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δῆλον οὖν κ.τ.λ.] ‘It is plain therefore from what has been said (§ 11, κἂν ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή), that in both (the following) ways it may be said to be greater: for whether it be an origin (or beginning), and the other not a beginning, it may be shewn to be made to appear greater; or if it be not itself a beginning, but the other be a beginning (it may be equally shewn to be so), because the ‘end’ is greater (superior), and yet no beginning’. ‘The end is greater’, because τέλος ἐστὶν οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ ἄλλα: and if ‘everything else’ is but a mean to an end, the beginning must be included with the rest, and is therefore subordinate and inferior. μεῖζον is here ‘greater’, ‘more important’, superior in respect of influence or effective power; not necessarily ‘better’. In the examples, first, the ‘adviser’ is the ἀρχή, the origin or originator of the plot; so in Metaph. Δ 2, 1013 a 31, βουλεύσας is an αἴτιον, namely the efficient cause, or origin of motion and change, ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς. The adviser of a scheme is therefore according to this view the ‘cause’ of all that resulted from his advice, which is made to appear (δοκεῖ) by the argument more important than the result or actual crime (which is not ‘the beginning’); and, secondly, the converse (ἀνάπαλιν) is proved, that the crime, the ‘end’ of the advice or deliberation, is the more important thing of the two, because it was for that, as a mean to attain that, that the whole scheme was undertaken. It appears from the expressions of this text that Callistratus devised the scheme and Chabrias carried it into execution.

Leodamas of Acharnae was a famous orator, an earlier contemporary of Demosthenes and Aeschines. The latter mentions him, c. Ctesiph. § 138, as having been sent as ambassador to Thebes, and as a speaker the rival of Demosthenes; indeed in his opinion even pleasanter to listen to. He is mentioned again in II 23, 25 (comp. the note there); in Dem. adv. Lept. 501 and 502, who also speaks of him as a distinguished orator, where allusion is made to a certain proposition of his to cancel the ‘grant’, especially the ἀτέλεια, made to Chabrias for his public services —οὗτος ἐγράψατο τὴν Χαβρίου δωρεάν1, a proposition which he failed to carry; and in other places of Aeschines. See Sauppe, Fragm. Or. Att. II 216; Fr. XVI, and p. 244; Fr. XXVI; Clinton, F. H. Vol. II p. 111, sub an. 372, 3.

Callistratus, son of Callicrates, of Aphidna, a distinguished Athenian orator and politician, of the earlier half of the 4th cent. B. C. His name first appears in history in the year 379 B. C. Aristotle refers to two speeches of his, Rhet. I 14. 1, and III 17. 14. Leodamas' accusation of him, here mentioned, seems to have been directed against his conduct in the affairs of Oropus, in 366, Grote, Hist. Gr. X p. 392; Smith's Dict. Biogr. Art. Callistratus; Clinton, Fast. Hell. II 396, note w. He was associated with Chabrias, the celebrated Athenian general, in the transactions with respect to Oropus, and with him was brought to trial; and it is most probable that both of the speeches referred to in the text were made by Leodamas on this occasion.

On Callistratus and Chabrias Mr Elder's articles in Smith's Biogr. Dict. may be consulted. Callistratus' name occurs very frequently in the Attic orators. See Baiter and Sauppe, Orat. Att. Vol. III; Ind. Nom. p. 73.

βουλεύσαντα, βουλευσαμένου, βουλεύσαντος, ἐπιβουλεύειν] are all applied to the same transaction, viz. Callistratus' ‘advice’ or ‘device’. They express precisely the same thing, each from a somewhat different point of view. βουλεύειν τινί τι, is to give advice, to advise. βουλεύεσθαι to give oneself advice, to deliberate; or secondly, of a number of people deliberating together, and giving one another advice, ‘consulting in common’. So μὴ βουλευσαμένου here is, ‘if he had not deliberated upon it’ preparatory to ‘suggesting’ or ‘advising’ it. ἐπιβουλεύειν retains its proper sense of a hostile design (ἐπί ‘against’); the advice, or scheme which resulted from it, and the deliberation which suggested it, are now represented as ‘a plot’, a hostile, aggressive, design. It appears therefore that there is no occasion to have recourse to the explanation of Victorius and Buhle, that ἐπιβουλεύειν is (or can be) put for βουλεύειν or βουλεύεσθαι. Gaisford prints these two notes of V. and B. without comment.

εἰ μὴ ἦν πράξων] On this use of the definite article, indicating a member of a class or γένος, which we express by our indefinite article, see Buttmann, Gr. Gr. § 124, Obs. 2. Engl. Tr. p. 319. The two senses of the Greek definite article are, according to Schneider, on Pl. Rep. VIII 564 A, that it marks quod praesens et in conspectu positum cogitatur, and (2) the genus. ‘Articulus definit indefinita, idque duobus modis: aut designando certo de multis, aut quae multa sunt cunctis in unum colligendis’ (the second describes the generic use). Herm. Praef. ad Iph. Aul. p. XV. Several examples of this usage of the def. art. are collected from the N. T. by Dean Alford, in a pamphlet in reply to Bishop Ellicott, p. 45 seq. I will only quote Matth. xiii. 3, σπείρων: xxv. 32, ποιμήν. In a subsequent passage of this work, II 4, 31, Aristotle has quite unconsciously and unintentionally stated this grammatical distinction, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη: τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ κ.τ.λ.

We render πράξωνanyone to do it’, carry it out, put it in execution.

1 This cannot be the same accusation as that which Aristotle here refers to; ἐγράψατο δωρεάν and τὸν πράξαντα, ‘the man that carried into execution a nefarious scheme’, are quite inapplicable to the same offence. Again Demosthenes, c. Mid. 535, tells us that Philostratus was the accuser of Chabrias, ὅτ᾽ ἐκρίνετο τὴν περὶ Ὠρωποῦ τὴν κρίσιν θανάτου. Were there two accusers of Chabrias on his trial? Or two separate trials? (this seems improbable): or has Aristotle made a slip of memory in assigning the accusation of Chabrias to Leodamas? None of these suppositions is necessary to reconcile the, at first sight, conflicting statements. The accusation of Leodamas is directed against both parties; he takes the case of Callistratus first, and then secondly (πάλιν δέ) applies the converse of the argument which he had issued against the other to the offence of Chabrias. Philostratus, who took part in the same proceedings, was another and independent accuser. Mr Grote, p. 393, note 3, who does not refer to the passage of Aristotle, assigns the trial or trials of Callistratus and Chabrias to this period, 366 B. C., and the alleged misconduct about Oropus. The other speech of Leodamas against Chabrias, referred to by Dem. adv. Lept. l. c. was earlier, and had nothing to do with the affair of Oropus. [Arnold Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit 1 p. 96. s.]

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