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ἐπεὶ δὲ αἱ πίστεις—καὶ πῶς] “seeing then that these are the channels, or modes of communication of rhetorical proofs, it is plain that to grasp, or get possession, or make himself master of them (λαβεῖν) is a task for one who has a capacity for logical reasoning, and for the contemplation or study of characters, and thirdly [for the discernment] of the emotions;—and of the latter, what each is in itself, and what are its qualities and properties (ποῖόν τι), and from what sources (what motives and impulses, ἐκ τίνων,) it may be excited, and in what modes (πῶς).”— ταῦτα...ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου, lit. ‘it belongs to the student of logic to get hold of them’. Of these the logical branch belongs to Dialectics, which teaches the habit of reasoning and discussion, the other two to the study of Ethics, which deals with human beings as individuals, and investigates the fixed habits, virtuous or vicious (ἕξεις), which constitute their characters (ἤθη), and the moral πάθη or ‘emotions’, which when developed by exercise, according to the direction which they take, become virtues and vices. The consequence is, ὥστε συμβαίνει, that Rhetoric may be considered a scion or offshoot of the study of Dialectics and Ethics, the latter ‘which may fairly be called Politics’ (because it treats of men in society and therefore includes the science of the individual, ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος (Ethics) τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα. Eth. Nic. I 1, 1074 b 11), standing to them in the relation of the offshoot to the parent plant. Sed idem (Aristoteles) et de arte rhetorica tres libros scripsit, et in eorum primo non artem solum eam fatetur, sed ei particulam civilitatis sicut dialectices assignat. Quint. Inst. Orat. II 17, 4. συλλογίσασθαι] improperly applied here, as ἀπόδειξις above, I § 11 p. 19, to rhetorical reasoning. But as there the rhetorical πίστεις are called a kind of demonstration, ‘a sort of’, or subordinate variety of, demonstration in a general sense, so here the syllogistic process is allowed to stand for reasoning in general, to which even rhetorical reasoning, though not syllogistic in the strict sense, but enthymematic, of course belongs. παραφυές] which usually appears under the form παραφυάς in Aristotle and Theophrastus, properly denotes either a branch or a separate plant ‘growing alongside’ of the parent plant, and proceeding either from the stem or the root, as a scion or offshoot. In the latter of these two senses it certainly occurs in Theophr. Hist. Plant. II 2, 4, ἐὰν ἀπὸ ῥίζης ἡ παραφυὰς ἦ, though here also the hypothetical ἐάν admits the other possibility. Also παραφύεσθαι, Hist. Plant. III 17, 3, ἀποκοπὲν δὲ καὶ ἐπικαυθὲν παραφύεται (grows from the root) καὶ ἀναβλαστάνει. This word and its cognates, παραφύεσθαι, παράφυσις, ἀποφυάς (Hist. An. II 1, 53, de part. An. III 5 § 1, 10 § 5, 14 § 14, Theophr. Hist. Plant. I 6, 6, VII 2, 5 and 8, &c.), παραβλαστάνειν, -βλαστή, -βλάστημα, are applied by Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastus primarily to plants, and by analogy to the corresponding parts of animals. It occurs again as a metaphor in Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096 a 21, παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ᾽ ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος; that is, τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό and ἡ οὐσία stand to ‘the relative’, τὸ πρός τι, in the same relation as parent plant to offshoot. ‘Similitudo, explicante Giphanio, a pullis arborum desumta, qui Graecis dicuntur παραφυάδες’. Zell, ad loc. So that Rhetoric is represented by this metaphor as a scion derived from two stocks or plants, Dialectics and Ethics, not identical with either, but with a general or inherited family resemblance to both. (The analogy will not bear pressing: one does not see, for example, how a young plant can be the scion or offspring of two others, but this general meaning is clear, that it bears a likeness to both, though differing from each of them.) ὑποδύεται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα] ‘creeps under, insinuates itself into, the form or figure’; ‘assumes the mask or disguise of (for the purpose of acting a part)’, ‘personates’, Plat. Gorg. 464 C, ἡ κολακευτική...ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ...ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ ὑποδέδυκε... Sopater, ap. Stallb. not. ad loc. ὑποδύεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὑπεισέρχεται, ὑποκρίνεται, ὡς ἐκείνῃ ταὐτὸν δοκεῖν εἶναι. Metaph. A 2, 1004 b 17, οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ταὐτὸν μὲν ὑποδύονται σχῆμα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ. ἀλαζονεία implies both presumption and imposture; either a character between both and a mixture of both (as Theophrastus' ἀλαζών, ‘the braggart’, of which Pyrgopolinices in the Miles Gloriosus, Thraso in the Eunuchus, and Captain Bobadil in Every Man in his Humour, are the three types, ancient and modern; and probably also the Sophistical Rhetoricians here referred to): or again a character in which either presumption or imposture is characteristic and predominant. For example, the insolent assumption, arrogance, and swagger appear more prominently in this picture of the ἀλαζών drawn by Xenophon, Cyrop. II 2, 12, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαζὼν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς προσποιουμένοις καὶ πλουσιωτέροις εἶναι ἤ εἰσι, καὶ ἀνδρειοτέροις, καὶ ποιήσειν ἃ μὴ ἱκανοί εἰσιν ὑπισχνουμένοις: καὶ ταῦτα φανεροῖς γιγνομένοις ὅτι τοῦ λαβεῖν τι ἕνεκα καὶ κερδᾶναι: ποιοῦσιν. This last mercenary element is not found elsewhere in the character of the ἀλαζών. In Aristotle, Eth. Nic. II 7, IV 13, empty pretension, ostentation and swagger are the leading characteristics of the ἀλαζών. The vice is one of the extremes of which ἀλήθεια, the social virtue of frankness, sincerity, and plain dealing is the mean, the opposite extreme being εἰρωνεία, ‘mock’ in conversation, Socrates' habit. It is the extreme in προσποίησις, ‘pretension’, of which ἀλήθεια is the mean state. Whereas in Aristophanes it usually represents rather the other side of the character, its quackery and imposture; and ἀλαζών is ‘a quack or a humbug’. Of course Socrates and his brother Sophists are the great representatives of the class. Nubes 102, 1494, et passim. And this is also the side of the character which is generally uppermost in Plato's view of it. See Rep. VI 486 B, 490 A, VIII 560 C, Phaedo 92 D, ἡδονὴ...ἁπάντων ἀλαζονέστατον, Phil. 65 C. The definition of it given in the Platonic ὅροι, p. 416, is that of undue pretension, assumption, imposture. ἕξις προσποιητικὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἀγαθῶν τῶν μὴ ὑπαρχόντων. Quackery and imposture are also predominant in the application of it, Rhet. II 6, 11. δἰ ἄλλας αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικάς] ‘incident to humanity’, implying the infirmities, imperfections, frailties, miseries, and especially errors to which the human condition is exposed, and from which the divine nature, which is tactily opposed to it in this conception, is exempt. ‘The other human causes’ here referred to are any other defects or imperfections to which the human nature is liable. Thuc. III 40 ἀνθρωπίνως ἁμαρτάνειν, compared with III 45, πεφύκασί τε ἅπαντες ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἁμαρτάνειν: ‘humanum est errare’. Plato, Soph. 229 A κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην δόξαν, ‘ex humana opinione, quae obnoxia est erroribus. Uti apud Latinos homo fuit frequens erroris vel imbecillitatis humanae excusatio’ (Heindorf ad loc. Polit. 279 C, ἀλεξιφάρμακα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα et cet.). Demosth. de Cor. p. 328, § 308, ἢ παρὰ τῆς τύχης τι συμβέβηκεν ἐναντίωμα, ἢ ἄλλο τι δύσκολον γέγονε—πολλὰ δὲ τἀνθρώπινα.—Id. c. Lept. p. 506, 15, πάντα δ᾽ ἀνθρώπινα ἡγεῖσθαι. Bœot. de Nomine p. 998, πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τἀνθρώπινα. Ar. Rhet. I 13, 17, καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές. Eth. Nic. IV 11, 1126 a 31, ἀνθρωπικώτερον (more humane) γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι. VIII 16, sub. fin. χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι. In Rhet. I 5, 10, διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, it has this more general sense of ‘all human affairs, business and enjoyments’: with which comp. Plat. Theaet. 170 B καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τἀνθρώπινα (all human society or affairs in general) ζητούντων διδασκάλους κ.τ.λ. So Virgil, Æn. I 462, sunt lacrimae rerum; et mentem mortalia tangunt: and in the second sense, Ecl. VIII 35, nec curare deum credis mortalia quemquam.
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