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ἔστω δή] said of a provisional definition, suitable for rhetorical purposes, but without scientific exactness. Comp. I 5. 3, and note, 6. 2, 7. 2, 10. 3. On rhetorical definitions, see Introd. p. 13.

ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπηςμὴ προσήκοντος] This definition of anger occurs likewise in the Topics, Θ 156 a 30, ὀργὴ ὄρεξις εἶναι τιμωρίας διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν, as an average specimen of a dialectical definition; whence no doubt it was imported into the Rhetoric. Another definition similar to this is again spoken of as popular and dialectical, and opposed to a true ‘physical’ definition, de Anima 1, 403 a 29, διαφερόντως δ᾽ ἂν ὁρίσαιντο φυσικός τε καὶ διαλεκτικὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον ὀργὴ τί ἐστίν: μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως τι τοιοῦτον, δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ; the latter is the ‘appropriate’ form of definition. And Plutarch, de Virt. Mor. p. 442 B, speaks of ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως in terms which seem to imply that Aristotle had himself employed as his own definition. This, says Seneca, de Ira, I 3. 3, very nearly corresponded with his own, (cupiditas iniuriae ulciscendae I 2. 4,) ait enim (Arist.) iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi; which appears to be a translation of ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως. A passage of the Eth. Nic. VII 7, 1149 a 30, will illustrate some points of the definition of the Rhetoric. θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα...ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. μὲν γὰρ λόγος φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, δ᾽ ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς: δ̓ ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ λόγος αἴσθησις, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. Here two elements of anger are distinguished. And the pain lies in the struggle which the θυμός undergoes, whilst the pleasure is caused by the satisfaction of the ἐπιθυμία, the appetite or desire of satisfaction or compensation for the injury inflicted, which is the object of the τιμωρία. Victorius quotes the Stoic definition of anger, τιμωρίας ἐπιθυμία τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἠδικηκέναι οὐ προσηκόντως, which is derived probably from this of Aristotle.

ὄρεξις as a general term denotes a class of ὀρέξεις, instinctive and impulsive faculties of the soul or immaterial part, intellectual as well as moral, the ultimate origin of all action in the human subject. Sir W. Hamilton, Lect. on Metaph. I p. 185, laments the want of any corresponding word in modern psychology, and proposes to supply it by the term ‘conative’ faculties. The ὄρεξις, so far as it is described at all, is noticed in de Anima II 3, sub init., and afterwards more at length in III 9 and 10; compare also Eth. N. VI 2. The first of these passages enumerates the ascending stages or forms of life which characterise and distinguish the ascending orders of plants and animals. The first, τὸ θρεπτικόν, the life or principle of growth and nutrition, is the lowest form, and is characteristic of plants, which have no other. The second stage in the development of life is τὸ αἰσθητικόν, with which τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, the ultimate origin of motion in the living animal, is inseparably connected; (sensation implies impulse) both of them being instinctive and both together constituting animal as distinguished from plant. But the lowest animals have no power of motion; consequently the next stage in the upward course is τὸ κινητικόν, local motion, or locomotion in space, κατὰ τόπον. The last, which is peculiar to humanity, is τὸ διανοητικόν, the intellectual element, divided into νοῦς and διάνοια. The ὀρεκτικόν is here divided, 414 b 2, into three classes of faculties, ἐπιθυμία (the appetites, or sensual desires)1, θυμός (the passions, anger, love, hatred, and all the more violent and impetuous emotions, the angry passions especially—the word is as old as Homer, a relic of antiquity, and as a psychological term very vague and indistinct), and lastly βούλησις, which seems here to include ‘will’ as well as ‘wish’. The will is more directly implied, though never disengaged and distinctly expressed, in the προαίρεσις the moral faculty of deliberate purpose: this consists of an intellectual, and also of an impulsive element, the spontaneous origin of moral action which it is the office of the intellectual part to direct aright; the προαίρεσις accordingly is ὄρεξις βουλευτική, Eth. N. VI 2, 1139 a 24, or again, ὀρεκτικος νους ὄρεξις διανοητική, ib. b 4. These two elements in combination, (the προαίρεσις), are the ἀρχὴ πράξεως, ib. a 32, of which the ὄρεξις (and so de Anima III 9. 2, 3, ἓν δὴ τὸ κινοῦν, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν,) is the original moving agent: and this, though not expressly so called, is in fact the will. In de Anima III cc. 9, 10, are repeated the statements of II 3, with the addition of further details. Of the three component elements of ὄρεξις, the second, θυμός, is omitted: and the five stages of life of the former passage still remaining five, the intellectual is now divided into two, τὸ νοητικόν, and τὸ βουλευτικόν (the speculative and practical reason), and the κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον has disappeared. How this division of the ψυχή, soul or life, is to be reconciled with that of the Ethics II 4, into πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις, Aristotle has not told us, and no one I believe has yet discovered. Of the three sets of ὀρέξεις above mentioned ὀργή must belong to the θυμός.

