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ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ᾽ ἀγαθόν] If, for instance, you can shew that vice and folly are bad, you may infer at once that their opposites, virtue and wisdom, are good. This is not universally true; Aristotle himself places it amongst the topics which are ‘open to question’. So Bacon, Cuius contrarium malum bonum; cuius bonum malum. Non tenet (this does not hold) is the ‘redargutio’, in iis rebus quarum vis in temperamento et mensura sita est. Dum vitant stulti vitia in contraria currunt. Pref. to Colours of Good and Evil. Bacon's Works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, Vol. VII p. 67. According to Aristotle, Eth. N. II 8, there is double opposition in the case of virtue and vice, αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις. When virtue, the mean disposition, is opposed to either of the extremes or vices, the rule holds; when the extremes or vices are considered as opposed to one another, it fails. Categ. c. 11, 13 b 36, ἐναντίον δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγαθῷ μὲν κακόν: τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον τῇ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον ὑγιείᾳ νόσος καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία, ὁμοίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κακῷ δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον, ὁτὲ δὲ κακόν: τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ κακῷ ὄντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακὸν ὄν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντία ἑκατέρῳ, οὖσα ἀγαθόν. ἐπ̓ ὀλίγων δ̓ ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν. 14 a 19, ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι, ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι...ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη τινῶν ὄντα. Cic. Topic. XI 47, deinceps locus est qui a contrario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera sunt plura: unum eorum quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt (Aristotle's ἐναντία, in his ordinary usage of the term. Good and bad however are different genera, not extremes of the same genus), ut sapientia et stultitia. Eodem autem genere dicuntur quibus propositis occurrunt tamquam e regione quaedam contraria, ut celeritati tarditas, non debilitas: ex quibus argumenta talia existunt: si stultitiam fugimus sapientiam sequamur: et bonitatem si malitiam. The dialectical topics of τὰ ἐναντία, in which this is not included, are analysed in Topic. B cc. 7, 8. To this head may also be referred the topic of στέρησις, privatio, criticised by Bacon, Colours of Good and Evil, No. 6, cuius privatio bona, malum: cuius privatio mala, bonum. στέρησις and ἕξις, one of the forms of contraricty or opposition, Met. I 4, 1055 a 33, πρώτη δὲ ἐναντίωσις ἕξις καὶ στέρησίς ἐστιν. And Top. B 8, 114 a 7 (though in a different application), ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν στερήσεων καὶ ἕξεων σκεπτέον. Στέρησις contrasted with ἕξις is one of the four (Categ. 10, 11 b 17) or five (Metaph. Δ 10, 1018 a 20) kinds of opposition, ἀντικεῖσθαι. Comp. supr. § 4, in which this is implied.
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