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εὐγένεια] in an individual or family is defined in Pol. VI (IV) 8, 1294 a 21, η γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή, and VIII (V) I, 1301 b 2, εὐγενεῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος. Rhet. II 15. 2, 3. Plat. Theaet. 174 E, τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνούντων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἑπτὰ πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, which seems to have been the current definition of εὐγένεια at Athens in Plato's time.

αὐτόχθονας] Herod. I 171, Thuc. I, 2 and 6, Arist. Vesp. 1076, Eur. Ion 29, 589, 737, of Athens; Isocr. Panath. § 124, also of Athens; Paneg. § 24, 25, Dem. de F. L. § 296, of the Athenians and Arcadians. Quint. III 7, 26, laudantur autem urbes similiter atque homines. Nam pro parente est conditor; et multum auctoritatis affert vetustas, ut iis qui terra dicuntur orti.

καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρώτους ἐπιφανεῖς] ‘and to have had for their first rulers famous men’, like Theseus at Athens.

καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖςἐπὶ τοῖς ζηλουμένοις] ‘and many men sprung from their race renowned for things (personal qualities, feats of arms, noble deeds, and such like) that are esteemed and admired’. ἐπί, ‘standing, resting upon’, ‘upon the basis, terms, or condition of...’.

ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐγένεια ἀπ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ἀπὸ γυναικῶν] ‘privately, in a family, it may be derived either from the father's or the mother's side’, i. e. from famous ancestors on either.

γνησιότης ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν] ‘legitimacy on both sides’, in birth and citizenship. γνήσιος, opposed to νόθος, Il. Λ 102, υἷε δύω Πριάμοιο νόθον καὶ γνήσιον, Plat. Rep. VII 536 A, τὸν νόθον τε καὶ τὸν γνήσιον, and also to ποιητός, εἰσποίητος, θετὸς υἱός, Dem. c. Leoch. 1095, 5, τὸ μὲν γὰρ γνήσιόν ἐστιν ὅταν γόνῳ γεγονώς, καὶ νόμος ταῦτα μαρτυρεῖ λέγων, ἣν ἂν ἐγγυήσῃ πατὴρ ἄδελφος πάππος ἐκ ταύτης εἶναι παῖδας γνησίους...ποιητὸς δ᾽ ὁμολογῶν εἶναι φαίνεται οὐκ εἰσποιηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ τετελευτηκότος αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ. and 1099, 19; and hence metaphorically ‘genuine’, real, true, as opposed to spurious, fictitious. Plat. Rep. IX 587 B, μιᾶς μὲν (ἡδονῆς) γνησίας, δυοῖν δὲ νόθοιν. On the γνήσιος πολίτης, cf. Ar. Pol. III 5. The conditions of citizenship vary according to the form of constitution, and the number of the population. In the normal state no βάναυσοι or θῆτες, no mechanics or paid agricultural labourers, still less slaves, should be admitted to the rights of citizenship. When the number of the γνήσιοι πολῖται (legitimate by birth) declines, νόθοι are admitted; in the opposite case a more stringent rule

γῆς, χωρίων κτῆσις] γῆ, ‘territory’, the acquisition or possession of public property, χώρια (dim. of χῶρος or χώρα, little places, regions, countries, ‘spots’,) ‘farms’, ‘estates’, ‘domains’, private properties. Or perhaps rather, γη merely ‘land’ in general, and χώρια the divisions of land, the actual private properties.

ἔπιπλα, (a division of property) ‘moveables’, moveable furniture or property of all kinds: opposed to ‘fixtures’, such as houses and land. Xen. Oecon. IX 6 includes in it all sacrificial furniture or apparatus; and articles of dress, shoes, female ornaments; and of house furniture, as beds. In Thuc. III 68, ἦν ἐν τῷ τείχει ἔπιπλα, χαλκὸς καὶ σίδηρος, it stands for household furniture of bronze and iron: everything of this kind which was in the fort, the Laced., after the capture of Plataea, converted into couches (κλῖναι) and dedicated to Ἥρα. In Arist. Pol. II 7, 1267 b 12, καὶ κατασκευὴ πολλὴ (a large stock) τῶν καλουμένων ἐπίπλων, it is opposed, first, with money, slaves and cattle, to land, and then, secondly, to the three former. Similarly in the present passage, they are distinguished from cattle and slaves as inanimate moveable furniture, or ‘plenishing’. Herodotus writes the word ἐπίπλοα in I 94; elsewhere, as usual, ἔπιπλα. The derivation appears to be, τὰ ἐπιπολῆς σκεύη, τὰ ἐπιπόλαια, superficial’. They are said to be ‘superficial’, to ‘lie on the surface’, because they are not fixed or rooted, like land, houses, trees; which are all ‘property’ nevertheless.

ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθέρια καὶ χρήσιμα] All the kinds of property just mentioned are ‘secure’, (in the sense, ‘that the use of it is always in your own power’, infra), not liable to risk, as money made and employed in trade or commerce; and ‘liberal’, such as befit a gentleman, a man of ‘liberal’ education and pursuits, cultivated and accomplished and refined, πεπαιδευμένος (παιδεία, διαγιγνώσκομεν τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 260); and also ‘useful’, πρὸς τὸ ζῇν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῇν, and therefore a part of genuine wealth (with which money is here included, contrary to the true theory).

ἐλευθέριος, as here applied, expresses the general notion of liberality, in character and habits of mind. In the Ethics, and most frequently in the ordinary language, it is restricted as a moral virtue to a species of liberality, that namely which manifests itself περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν. Eth. Nic. II 7. The ἐλευθέριος represents the gentleman from the democratic point of view; he embodies the notion of ‘freedom which is the ὅρος, the principle, and the end and aim of the democratic commonwealth; he is the type of a free citizen, and therefore as expressive of character the term denotes ‘that which a model free citizen ought to be’; and connotes or implies those qualifications, particularly education and enlightenment, which enable him efficiently to discharge the proper functions of a free citizen, and those social qualities and habits which fit him for such a society. This is opposed to the aristocratic conception of a gentleman which makes the character or notion depend rather upon birth, wealth and station; and according to which the ἀγαθοί, ἄριστοι, ἀριστῆες, the boni, optimi, optimates, &c., are the nobles, the men of rank, and of good family in a state. See further on this subject, Donaldson, New Cratylus, §§ 321—328.

Another characteristic of Greek feeling, which deserves notice, is brought into view in the application of the term ἐλευθέρια to distinguish a particular kind of property; and this is, the contempt for trade and commerce as a profession and a means of acquiring wealth, which as B. St Hilaire observes (note on Transl. of Ar. Pol. p. 36) was common to all antiquity. A similar observation is made by Böckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens, Bk. I c. 8 p. 43 (Transl.).

Plato's writings abound with contemptuous epithets and expressions applied to ἐμπορία, καπηλεία, χρηματιστική, χρηματισμός, and all arts and professions of which money-making was the only object; for instance, Legg. IV 1, 705 A, ἐμπορίας γὰρ καὶ χρηματισμοῦ διὰ καπηλείας ἐμπιπλᾶσα αὐτήν, ἤθη παλίμβολα καὶ ἄπιστα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντίκτουσα, αὐτήν τε πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν ἄπιστον καὶ ἄφιλον ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὡσαύτως, where trade is represented as corrupting and demoralizing. In XI 4, 918 D, in the course of a discussion on the legitimate objects and uses of trade, he makes the remark, διὸ πάντα τὰ περὶ τὴν καπηλείαν καὶ ἐμπορίαν καὶ πανδοκείαν γένη (in the actual practice of them) διαβέβληταί τε καὶ ἐν αἰσχροῖς γέγονεν ὀνείδεσιν, which results from their general tendency to corrupt the character of those who follow these pursuits, by the immoderate desire of gain which they stimulate and foster. Accordingly no citizen of the model state is allowed to follow any retail trade; this must be confined to metics and strangers, μέτοικον εἶναι χρεὼν ξένον ὃς ἂν μέλλῃ καπηλεύσειν. VIII 11, 847 D, καπηλείαν δὲ ἕνεκα χρηματισμῶν μήτε οὖν τούτου μήτε ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ὅλῃ καὶ πόλει ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι. On Plato's general views on this subject, as expressed in the ‘Laws’, see Grote, Plato, III 431.

Aristotle similarly condemns trade and the business and practice of interchanging commodities, so far as its object is mere money-making, χρηματιστική. This is the accumulation of unnatural, artificial property: the only kind of property or wealth that is natural, φύσει, is that which can be applied directly to one's own use, πρὸς χρῆσιν, and ultimately πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῇν, and falls under the province of οἰκοναμική, from which χρηματιστική is excluded. Pol. I 9. Hence of the two kinds of κτητική, the one, which may be called οἰκονομική, because it forms part of the science of œconomics (domestic economy) properly understood, is neces sary and laudable; the other, καπηλική or μεταβλητική, with its offspring usury, which breeds money out of money, and is thence called τόκος, ‘is justly reprehended’ and usury ‘most reasonably the object of abhorrence’. τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως, οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἀπ̓ ἀλλήλων ἐστίν, εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ὀβολοστατικὴ διὰ τὸ ὑπ̓ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ̓ ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη. κ.τ.λ. I 10 sub fin.

On the character and tendencies of ἔμποροι, compare Xen. Oecon. XX 27, 28. In the same treatise, c. I 12, 13, 14, a distinction is taken, similar to that of Aristotle, between χρήματα, wealth or property which you can use directly, which does you direct service, and money, which is excluded from the notion of property in this sense. Xenophon, like Aristotle, approves of nothing but the agricultural mode of life as the best both for mind and body, and as cultivating and promoting the habits which go to form the best of citizens. See Oecon. c. VI 8, 9, 10, c. XV 9.

