες or the ἐνθυμηματικὸν) has good in it’, that each of them has its own particular virtue and excellence, or advantage. Buhle construes the words τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἔχει ἑκάτερον ἀγαθόν, ‘Rhetoricen utroque bono frui, et enthymemate et exemplo’. (He takes τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥ. for a mere periphrasis. So in fact it does occur in Pol. I 4, 1253 b 28, ἐν ὀργάνου εἴδει “in the shape of an instrument”, de gen. et corr. I 3, 10, ἐν ὕλης εἴδει—but εἶδος in this usage does not seem to admit the definite article.) We have a similar use of ἀγαθὸν ἔχειν in Rhet. II 20, 7, εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἱ λόγοι δημηγορικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς] ‘Scheint eine mittelstellung zwischen analytik und dialektik eingenommen zu haben’, Brandis, u.s. p. 13. The work is mentioned twice by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. I cc. 6 and 8, each time in company with Analytics and Topics. From this circumstance and from the reference here, it is natural to conclude that its subject was connected in some way with Logic. Diogenes Laert. V 1, 23, includes in his list of Aristotle's writings μεθοδικά in eight books, and § 25, μεθοδικόν in one: the former comes amongst the logical, the latter amongst the rhetorical works. It appears also in the list of the ‘Anonymous’ author of the life of Aristotle (in Buhle, Vol. I p. 62), again in near connexion with works on Logic, Ἀναλυτικῶν, Προβλημάτων, Μεθοδικά. Hesychius Milesius in his life of Aristotle (Buhle, Vol. I p. 72), describes it thus; πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὴν εὕρεσιν, τά τε τοπικὰ καὶ μεθοδικά, παρέδωκε προτάσεων πλῆθος, ἐξ ὧν πρὸς τὰ προβλήματα πιθανῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων οἷόντε εὐπορεῖν: classing it, like Dionysius and Diogenes, with the Topics and Analytics, the latter of which is mentioned immediately after. Simplicius ad Categ. fol. 7 a (quoted by Buhle) speaks of it as one of Aristotle's ὑπομνήματα, commentarii; ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὑπομνήματι. Brandis, u.s., adds a reference to the Schol. in Arist. p. 47 b 40. ῥητορεῖαι] ‘rhetorical exhibitions or displays’ Probl. XVIII 3. The word is a rare one, and as distinguished from ῥητορική denotes rather the practice and results of Rhetoric, speaking and speeches, than the system and theory of it as embodied in the ‘art’. It is found in Plato, Polit. 304 A, where Stallbaum notes, ‘vox ῥητορεία a Platone ficta videtur ut ars oratoria nobilior et generosior distingueretur a varia illa ῥητορικῇ cuius nomen profanaverant qui ad explendas suas cupiditates abusi erant.’ The fact, that the word was a Platonic invention, and the ground assigned for the distinction, seem equally unauthenticated. It occurs also in Isocrates, κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν § 21, for ‘the practice of rhetoric’ in general, also Panath. § 2, Phil. § 26; and amongst the later writers, in Plutarch and Lucian: ῥητορεύειν, in Plato, Isocrates, and Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), 35. πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν—οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί] Anal. Pr. II 23, ult. φύσει μὲν οὖν πρότερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος ὁ διὰ τοῦ μέσου συλλογισμός, ἡμῖν δ᾽ ἐναργέστερος ὁ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. The objects of sense and observation from which we derive our inductions and examples are ‘nearer to us’, more readily apprehensible by us, than the universals of the syllogism: and therefore, Top. A 12, 105 a 16, ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ πιθανώτερον καὶ σαφέστερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς βιαστικώτερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐνεργέστερον, ‘induction is a mode of reasoning which is clearer (to us) and more persuasive, because its materials are better known to us’, the example must be familiar and well known or it will not produce its effect in the way of proof; also some kind of induction is constantly used by every one, τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν; the syllogism and enthymeme are more ‘cogent’ and ‘effective’ against an adversary in a debate, and are therefore ‘more applauded’, θορυβοῦνται δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί. There is no real contradiction between what is here said and in Probl. XVIII 3. In the Problem the question is why people in general are better pleased with examples than with enthymemes, the fact being assumed. The answer is, that they learn more from them, and are therefore more amused, and the facts which are adduced by way of examples are more familiar and interesting; the enthymeme (as the syllogism in the Topics) proceeds from universals, which we are less acquainted with than with particulars. Consequently, examples are more pleasing and therefore plausible (πιθανά), whilst the conclusive argument, the enthymeme which leaves the adversary without reply, is more striking, and therefore more applauded. θορυβεῖσθαι, ‘to be applauded’, is a regular formation of the passive. For although the usual construction of θορυβεῖν is with ἐπί and the dative, many examples of the transitive use of it are found. See the examples of both, and of the passive, in Ast's Lex. Plat. Isocr. Panath. § 233, (ὁ λόγος) ἐπῃνήμενος ἦν καὶ τεθορυβημένος: and Rhet. II 23, 30, τῶν συλλογισμῶν θορυβεῖται μάλιστα τοιαῦτα ὅσα κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rhet. I 9, 40, quoted in Introd. p. 155.
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