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εὐφυΐα] is a happy natural constitution of mind or body or both; εὐφυὴς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, Plat. Rep. III 409 E. In de Soph. El. c. 1, 165 a 5, we have εὐφυέστατος applied to ‘a topic’, in the sense (apparently) of ‘naturally best adapted to a certain purpose’. And in the spurious addition to the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (Bekk. 39), 19, εὐφυΐα τόπων occurs to denote the ‘natural advantages of situation’, opportunitas locorum. The word is however applied here, as it usually is, to the mental faculties, and signifies cleverness, quickness of intellect, intellectual dexterity, differing very little from ἀρχίνοια. And so, infr. § 29 and II 15 3. Similarly de Anima B 9, 2, 421 a 25, οἱ μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς. Top. Γ 2, 118 a 22, φιλοπονεῖν ἀρνούμεθα ἵν᾽ εὐφυεῖς εἶναι δοκῶμεν, ‘we deny that we are industrious in order to gain the reputation of cleverness’. In Top. Θ 14, 163 b 13, ἡ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν εὐφυΐα is defined, for dialectical purposes, τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς ἑλέσθαι τἀληθὲς καὶ φυγεῖν τὸ ψεῦδος: ὅπερ οἱ πεφυκότες εὖ δύνανται ποιεῖν. In Eth. Nic. III 7, 1114 b 9, it is used similarly to denote sagacity in aiming rightly at the true end, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθίνη ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα. Rhet. III 2, 10 init. In Poet. 22, 17 it stands for readiness in poetical invention. ἀφυής, the opposite, is ‘dull’ and ‘stupid’, Plat. Phaed. 96 C. In the Platonic ὅροι, p. 413 D, it is defined, ταχος μαθήσεως: γέννησις φύσεως ἀγαθή: ἀρετὴ ἐν φύσει. μνῆμαι] Victorius, Vater and Vahlen (in Trans. of Vienna Acad. Oct. 1861, p. 105) object to the plural of this word, on the ground either that abstract nouns do not admit of the plural formation, or (as Vahlen) that as it is the faculty of memory that is here in question the plural is inadmissible. As to the former, such is no doubt the rule, but the exceptions are abundant. Parallel to this is ἀναμνήσεις, ‘acts of recollection’, de Memor. 2, 6 and 10. We have already noticed προσκυνήσεις and ἐκστάσεις as examples in c. 5, 9; three more occur together in c. 11, 4, ῥαθυμίαι, ἀπονίαι, ἀμέλειαι. Eth. N. I 13, 1102 b 4, ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, II 1, 1103 b 19, τὰς ὀργάς, 2, 1104 a 27, γενέσεις, αὐξήσεις, φθοραί, b 25 τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἠρεμίας. Pol. II 5, 1264 a 35, εἱλωτείας τε καὶ πενεστείας καὶ δουλείας. The plural expresses the several acts or moments of these abstract conceptions when carried into operation, or particular cases or instances of the manifestation of them. Μνῆμαι therefore means here, any ordinary examples of retentive memory. It occurs itself, Metaph. A 1, 980 b 29, and Anal. Post. II 19, 100 a 5. [Also, in Eth. N. IX 4, 1166 a 25; X 2, 1173 b 19, Index Aristotelicus. S.] εὐμάθεια] which is equivalent to εὐφυΐα πρὸς μάθησιν, is a particular kind of natural sagacity and readiness directed to learning. εὐφυΐα ψυχῆς πρὸς τάχος μαθήσεως. Ὅροι Platon. 413 D. ἀγχίνοια] ‘ready wit’, ‘quickness of apprehension’, is mentioned as a kind of εὐστοχία and distinguished from εὐβουλία (right judgment), but not defined, Eth. Nic. VI 9. The defin. of ὅροι Platon. is εὐφυΐα ψυχῆς, καθ̓ ἣν ὁ ἔχων στο<*>χαστικός ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ τοῦ δεόντος: ὀξύτης νοῦ, which agrees very well with the preceding. It is therefore an intellectual (not moral) ‘presence of mind’, the faculty of seeing the point at once, or ‘ready wit’. In Anal. Post. I 34, init. it is thus defined, εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ (intuitive, immediate) τοῦ μέσου (the middle term of the syllogism, which expresses the cause), οἷον εἴ τις ἰδὼν ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχὺ ἐνόησε διὰ τί τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου: ἢ διαλεγόμενον πλουσίῳ ἔγνω διότι δανείζεται: ἢ διότι φίλοι, ὅτι ἐχθροὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, which expresses in a logical form precisely the same characteristic of the faculty, rapidity of apprehension, ταχὺ ἐνόησε. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλο κ.τ.λ.] This seems to refer exclusively to the last mentioned of the three, τὸ ζῇν, to which alone it is strictly appropriate. Sciences and arts are avowedly ‘productive of good’, and rest their claims upon that alone.
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