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καὶ τὸ αἱρετώτερον καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ̓ αὑτό] Top. Γ I, 116 a 29 καὶ τὸ δἰ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν τοῦ δἰ ἕτερον αἱρετοῦ αἱρετώτερον, οἷον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι: τὸ μὲν γὰρ δἰ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ δἰ ἕτερον. And again, Ib. b 8, καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τινὶ αἱρετώτερον, οἷον τὸ ὑγιάζεσθαι τοῦ τέμνεσθαι: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τινὶ τῷ δεόμενῳ τῆς τομῆς. These two though differing in expression seem to be reducible to the same head, and, from the examples given, applicable to the same cases: for the absolute good is that which is in itself desirable, and conversely; and τέμνε- σθαι the example in the second case of particular good, is only good as the means to an end, δἰ ἕτερον. ἰσχὺς ὑγιεινοῦ] strength is more desirable in itself; the ‘wholesome’ only as the means to an end, health. Strength is considered by Aristotle not as absolutely desirable αἱρετὸν καθ᾽ αὑτό, but only relatively to other things— ‘more desirable in itself than many others.’ Brandis, Philologus, IV, i, p. 44. ὅπερ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθόν] ἦν, § 7. The reference is to 6 § 2 p. 97.
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