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τιμή, δόξα] The distinction between these two is stated in note on c. 5, 4, p. 76. These are not only ‘pleasant’ and therefore good in them selves, but also productive of various advantages which accrue to them from the respect of others, and so ‘good’ in this secondary or subordinate sense likewise. καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ.] ‘and they are accompanied for the most part by the actual possession of the things’ (natural gifts, qualities, accomplishments, acquirements, military distinction, rank and fortune, and such like) ‘which the honours paid them (these supposed possessors) imply’, ἐφ᾽ οἷς τιμῶνται, on the basis of which, on account of, for which, they receive the honour paid, or ‘on which the honours paid them rest, are grounded, or based’. ἐφ᾽ οἷς τ. might possibly be rendered ‘for which they (the honour and reputation) are valued’; on which their value depends, or, by which it is measured; but the other interpretation seems more direct and natural. The rule here tacitly referred to, as warranting the inference that, when honour is conferred, those so honoured are generally worthy of it, is that a generally received opinion, or popularly current maxim, or the expression of these in the ordinary language, may be for the most part depended on as true1. With τὸ ὑπάρχειν, τοῖς κεκτημένοις, or something similar, must be supplied.
1 This principle is in fact constantly appealed to by Aristotle, and is one of the ordinary arguments to which he has recourse in the establishment of the doctrines of his philosophy.
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