This text is part of:
Table of Contents:
A summary repetition of the contents of the following sections, 14—19, is given in the chapter on λύσις, II 25, 8—9. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὀλίγα—ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] Comp. II 22, 3, καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλ᾽ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἐνδεχόμενα] ‘things possible’, as opposed to things necessary, not here to things impossible. On ἐνδέχεσθαι and δύνασθαι, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον and τὸ δυνατόν in Aristotle, see Waitz on Anal. Pr. I 3, 25 a 37, (Vol. I p. 375 seq.) and Bonitz on Metaph. Θ 3, 1047 a 26, p. 387. δυνατόν according to Waitz, where the two are distinguished, expresses physical, ἐνδεχόμενον logical, possibility: the latter implies the possible truth of an assertion, viz. that when we assert anything we do not contradict ourselves. ἐνδεχόμενα are therefore here ‘possibilities’ as opposed to certainties; things and events which are only conceived as possible, which may be in one way or in another. In the ordinary language ἐνδέχεσθαι and ἐνδεχόμενον have usually some other words, as ἄλλως ἔχειν, γένεσθαι ἢ μὴ γίγνεσθαι, or something similar, added to them in the way of a definition or limitation. With the absolute use of it in this passage (and the general sense in which it appears in Waitz's and Bonitz's Commentaries) comp. I 4, 3, οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἁπάντων. Eth. Nic. VI 2, 1139 a 8, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. Ib. c. 12, 1143 b 2, τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου. ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.] Anal. Pr. I 8, 29 b 29, ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἕτερόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν (πολλὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχει μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης: τὰ δ᾽ οὔτ̓ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔθ̓ ὑπάρχει ὅλως, ἐνδέχεται δ̓ ὑπάρχειν) δῆλον ὅτι καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἑκάστου τούτων ἕτερος ἔσται, καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐχόντων τῶν ὅρων, ᾀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἐξ ἀναγκαίων, ὁ δ̓ ἐξ ὑπαρχόντων, ὁ δ̓ ἐξ ἐνδεχομένων. Anal. Pr. I 13, 32 b 4, where two kinds of possibility, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, are distinguished: one, the order of nature, which from its ordinary uniformity makes a near approach to the necessary, and the other, the indefinite, the purely accidental, τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης, in which there is no natural order at all. τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἔσται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] ‘It is plain that the materials of enthymemes, the propositions or premisses of which they are constructed, though they may be necessary, are most of them no more than probabilities, or things that usually happen’. [On μέν—δέ, see the references above given in note on 1 § 12 p. 24.] γέγεται ἐνθυμήματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων] Comp. I 3, 7, II 25, 8, where παραδείγματα are added. Anal. Pr. II 27, 70 a 10. On εἰκότα and σημεῖα, Introd. p. 160—163. The meaning and connexion of the following sections on the rhetorical instruments of proof are explained in full detail in the paraphrase, to which the reader is referred (Introd. p. 163—168).
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.