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ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ διχῶς] ‘the term attending upon admits of two different senses, either simultaneous (attendance, accompaniment) or subsequent (consequence), as knowledge attends on learning subsequently, but life on health simultaneously1’. ἀκολουθεῖν and ἕπεσθαι are both used in logic to denote not merely something that follows, a ‘consequence’ in the ordinary acceptation of the words, but also an invariable or necessary attendant or concomitant in five different senses: (1) a preceding concomitant, or antecedent, Top. Γ 2, 117 a 11, καὶ γὰρ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἕπεται, as learning is always preceded by ignorance; Categ. c. 12, πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται τετραχῶς...δεύτερον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο πρότερον: δυοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθὺς τὸ ἓν εἶναι, κ.τ.λ. (2) a simultaneous concomitant, ἅμα: as health and life, Rhet. I 6, 3; 7, 5. (3) a subsequent concomitant, or ‘consequent’, ὕστερον, as learning is followed by knowledge, Rhet. ll. cc. (4) δυνάμει, a virtual concomitant, by implication, as sacrilege necessarily implies, includes potentially or virtually the notion of theft or fraud, by the rule omne maius continet in se minus; and (5) reciprocal contradictories regarded as consequents, Top. B 8, 113 b 25, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἀκολούθησις, or ἀντικατηγορουμένως, where two terms or propositions are ‘convertible’, ἀντιστρέφει: such are ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον, and τὸ μὴ ζῷον οὐκ ἄνθρωπος: τὸ μὴ ἡδὺ οὐ καλὸν, and τὸ καλὸν ἡδύ. It seems from this as if the primary sense of ἀκολουθεῖν were to attend or wait upon, and that that of ‘following’ is a special and secondary signification under the general notion of accompaniment. Hence ἀκόλουθος becomes pedissequus, a constant attendant, footman, or ‘follower’. The ‘simultaneous’ kind of accompaniment appears also in this word sometimes even in the ordinary language, as when Plato writes, Menex. 249 D, ἀκολούθει μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ, Lach. 187 D, μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκολουθῶν: and similarly Demosthenes and the Orators; and Xenophon joins it with σύν. Diog. Laert. VII § 125, τὰς δ᾽ ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, of the Stoics. Plutarch, de Repugn. Stoic. c. 27, p. 1045 E, attributes the same doctrine in the same words to Chrysippus. καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τριχῶς] This triple division of productive causes or conditions is thus explained by Majoragius. ‘Point tres species rerum conficientium quae ita distingui possunt. Quae conficiunt, aut sunt a natura, h. e. intrinsecus, aut extrinsecus adhibentur. A natura sunt, ut temperies humorum, et bona corporis constitutio, conficiens est bonae valetudinis. Quae extrinsecus adhibentur aut sunt tanquam instrumenta, aut sunt actiones; instrumenta, ut cibaria:...actiones, ut exercitatio corporis, et deambulatio, quae frequenter bonam valetudinem efficit.’ This account, though correct in the main, requires a little further explanation and modification. The ground of the distinction of the first of the three classes, of which the illustration is τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, the healthy state of body, active, actual health, as produced by ὑγιεία, health in itself, we learn from two passages of the Nic. Eth. First, VI 13, 1144 a 4, ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν (αὗται αἱ ἀρεταὶ) οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν: μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. Here ὑγίεια itself represents the formal cause of health, which is internal and essential (μέρος, ἔχεσθαι), and developes, quickens, and stimulates the bodily functions into healthy activity, gives health an active reality (ἐνεργεῖ), and is therefore contrasted with the efficient, and external cause, the physician, who, as the Paraphrast on the parallel passage, X 4, says, συντηρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει, καὶ ὅπως παραμείνῃ ζητεῖ. The second passage, X 4, 1174 b 25, is again an illustration: οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τόπον ἥ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἴτιά ἐστι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν: on which the Paraphrast's (Andronicus Rhodius) commentary is, ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ ποιεῖ μὴ οὖσα (i. e. ἐνέργεια, not ‘non-existent’) τὴν τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἐνέργειαν, ὁ δὲ συντηρεῖ κ.τ.λ. as before. The second and third divisions represent two kinds of extraneous causes or conditions, distinguished from this formal, intrinsic cause. These are first, necessary conditions, as of health, represented by food; and secondly, probable conditions, as exercise, which, as Aristotle adds, only produces health ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
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