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ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία] Brandis, u. s. p. 48, note 42, (after Spengel) remarks upon this use of ἔστω as marking the popular character of the definitions that follow—as if it were a matter of indifference whether they are right or not, provided that they are so generally acceptable as to be certain to satisfy the audience. The same form is repeated c. 6, 2; 7, 2; 10, 3; II 2, 1, and throughout the chapters on the πάθη. On the definition of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 13; and on this definition of happiness, p. 176. Aristotle's own definition of happiness in the Eth. Nic., the result of his inquiries in that work, is something far different, ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ᾽ ἀρετήν, the fully developed activity or active exercise (implying full consciousness) of the soul in respect of its proper (and therefore highest) excellence: that is contemplation, θεωρία, the exercise of the highest faculty, the νοῦς, or intuitive reason; the highest faculties being the intellectual. This is the theory; but practically a lower view of happiness is admitted (Bk. X), which consists in the exercise of the moral as well as the intellectual virtues. Of the definitions here given, αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς comes nearest to his own: it expresses a self-sufficing life, complete in itself, independent of all external aids and advantages, and is in fact essential to the notion of happiness. See Eth. Nic. I 5 (quoted below). The essentials of the three first of these definitions are found all united in the conception of happiness, the ultimate end of all human desire and effort, which forms the conclusion of the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, from the sixth chapter to the end. It contains first, the εὐπραξία μετ᾽ ἀρετῆς, in the exercise of moral and intellectual virtue, the intellectual being the higher and more perfect form of it, and in that the intuitive contemplative energy; secondly, the αὐτάρκεια τῆς ζωῆς, the self-sufficiency and independence of everything external, which is necessary to perfection and happiness; and thirdly, the life μετ᾽ ἀσφαλείας, the happiness residing in θεωρία being most secure because it is most independent and the nearest approach to the happiness of the Gods, who have all their wants and faculties satisfied in themselves, and want nothing <*>m without (c. 7); and also ἥδιστος, because pleasure is the necessary accompaniment of every ἐνέργεια (active exercise, realisation in exercise, of any δύναμις or capacity), and θεωρία being the most perfect form of ἐνέργεια, the pleasure that accompanies it must needs be the highest and most complete; and the exercise of the moral faculties in proportion to their comparative excellence. καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος (ἥδιστος καὶ κράτιστος), εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος. Eth. N. X 7 ult. (In the popular and lower sense of the words this definition of happiness would belong to the Epicurean school.) The fourth definition, εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων: is only applicable to a state. The Stoic definition of happiness was εὔροια βίου. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hypot. Γ § 172, πρὸς Ἠθικούς § 30. εὐπραξία μετ᾽ ἀρετῆς] Comp. Pol. IV (VII) 1, 1323 b 20, ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἑκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὃς εὐδαίμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος, δἰ οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ δἰ αὑτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον ἕτερον εἶναι κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 3, 1326 b 12, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ̓ ἕκαστον ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. By comparing this latter passage with the definition, it would seem that the sense of εὐπραξία in the latter must be limited to ‘well doing’, and not extended to ‘welfare’, which it, like εὖ πράττειν, is capable of including. Pol. IV (VII) 1, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς: ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν τὴν μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσαν. Ib. c. 3 sub init. ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηθὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δ᾽ εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταὐτόν. Ib. c. 8, εὐδαιμονία...ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσίς τις τέλειος. c. 13, 1332 a 7. αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς] Eth. Nic. I 5, 1097 b 7, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν (the notion of αὔταρκες leads to the same result, or conception of happiness as that of τέλειον, previously applied to determine it). τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ...τὸ δ᾽ αὔταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ: τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι. Comp. X 6, 1176 b 5, οὐδενὸς γὰρͅ ἐνδεὴς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ᾽ αύτάρκης. c. 7, 1177 a 28, ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια (which is essential to happiness) περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴη: (and therefore the highest and most perfect happiness must consist in θεωρία). A similar αὐτάρκεια or independence is attributed to the perfect state in the Politics. On the notion of the perfect state or constitution in the second degree, that is, under the necessary limitations incident to a human condition, so far as humanity allows of perfection at all, see Pol. VI (IV) 11 init. In Pol. IV (VII) 5 init. αὐτάρκεια is thus defined, τὸ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηθενὸς αὔταρκες. εὐθηνία] and εὐθηνεῖν are Ionic and also late Greek forms belonging to the κοινὴ διάλεκτος, for the Attic εὐθενεῖν and εὐθενία or εὐθένεια, and denote a ‘flourishing state’, or ‘prosperity’ in general. ‘εὐθενεῖν enim non tam robur (quod verbo εὐσθενεῖν subiectum est) quam vigorem et vitalitatem declarat, ut v. c. Aiax aliquis aut Hercules εὐσθενεῖν dicatur, sed vel tenerrima planta, quum laeto iuventae flore nitet, εὐθενεῖν dici possit. Et maximi quidem proprie de succo sanitatis et corporis incremento deque uberi proventu et auctu, sed non minus apte de prospero rerum publicarum privatarumque successu, deque omni ubertate et affluentia dicitur.’ (From an excellent note by Lobeck on these words ad Phryn. &c. p. 465—7: Lobeck derives εὐθενεῖν from εὖ and θέω (τίθημι), comparing it with other verbs of similar formation. The MSS of Arist. give sometimes εὐθενία and εὐθενεῖν, but generally εὐθηνία and εὐθηνεῖν. Lobeck's note may be applied as a corrective of Victorius' ad h. l.) κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων] ‘property’ of all kinds, goods and chattels, including especially flocks and herds; and ‘population’, here estimated by ‘bodies’, not by ‘souls’ as Christianity has taught us to reckon it.
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