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πίστεων τρία εἴδη] Compare Rhet. III I, 1. This threefold division of rhetorical proofs, due to Aristotle, is recognized by Dionysius, de Lys. jud. c. 19, ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν καλουμένων ἐντέχνων πίστεων, καὶ χωρὶς ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου μέρους διαλέξομαι. τριχῇ δὲ νενεμημένων τούτων, εἴς τε τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ἦθος κ.τ.λ.: and by Charmadas, in Cic. de Orat. I 19, 87, where only the ἦθος and πάθος are directly mentioned, but the other, which is absolutely indispensable, must of course be assumed as a third division: by Cicero himself, de Orat. II 27, 115, ita omnis ratio dicendi tribus ad persuadendum rebus est nixa; ut probemus vera esse quae defendimus; ut conciliemus nobis eos qui audiunt; ut animos eorum ad quemcunque causa postulabit motum vocemus. This is repeated in §§ 121 and 128 and the ἦθος and πάθος described at length in c. 43 and the following. These two latter are again referred to Orat. XXXVII 128; and again in Partitiones Oratoriae XIII 46 the three πίστεις are thus ingeniously distinguished in a twofold division. Argumentandi duo sunt genera, quorum alterum ad fidem directe spectat, alterum se inflectit ad motum. (These are the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ proofs and arguments.) Dirigitur cum proposuit aliquid quod probaret, sumpsitque ea quibus niteretur; atque his confirmatis ad propositum se retulit atque conclusit. Illa autem altera argumentatio, quasi retro et contra, prius sumit quae vult eaque confirmat, deinde id quod proponendum fuit permotis animis iacit ad extremum. Quintilian touches on this subject in many places of his work; the most detailed account of ἦθος and πάθος is given in the second chapter of his sixth book: the description and distinction of them occur in §§ 18, 19. They are both referred, as subordinate species, to the general head of ‘affectus’, § 8, comp. § 12; and these are again distinguished from the direct and logical arguments, § 3. In this and the following section he compares these two classes of arguments together in respect of their rhetorical value and importance, and comes to a conclusion precisely opposite to that of Aristotle. For Aristotle holds that these indirect proofs, though necessary to the orator by reason of the deficiencies and infirmities of his audience, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν, III 1 § 5, and therefore not to be excluded from the theory or practice of Rhetoric, yet are to be regarded as merely auxiliary and subordinate, standing in the same relation to the direct proofs as dress and personal ornaments to the body, serviceable but not essential. Quintilian on the contrary pronounces that these in comparison with the overpowering force of the appeals to the feelings are only not contemptible in respect of their power of persuasion; quos equidem non contemno, sed hactenus utiles credo ne quid per eos iudici sit ignotum; atque ut dicam quod sentio, dignos a quibus causas diserti docerentur § 3: that those that use them therefore are only fit to lay before the judges the facts of the case, not to influence their decision, and to instruct the real advocate, who can sway their minds and feelings at his will, and force them to decide in favour of his client: ubi vero animis iudicum vis afferenda est, et ab ipsa veri contemplatione abducenda mens, ibi proprium oratoris opus est § 5. It may be observed in concluding this note, that there is a somewhat important difference, which I have already pointed out in the Introduction, between Aristotle's view of the use to be made of ἦθος in the practice of Rhetoric, and that of the Latin Rhetoricians, as well as the author of the Rhet. ad Alex.; see c. 39 (38) 2. Quintilian's auctoritas—and compare Cicero in de Oratore, II 43—expresses the influence of character upon opinion, in general: but in Aristotle's system the ἦθος means something more; the effect must be produced immediately by the speech δεῖ δὲ καὶ τουτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τὸ προδεδόξασθαι ποῖόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα, Rhet. I 2, 4; and hence it finds a place in Rhetoric as in Art: whereas in the other view the auctoritas exercised may have been previously acquired, and altogether ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος, acting independ ently of any artistic or systematic process, in the way of reasoning or proving.
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