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καὶ τὰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὰ κ.τ.λ.] ‘Eundem hunc locum commutatis verbis exponit in III Topicorum c. 1 (116 b 26), ἔτι δύο ποιητικῶν ὄντων, οὗ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον καὶ αὐτὸ βέλτιον. Ad haec verba Alex. Aphrod. p. 125, ἀσαφῶς εἴρηται διὰ βραχύτητα: τόπος δ᾽ ἐστι τοιοῦτος: εἰ δύο εἴη τινὰ δύο τελῶν ποιητικά, οὗ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον καὶ αἱρετώτερον καὶ αὐτὸ βέλτιον. οὕτως παιδεία γυμνασίων δεικνύοιτ̓ ἂν ἀμείνων, εἴ γε γυμνάσια μὲν ὑγιείας ἐστὶ ποιητικά, παιδεία δὲ φρονήσεως, καὶ ἔστιν φρόνησις τῆς ὑγιείας αἱρετώτερον: πάλιν τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι αἱρετώτερον: τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλούτου, τὸ δὲ ὑγιείας ποιητικόν, βέλτιον δ̓ ὑγίεια πλούτου.’ Victorius.

τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν] ‘this is what was meant by’, this is what was (said to be) good; viz. in § 3.

τὸ...ποιητικῷ εἶναι] On this Aristotelian formula which denotes the abstract conception of a thing by the mind, as opposed to its actual existence as an object of sense, see Trendel. de Anima, p. 471 seq. and on I 1, 2; II 1, 8, also in Rheinisches Museum 1828, Vol. II 457 seq., Kategorienlehre, p. 35 with reff. in note, and Waitz, Organ. Vol. II p. 386. The distinction, which is nowhere expressly stated, is, as may be gathered from numerous passages, the following: τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι universam esse notionem, qua res constituitur, a materia avocatam, universa cogitatione conceptam —the λόγος of the thing—τὸ μέγεθος vero ad singula quaeque pertinere quae sub sensus cadant. Metaph. Z 15, 1039 b 25, οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ οἰκίᾳ εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῇδε τῇ οἰκίᾳ. Anal. Post. II 4, 91 b 5, ἀληθὲς γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ζῴῳ εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ πάντα ἄνθρωπον ζῷον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε ἓν εἶναι. Phys. I 3, 4, οὔτε γὰρ τῇ συνεχείᾳ ἓν ἔσται τὸ λευκὸν οὔτε τῷ λόγω: ἄλλο γὰρ ἔσται τὸ εἶναι λευκῷ κ.τ.λ. It abounds in the de Anima. Why and when Aristotle employs it, and whether the distinction is always necessary and appropriate, are questions that I will not undertake to answer. [Index Aristotelicus, p. 221 a 34—40; p. 764 a 50—p. 765 a 6. S.]

The Syntax of the phrase, which only Trendelenburg, as far as I know, has attempted to explain1, seems to be this:—The dative is in apposition with a supposed τινί, τό τινι εἶναι μεγόθει, and the construction is analogous to ὥστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν, I 10, 18. Other instances of a similar use of the dative, which lead up to the explanation of this, are such as Thuc. I 24, ἐν δεξίᾳ ἐσπλέοντι τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον: and others are to be found in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 388.

καὶ οὗ τὸ ποιητικὸν μεῖζον ὡσαύτως] ‘and that of which the productive agent or producing cause is of a higher order, (superior), follows the same rule’, viz. that the product or result of the superior cause or agent is superior in a comparison between two. If wholesome food and exercise which produce health are more desirable and therefore superior to things which are merely pleasant, then the result of the former, health, is superior to the result of the latter, pleasure.

1 Trendel. in Rhein. Mus. 1828, Vol. II p. 481—3. The author, who has discussed with great learning and ingenuity the meaning of this Aristotelian technicality, and its relation to τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, is, it seems to me, less successful in his grammatical explanation. I think that from the analogy of similar constructions of this dative in the ordinary language, the use of it here must needs be a case of attraction, as I have explained it in the note. Trendelenburg, who takes nothing into account but the possible meanings of the dative (or, as he rightly prefers to call it, the ‘acceptive’) case, locative, instrumental, acceptive, selects the last of the three as that which belongs to the dative in this phrase. τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι express, according to him, ‘the abstract conception (τὸ εἶναι) belonging to (given to and received by) magnitude’: making this dative depend solely upon εἰναι, and leaving out the attraction to a word in the dative, actually or hypothetically preceding, as in any way concerned in the ‘government’ of it. This is all that I have to object to in Trendelenburg's paper: in the rest he has shewn the same ability and intimate knowledge of his author which characterizes all his other writings upon Aristotle.

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