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καὶ φύσει...καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθά] This same distinction of goods naturally and accidentally accruing to us, is found in Eth. Eud. 1 3, 5, 1215 a 12, εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γενομένοις ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ζῇν ἐστὶν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἴη πολλοῖς. These are opposed to those advantages and objects of desire the acquisition of which depends upon ourselves and our own exertions and studies. οὐ γάρ ἐστι δἰ ἐπιμελείας ἡ κτῆσις οὐδὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας compared with ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἡμᾶς (to be referred to ourselves), καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστίν. The gifts of nature and the good things that result from accident cannot be included amongst the possible advantages, the ‘profitable’ or ‘expedient’, which are the object and aim of the deliberative speaker, because they are not attainable by any exertions of our own; and so for the purposes of Rhetoric are just as useless as things necessary and impossible. The subjects of Rhetoric are the subjects of deliberation, and no one deliberates about anything which is beyond the sphere of his influence. πρὸ ἔργου] Note on c. 1 § 10 p. 17. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι] (τὸ συμβουλεύειν ἐστὶ) περὶ ὅσων κ.τ.λ.
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