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The eighth and ninth and part of the tenth sections of this chapter are quoted by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. I c. 7, from τῶν δὲ διὰ to ἐν τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔχει. The variations are, δείκνυσθαι (bis) for δεικνύναι, ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς for ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, the omission of ὁντινοῦν, and of αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ; for ἕτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι, we have ἕτερόν τε διὰ τ. ς. παρὰ τὸ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι, also φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι for ὅτι καὶ, further τὸ omitted before εἶδος, and γάρ after καθάπερ, and lastly ῥητορείας for ῥητορικῆς.

τῶν δὲ] πίστεων.

ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς] Dionysius has ἀναλυτικοῖς, which Spengel has introduced into the text, with the remark, certe Aristoteles τῇ διαλεκτικῇ scripsisset (Rhetores Graeci p. 5, Praef. p. 5); and again, über die Rhet. des Arist. Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 44, Aristoteles sagt nur ἐν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ, nicht ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς; in reply to which I will merely quote Rhet. II 22, 14, where ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς again occurs. Even without this evidence I can see no reason why an author who speaks habitually of others of his works in the plural, as τὰ ἀναλυτικά, ἠθικά, πολιτικά, μεθοδικά, should be denied that privilege in the special case of the Topics. Nor do I see why the single testimony of Dionysius should override the authority of all the Aristotelian MSS. I have therefore retained the old reading.

πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνταικαὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν πως] Anal. Pr. II 23, 68 b 9, ὅτι δ᾽ οὐ μόνον οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ διὰ τῶν προειρημένων γίνονται σχημάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ καὶ ἁπλοῦς ἡτισοῦν πίστις καὶ καθ̓ ὁποιανοῦν μέθοδον, νῦν ἂν εἴη λεκτέον. ἅπαντα γὰρ πιστεύομεν διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς. Anal. Post. I 18, 81 a 40, εἴπερ μανθάνομεν ἐπαγωγῇ ἀποδείξει. Eth. Nic. VI 1139 b 27, ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν: μὲν γὰρ δἰ ἐπαγωγῆς, δὲ συλλογισμῷ. The reference here is most unmistakeably to the opening words of the Anal. Post., an additional evidence, against Brandis (see the succeeding note), that the reference in ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν is either directly and exclusively to this passage of the Analytics or at any rate includes it with the others.

ὁντινοῦν] is rejected by Spengel on the authority of Dionysius, who omits it, and against that of the Aristotelian MSS, which, as appears from Bekker's revision, all agree in retaining it. It is not merely perfectly intelligible, and absolutely unexceptionable on all critical grounds, but when compared with the commencement of the Anal. Post., to which reference is immediately after made, it seems to tally so precisely with what is there stated, that it might almost be regarded as a necessary addition. In the passage of the Analytics we are told that every kind of instruction and learning, proof scientific and popular, mathematical or dialectical knowledge, is conveyed by way of syllogism or induction: and it is then added, ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συμπείθουσιν: γὰρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων, ἐστιν ἐπαγωγή, δἰ ἐνθυμημάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συλλογισμός, a statement with which the ὁντινοῦν of the Rhetoric seems to correspond to a nicety. And for the same reason I hold that this passage is referred to in ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν, as well as Anal. Pr. II 23, 68 b 9, (quoted in the preceding note,) and the continuation of the subject there suggested in chapters 24 and 27, (which contain the logical description of induction and example, and the enthymeme), though Brandis, in his tract on the Rhetoric in Schneidewin's Philologus IV 1, p. 24, would confine the reference to the latter passage.

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