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ἔστιν τοιοῦτος φίλος κ.τ.λ.] ‘all such are friends, as, when they think anything good for some particular person’ (ἐκείνῳ, some one in particular, that particular person, whoever it may be) ‘are inclined to do it for his sake’. In this definition, friendship or love is described as a state of mind, a moral habit or disposition, not as a natural affection. The desire of doing our friend good for his own sake is a necessary accompaniment and consequence of the feeling or affection, but not identical with it. The definition is ‘rhetorical’, and does not give the ‘essence’ of the thing, as a scientific definition would. The definition of φιλία as a πάθος, II 4, 2, is in exact conformity with this, and equally deficient. In the Ethics, VIII 2, after quoting some of the ordinary current notions of love to be found in the preceding poets and philosophers, he proceeds to the establishment of his own. And here again the same conception of it reappears in the words τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. Accordingly φιλία is εὔνοια ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι, reciprocal goodwill or affection; the reciprocity being essential to true φιλία or affection of two human beings to one another. For though we may be ‘fond’ of wine, φίλοινος, or ‘fond’ of animals, there is in these cases no true reciprocity of affection. Further, since ‘fondness’ is applicable to three classes of objects, the good, the pleasant, and the useful, three classes of corresponding ‘friendships’ or ‘fondnesses’ are hereby determined; but only the first of them, the love of the good, is the basis of true and perfect love; and consequently the highest and perfect form of ‘love’ can only exist between the good, τελεία δ᾽ ἐστὶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ̓ ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων: οὗτοι γὰρ τἀγαθ̓, ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἀγαθοί: ἀγαθοὶ δ̓ εἰσὶ καθ̓ αὑτούς, c. 4, init. In the concluding definition of c. 2, the jeeling or loving disposition is introduced in the word εὐνοεῖν. δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δἰ ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων. These τὰ εἰρημένα are the three objects of affection. This is therefore the general conception of love according to Aristotle. The highest form of human love or friendship would be εὐνοεῖν...διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

ἐπιεικεῖς] Note on c. 2 § 4, p. 30.

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