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τὰ προαιρετά] ‘objects of deliberate and voluntary choice’. The προαίρεσις seems here intended in the more general sense in which προαιρεῖσθαι and προαίρεσις are employed in the ordinary language, and even sometimes in the Ethical treatise itself, as I 2, init. ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται. προαίρεσις is defined in Eth. Nic. III 5, ult. βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, ‘an impulsive faculty (implying, not directly expressing the free will) capable of deliberation, directed to things within our power’—no one deliberates about things beyond his power, οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον. And again in precise conformity with this, de Mot. Anim. c. 6, ἡ προαίρεσις κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως, ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον (is the ultimate mover, the origin of motion or action) τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητόν, (it is the object of the two faculties, and not the faculties themselves, which is the real origin of motion, according to the Aristotelian doctrine that the primary moving agent must be itself unmoved,) οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ διανοητὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος. Thus the προαίρεσις is composed of two separate elements or faculties, intellectual and impulsive, of which the latter alone is the agent of motion, or stimulates to action: the intellectual part deliberates prior to action, and decides whether the proposed object of the action is good or bad, right or wrong1. Though the προαίρεσις in its general and wider signification of ‘deliberate, voluntary purpose’ is capable of prompting to action of every kind, yet in its narrower and specially ethical usage it is moral action alone that it originates and determines, οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων, Eth. N. III 4, init. Comp. III 2, 1110 b 31, οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας. From the ethical point of view therefore the definition will be ‘a deliberate and voluntary moral purpose’. The principal passages on the subject of προαίρεσις are Eth. Nic. III cc. 4, 5, 6, where it is analysed and distinguished from ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, which are mere animal impulses, on the one hand, and from βούλησις, βούλευσις and δόξα, on the other: ib. VI 2; and de Anima III 9, 10, where it is treated in reference to its action as a motive principle. τὰ εἰρημένα] all the objects of voluntary choice already mentioned which consist in, or are to be obtained by, action; such as health, pleasure, and especially the various moral virtues. καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κακά] This was an article of the received code of popular morality amongst the Greeks and Romans: comp. § 29, where one class of good things are ἃ ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. This is a duty, and a part of justice. In Rhet. I 9, 24, it is said to combine two kinds of virtue, τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι: τό τε γὰρ ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, καὶ ἀνδρείου τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι. II 5, 5. Rhet. ad Alex. I (2), 13. Xen. Memor. IV 2, 15, 16. Eur. Ion 1046, ὅταν δὲ πολεμίους δρᾶσαι κακῶς θέλῃ τις, οὐδεὶς ἐμποδὼν κεῖται νόμος. Med. 808, βαρεῖαν ἐχθροῖς καὶ φίλοισιν εὐμενῆ κ.τ.λ. Cic. de Off. I 7, Iustitiae primum munus est ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus iniuria.
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