These extracts will throw light upon the meaning of the word ἐλευθέρια as applied to the land and stock and buildings and moveables of the landed gentleman or country proprietor. They are said to belong to the gentleman or man of cultivation, in contrast with the degrading or corrupting habits engendered by trade and commerce.

ἔστι δὲ χρήσιμα μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.] Property employed in business, and therefore productive, ἀφ᾽ ὧν αἱ πρόσοδοι ‘from which one derives one's income’, is more useful, but carries with it the notion of sordidness or meanness; the other, because it produces nothing but the enjoyment1, which proceeds from using it, because it is not corrupted and degraded by any contact or connexion with money-making, better befits the cultivated man, who should hold himself aloof from such pursuits, and partakes more of the notion of καλόν. Comp. I 9, 25, καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν, αἱρετά τε γὰρ ἄκαρπα ὄντα. § 26, καὶ κτήματα ἄκαρπα (καλά ἐστι). ἐλευθεριώτερα γάρ. Eth. N. IV 8 sub fin. (of the μεγαλόψυχος), καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων—the contrast of ‘honour’ and ‘profit’.

ἀπολαυστικὰ δέ κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Metaph. A 1, 981 b 17, on the ascending scale of arts, in the order of superiority in knowledge and general excellence. πλείονων δ᾽ εὑρισκομένων τεχνῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν (passe-temps, pastime, diversion) οὐσῶν, ἀεὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. The highest in degree are ‘sciences’, the invention of which is due neither to necessity nor to the mere desire of amusements, and requires ‘leisure’: whence it happened that mathematics were first studied in Egypt by the priestly class.

τι καὶ ἄξιον] καί emphatic ‘which is in fact at all worth mentioning’. ἄξιον (λόγου). This emphatic use of καί, to enforce the meaning, usually of the single word following, and attract special attention to it, is so common in all Greek authors as scarcely to require illustration. It may be worth while to quote one or two prominent examples. Thuc. I 15, πάντες δὲ ἦσαν, ὅσοι καὶ (actually) ἐγένοντο, 97, τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ καὶ ἥψατο...Ἑλλανικός, II 51, δὲ καὶ γένοιτο εἰ τοῦτο ἐτελεύτα. Arist. Nub. 840, τί δ᾽ ἂν παῤ ἐκείνων καὶ μάθοι (what could one learn?) χρηστόν τις ἄν; Eur. Hippol. 91, τοῦ δὲ καὶ μ᾽ ἀνιστορεῖς πέρι; 224, τί κυνηγεσίων καὶ σοὶ μελέτη; (what is thy concern with hunting?), Ion, 241, ὅτι καὶ θέμις, 346, ταῦτα καὶ μαντεύομαι. Aesch. Agam. 97, ὅτι καὶ δυνατόν. 279. Dem. de F. L. § 87, ὅπερ καὶ γέγονεν. § 97, καὶ θαυμάζω (Schäfer's note). Porson ad Phoen. 1373; in interrogation, Wunder ad Antig. 720.

ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὕτω] ‘in such places and in such a way, as to &c.’

τοῦ τε οἰκεῖα εἶναι μή κ.τ.λ.] The definition of their being our own or not (of ownership), lies in the power of alienation, that is, giving or selling.

ὅλως δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν κ.τ.λ.] Polit. I 9 referred to above, pp. 79 and 81.

ἐνέργεια] This technical term, and the opposition of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια which pervades Aristotle's entire philosophy, represents πλοῦτος as a mere δύναμις or dormant faculty or capacity, until it is ‘developed’ or ‘realised’ and ‘set in action’ (energized) by use (χρῆσις), by application to the ‘service’ of its owner. On this ‘fundamental antithesis’ of δόναμις and ἐνέργεια as a physical, moral, and metaphysical conception, consult Metaph. Θ 6—9, and Bonitz Comm.; Trendel. El. Log. Arist. § 6, p. 61, Kategorienlehre, p. 157 seq., Comm. ad Ar. de Anima, Lib. II p. 295—312; Grant, Essays on Ethics, Ess. IV. p. 181 seq. (1st ed.) [p. 231 (3rd ed.)].

1 ἀπόλαυσις is properly ‘sensual enjoyment’. In Eth. N. 1 3, where the three kinds of lives, the ἀπολαυστικός, πρακτικός or πολιτικός, and θεωρητικός are distinguished and compared, the first is that which has ἡδονή for its sole object, the gratification of the animal appetites and desires, the satisfaction of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν; the second has ἀρετή moral virtue for its τέλος; the third, θεωρία, the highest activity of the intellect.

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