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καὶ ἕκαστον κ.τ.λ.] “and in every case from the accompanying, attendant, qualities (the qualities that come next, but always on the higher and better side; on ἀκολουθεῖν and its various senses, see note on c. 6. 3) derive (ἐκ) a term or expression always in the best direction (with the most favourable tendency, interpretatio in melius, putting the most favourable construction on the actual facts of the case); call, for instance, the irascible and insane, ‘simple and straightforward’, and self-will (headstrong, stubborn, obstinate temper; αὐθάδης, one who pleases himself, αὐθ-άδης, ‘self-pleaser’, and will have his own way), ‘magnificence’, or proper pride, and a due sense of dignity (σεμνόν)”1.

On ὀργίλος Victorius compares Hor. Sat. I 3. 51, at est truculentior atque plus aequo liber: simplex fortisque habeatur, with Cic. de Legg. I 7, solent enim, id quod virorum bonorum est, admodum irasci, and therefore an angry temper may be attributed to a virtuous disposition.

μανικός represents an excitable, violent, furious temper, which sometimes almost assumes the appearance of raving madness. In Plato it is applied to Chaerephon, Socrates' intimate (in the Charmides, init.), and to Apollodorus, Symp. 173 D, where it expresses a very impetuous, excitable temperament, inclined to extravagant and violent manifestations in feeling and utterance; which is illustrated by the conduct ascribed to him at Socrates' death, Phaedo 117 D.

On ἁπλοῦς, as expressive of character, see note I 2. 4.

αὐθάδης. In Eth. Eud. II 3, 1221 a 8, III 7, 1233 b 34, σεμνότης, proper pride, the due measure of personal dignity in one's bearing and behaviour to others, πρὸς ἕτερον ζῇν, is a mean between the two extremes, ἀρεσκεία the defect (over-complacency and obsequiousness), and αὐθάδεια the excess (undue contemptuousness καταφρόνησις, and disregard of their feelings and wishes). In the Magn. Mor. I 29, it is likewise the excess of σεμνότης, as ἀρεσκεία is the defect. It is exercised περὶ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, in the ordinary intercourse of society, and manifests itself in the character οἷος μηθενὶ ἐντυχεῖν μηδὲ διαλεγῆναι, in a wilful and stubborn reserve which repels all social converse. The character is represented in the name itself; which is αὐτο-άδης, ‘self-pleasing’. So that when we give the name of μεγαλόψυχος and σεμνός to one who is really αὐσάδης, we are substituting a virtue for a vice, a mean state for an excess. αὐθάδεια is one of Theophrastus' ‘Characters’ defined by him as ἀπήνεια ὁμιλίας, ‘social brutality’.

The special form of this misapplication of names in praise and censure is called ὑποκορισμός, when it takes the favourable side, and interpretatur in melius. On this figure, the name of which is derived from the endearing terms used by nurses to children (πρὸς κόρην κόρον λέγειν ἀποσμικροῦντα, Tim. Lex., lisping in imitation of them), compare Aesch. c. Timarch. p. 17 § 126, ταύτην ἐξ ὑποκορίσματος τιτθῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχω, Theophr. περὶ ἀηδίας: ὑποκορίζεσθαι ποππύζων (Ast ad loc.), or by lovers, Plat. Rep. V 474 E, ἐραστοῦ ὑποκοριζομένου, Arist. Plut. 1012, νητταρίον ἂν καὶ φάττιον ὑπεκορίζετο (whence it stands for a ‘diminutive’, Rhet. III 2. 15); hence it is transferred to flattering or endearing expressions in general, and especially such as, in describing the moral character of anything, substitute some nearly associated virtue for a vice; to palliate, extenuate, gloss over. Examples occur in Plat. Rep. VIII 560 E (already referred to), III 400 E, ἀνοιαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐήθειαν. Alexis, Tarantini Fr:3, Meineke, Fragm. Comm. III 484, ἆρ᾽ οὐκ οἶσθ̓ ὅτι τὸ καλούμενον ζῇν τοῦτο διατριβῆς χάριν ὄνομ̓ ἐστὶν ὑποκόρισμα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μοίρας: Ovid, Ar. Am. II 657, nominibus mollire licet mala, followed by a long string of examples. Lucr. IV 1154 seq. Horat. Sat. I 3. 44—54. Thucydides, III 82, in a well-known passage, mentions this perversion of moral terms amongst the signs of demoralization prevalent in Greece at the period of the Corcyrean sedition, καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξιώσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει κ.τ.λ. See Ruhnken, ad Tim. p. 266, 6; Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v.; Shilleto, ad Dem. de F. L. § 293; Stallbaum, Plat. Rep. VI l. c.—Quintilian calls it derivatio verborum in the passage above quoted; and V 13. 25, describes it, si acri et vehementi fuerit usus oratione, eandem rem nostris verbis mitioribus proferre; which he then illustrates from Cicero's speeches. The opposite practice is described II 12. 4, est praeterea quaedam virtutum vitiorumque vicinia, qua maledicus pro libero, temerarius pro forti, effusus pro copioso accipitur. [Farrar's Chapters on Language, p. 281 sqq. S.]

καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς κ.τ.λ.] The only difference between this and the preceding form of ὑποκορισμός is, that this is a special variety of the other, which substitutes the mean for the excess, but still according to the favourable interpretation of it. θρασύτης is the ὑπερβολή of ἀνδρεία, Eth. N. II 7, 1107 b 3, 8, 1108 b 20, 1109 a 3, and ἀσωτία, prodigality, the spendthrift's habit, c. 7, 1107 b 10, c. 8, 1108 b 24.

παραλογιστικὸν ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας] ‘liable to lead to a false inference’, Rhet. II 24. 4, ‘suberit fallacia manans ex causa’, Portus. ‘The mis-reasoning (παραλογιστικόν), or false reasoning, proceeding from the cause’, is the identification of two different causes which must necessarily produce dissimilar effects or actions; these latter are confounded by the fallacy, and ascribed to the same cause. The cause of an action is the προαίρεσις, the voluntary and deliberate purpose of it; otherwise represented as the ‘motive’ (the efficient cause). Now this cause or motive is different in the case of an act of wanton rashness, where there is no necessity (obligation) to incur the danger (οὗ μὴ ἀνάγκη κινδυνευτικός), and of an act of virtue, true courage, which has a noble end, τὸ καλόν, in view: they are prompted by different motives, one belonging to the class ‘bad’, the other that of the ‘good’. This identification of the causes of the two actions leads to the ‘false inference’, that as the same cause produces the same effect, and the cause of both actions is the same, the effects are likewise the same, and both of them are acts of virtue. And then the further inference is drawn, that whatever a man will do from a less powerful motive, he will do a fortiori from one which is higher and more prevailing: the higher the motive or cause, the more powerful the impulse or effect. Similarly it is inferred that if a man is lavish to everybody, this must include his friends; by the rule, omne maius continet in se minus.

ὑπερβολὴ ἀρετῆς] Cic. Tusc. Q. V 26. 105, exsuperantia virtutis. ὑπερβολή and ὑπεροχή are frequently employed to express an excess above a given standard, average, or mean; the general conception of ‘excess’, of mere ‘superiority’; without the additional notion of a ‘vicious’ excess, a depravation or deviation from a true standard, which usually accompanies the word, and more especially in Aristotle's theory of virtue, where it stands for a class of moral vices. ‘Non significat hic nimium sed praestantia.’ Victorius. With the notion here expressed, comp. Eth. N. II 2, sub fin. 1105 a 9, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή: καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. The average standard of excellence is surpassed, ‘good becomes better’, in proportion to the degree of difficulty surmounted in accomplishing any task. Pol. IV (VII) 1, 1323 b 3, κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολήν, lines 8 and 14, κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, c. 4, 1326 a 21, Ib. b 12, τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὅρος, b 24. Pol. VI (IV) 12, 1296 b 19, ποσὸν δὲ (by ‘quantity’ I mean) τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχήν. This sense of the word is also common in Demosthenes, as de Cor. 291. 24, ἐγὼ δὲ τοσαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ποιοῦμαι, and the same phrase de F. L. p. 447. 25. c. Mid. 519. 24, ἔστι δὲ ὑπερβολὴ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα. ὑπερβολὴ συκοφαντίας, κακίας, δωρεῶν, ἀναιδείας, ὠμότητος, ὕβρεως, &c., in all which ὑπερβολή denotes not the vice, but merely the ‘measure’ of it.

1 It seems to me nearly certain that μεγαλοπρεπῆ is a mistake, either of the author himself or one of his transcribers, for μεγαλόψυχον. The two have already been distinguished in this very chapter, §§ 11, 12, and μεγαλοπρέπεια, when it is distinguished from the other as by Aristotle, and not made to include it as by Plato (see the note on § 12), is altogether unsuitable to express the character of the αὐθάδης, being confined as it is to liberality in bestowing money on a large scale: whereas the virtue of μεγαλοψυχία is precisely what αὐθάδεια might be represented to be by the figure ὑποκορισμός, by bestowing on it a ‘flattering’ designation. I refer for the proof of this to the Nic. Eth. IV 7.8: it will be found that σεμνότης, another false interpretation which is here put upon αὐθάδεια, is also characteristic of the μεγαλόψυχος. Plato points out the true ὑποκορισμός in the case of μεγαλοπρέπεια, Rep. VI 560 E, ὑποκοριζόμενοι...ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλοπρέπειαν.

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