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ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια] On Whately's comparison (Rhetoric, c. 2) of these three qualities as constituting the ethical character of the speech, with the character of Pericles, as drawn by himself, in Thuc. II 60, see Introd. p. 246, note 1. The explanation of them, and the reason of their selection, are there given. φρόνησις is the intellectual virtue of ‘practical wisdom’, essential above all to a statesman; ἀρετή is moral virtue, of character and conduct; εὔνοια is required in the speaker himself (or rather in his speech) as part of the ἦθος, and in the audience as a πάθος. In the Politics VIII (V) 9, init. the correspondence is exact, and the three same qualities or virtues are selected as the special qualifications of the statesman: τρία δέ τινα χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἄρξειν τὰς κυρίας ἀρχάς, πρῶτον μὲν φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστῶσαν πολιτείαν (this is something rather different from the εὔνοια of the Rhetoric: but the purpose of Rhetoric and of Politics is different), ἔπειτα δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς (this is ‘ability’, corresponding to φρόνησις in Rhet. and the combination of knowledge and eloquence in Thucyd.), τρίτον δ᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. It seems not unlikely that Arist. may have borrowed this from Thuc., altering however and perhaps improving the classification and the expression, and adapting it to his immediate purpose in the Politics and the Rhetoric. διαψεύδονται] ‘(the speakers) make mistakes, or false statements’, whether intentionally or unintentionally; ψεύδεσθαι can bear either sense. In the Nic. Eth. where it occurs several times, VI 3, 1139 b 18, ib. c. 6, 1140 b 4, c. 13, 1144 a 35, IX 3, 1165 b 8, and in the ordinary usage of other authors, it appears to be always ‘to be deceived’, implying an unintentional error, accordingly here also the mistakes and false statements must be represented as unintentional, so far as the word is concerned; though the alternative διὰ μοχθηρίαν—the second case, when ἀρετή is lacking—shews that it is also possible to make them intentionally and with intent to deceive. The fact is that here again is a sort of ζεῦγμα, and διαψεύδεσθαι (as interpreted by the ordinary usage of it) will only apply properly to the first of the three cases; in the other two it requires some modification. The concluding observation, διόπερ ἐνδέχέται...γιγνώσκοντας, ‘it is possible to do this with one's eyes open’, looks as if it was meant to supply this.
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