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The following passage, §§ 4—6, descriptive of the rhetorical method and its necessary limitations, and the distinction between it and the method of scientific demonstration, one of the most important in the entire work, will be found almost literally translated in the Introduction, pp. 173—4, to which the reader is referred.

ἀκριβῶς διαριθμήσασθαι] ‘to make an exact numerical division’, or ‘to enumerate in an exact division or analysis’. Plat. Phaed. 273 E, Crat. 437 D, Gorg. 501 A, Legg. I 633 A, et alibi. It is used in a general sense of ‘accurate distinction’.

διαλαβεῖν] ‘to part, separate, divide, distinguish’, is also familiar to Plato, Polit. 147 E, τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν, Symp. 222 E, ἵνα χωρὶς ἡμᾶς διαλάβῃ, Phileb. 23 C, πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα...διχῇ διαλάβωμεν, and numerous examples in Ast's Index, s. v.; and still more so διαιρεῖν in the same sense, and διαίρεσις, Sophist. 225 A, διαιρεῖν αὐτὴν δίχα, Polit. 262 D, κατ᾽ εἴδη δύο διαιρεῖν, ib. 283 D, διέλωμεν αὐτὴν δύο μέρη, Phaedr. 273 E, κατ᾽ εἴδη διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα. διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη, ‘to classify by genera and species’. Similarly διορίζειν.

περὶ ὧν εἰώθασι χρηματίζειν] ‘the subjects of ordinary business, i. e. deliberation (in the assembly)’. χρηματίζειν, which is properly to ‘transact χρήματα or business’ in general, is here ‘transferred’ by metaphor (of the class ἀπὸ γένους ἐπὶ εἰδος, Poet. XXI 7), to the special signification of the particular kind of business which is transacted in the general assembly, its debates and consultations; so Pol. VI (IV), 14, 1298 b 29, καὶ περὶ τούτων χρηματίζειν (of a general assembly as opposed to a βουλή or πρόβουλοι) περὶ ὧν ἂν οὗτοι προβουλεύσωσιν. Ib. c. 15, 1299 b 39, ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δημοκρατίαις ἐν αἷς δῆμος χρηματίζει περὶ πάντων (holds its assemblies and discusses everything). Also to the consultations of the law-courts, Demosth. c. Timocr. p. 717, 26, περὶ ὧν ἂν γνῷ τὸ δικαστήριον, πάλιν χρηματίζειν: and again, v. 28, to the deliberations of the assembly. Æschin. c. Timarch. § 23, of the πρόεδροι. Lastly, Demosth. de F. L. p. 430, 24, § 317, applies it to the intrigues of individuals, οὗτοι δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἐπαύσαντο ἰδίᾳ χρηματίζοντες.

κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν...ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς] of the scientific method which has ‘certainty’ or necessary truth for its aim and object, as opposed to the popular method of Dialectics and Rhetoric, which has no higher aim than probable opinion, πρὸς δόξαν. Top. A 14, 105 b 30, πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν (true philosophy, science) κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν. See references in Introd. p. 173, note 1. Add, Anal. Post. I 33, 88 b 30, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δἰ ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δ̓ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν κ.τ.λ. Eth. Nic. III 4, 1112 a 8, δοξάζομεν οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν. On δόξα in general, see Waitz Comm. ad Org. p. 444. On ἐμφρονεστέρας, ‘more intelligent, wiser, more instructive’, see above, note on c. 2 § 21 p. 50.

διὰ τὸ μήτε...πολλῷ δέ...] Wolf and MS A^{c} have πολλῷ τε, which is of course the more regular and strictly grammatical usage. On the general question of the meaning and distinctions of καί, δέ, and τε, with and without the negative, see Hermann's excellent dissertation in his Review of Elmsley's Medea, on lines 4, 5. Porson, Elmsley, and their English followers were in the habit of laying down rigorous and inflexible rules of Greek grammar, which were supposed to admit of no exception; any apparent violation of them was to be summarily emended: one of the great services rendered by Hermann to the study of the Greek language is the relaxation of these over exact rules, and the substitution of a rational and logical explanation of these differences of expression, and the analysis of their distinctions, for these often unwarranted alterations of the text. ‘Καὶ particula est coniunctiva’, says Hermann; ‘τε adiunctiva; δέ disiunctiva’. In the case of οὐδέ and μηδέ, οὔτε and μήτε, when several things are subordinated to, and included under, one negative conception, the one or the other (δέ or τε) is used according as the writer had or had not any notion of a difference between them. If the things under the general negative conception are represented merely as subordinate and with no expression of difference of opposition between them, the adnexive τε is employed, and the formula is οὐ...τε...τε, or οὐ...οὔτε...οὔτε, and similarly with μή: on the other hand, if some difference between any of the subordinate members of the division is to be marked, τε must be replaced by δέ, and the formula will be οὐ...οὐδέ, or οὐδέ...οὐδέ, or οὐ... οὔτε...οὔτε...οὐδέ, and so on for other similar cases. And the change of τε into δέ in the second clause of the sentence before us, represents the sudden occurrence to the writer's mind of the thought that there is an important difference between the two things that are assigned as reasons for not introducing a regular scientific division into the treatment of Rhetoric (viz. its necessarily unscientific character, and the fact that its province has already been unduly extended by previous professors), which requires to be marked, and accordingly is marked by the change of the particle. This, however, is not the only irregularity in Aristotle's sentence; for, evidently intending at the commencement to include both the subordinate members under the original negative, he introduces in the second clause a positive conception; contributing perhaps to enforce the distinction of the two, but in violation of grammatical accuracy.

πλείω δεδόσθαι...τῶν οἰκείων θεωρημάτων] ‘far more has been already assigned to it than its own proper subjects of inquiry’, refers doubtless to the sophistical professors of Rhetoric, his predecessors and contemporaries; who ὑποδύονται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτικῆς, and lay claim to the whole extent of the field of Politics, Rhet. I 2, 7. What this assumption of the Sophists implies is explained in Eth. Nic. X 10, 1181 a 1, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλ̓ οἱ πολιτευόμενοι κ.τ.λ., infr. v. 13, τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι: ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χείρω ἐτίθεσαν κ.τ.λ.

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