μετὰ λύπης] all the πάθη being attended by pleasure or pain; or sometimes both, as ὀργή. Note on c. 1. 8.

φαινομένης and φαινομένην] are both emphatic; not merely ‘apparent’ and unreal, but ‘manifest, conspicuous, evident’. φαινομένη τιμωρία, ‘a punishment of which the effect can be perceived’, (comp. II 3. 16, and note; II 4. 31, αἴσθεσθαι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.) and διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν, ‘due to a manifest slight’; a slight which is so manifest that it cannot escape observation; and therefore because it has been noticed by everybody, requires the more exemplary punishment in the way of compensation. It is because anger is an impulse towards this punishment or vengeance that can be seen, and accompanied with pain until this impulse is quieted by satisfaction, that we are told in I 11. 9, ‘that no one is angry with one who appears to be beyond the reach of his vengeance, or with those who are very far superior to him in power’.

With φαινομένῃς, for φανερᾶς, comp. I 7. 31 (note), 8. 6; 9. 32; II 10. 1; 11. 1; III 2. 9, διὰ τὸ παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι, compared with II 23. 30, where the same phrase occurs with φανερὰ εἶναι for φαίνεσθαι. Topic. H 3, 153 a 31, ὁποίου ἂν μάλιστα φανῇ ἐναντίος ὁρισμός. Eth. Nic. III 7, 1113 b 19, εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται, καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν κ.τ.λ. Parv. Nat. de Long. Vit. c. 5, sub init. φαίνεται γὰρ οὕτως. Compare also, alike for the sense and the expression, Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 b 28, ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ὀργή ἐστιν: and Top. B 2, 109 b 36, the parallel case of envy, εἰ γὰρ φθόνος ἐστὶ λύπη ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ εὐπραγίᾳ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν τινός. Plato Phaedo 84 C, Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, (as plainly appeared in his face and gesture). Eth. Eudem. III 1, 1229 b 12 (quoted in note on II 5. 1), is a good instance.

ὀλιγωρίαν] ‘slight esteem or regard’, ‘slight’. The cause of anger is stated so nearly in the same terms in Rhet. ad Alex. 34 (35). 11, ὀργὴν δέ (ἐμποιήσομεν), ἐὰν ἐπιδεικνύωμεν παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον ὠλιγωρημένους ἠδικημένους, τῶν φίλων ἐκείνων, αὐτοὺς ὧν κηδόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν αὐτοί, that one might almost suppose that the two explanations are derived from some common source, perhaps a definition of anger current in the earlier treatises on Rhetoric, Thrasymachus' ἔλεοι (Rhet. III 1. 7, Plat. Phaedr. 267 C), and the like.

A valuable commentary on this explanation of the cause of anger, the coincidence between the two being manifestly accidental, is to be found in Prof. Bain's work on The Emotions and the Will, p. 166, ch. ix. § 3, on the ‘irascible emotion’. “These two facts both pertain,” he says, “to the nature of true anger, the discomposure of mind from the circumstance of another man's intention in working evil against us, and the cure of this discomposure by the submission or suffering of the agent.” I will only add one remark upon this interesting subject; that when Aristotle assigns ὀλιγωρία, the contempt and indifference to our feelings and sense of personal dignity implied in the notion of ‘slight’, as the main cause of the emotion of anger, he is thinking only of the angry passion as excited against a fellow man. Yet we are angry with a dog that bites, or a cat that scratches us2, and here there cannot in all cases be any sense of undeserved contempt or indifference to provoke the angry feeling; though perhaps sometimes it may be increased by such an act of aggression, if the animal happen to be a pet or favourite, in which case we may extend (by analogy) human feelings to the brute, comparing him unconsciously with a friend who has injured us, and forgetting the intellectual and moral differences of the two, which aggravate the offence in the human subject. Seneca denies the capacity of anger to all but man: de Ira, I 3. 4, dicendum est feras ira carere et omnia praeter hominem.

τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν (‘him’ i. e. αὑτόν, ‘himself’) τῶν αὐτοῦ] This phrase, which is unusually elliptical—even for Aristotle—must it seems be thus filled up and explained. τῶν εἰς αὐτόν means τῶν ἀδικηθέντων or simply πραχθέντων εἰς αὐτόν, ‘offences or acts committed against oneself’, and ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν is, ‘slight or contemptuous indifference of, i. e. shewn in, evidenced by, offences &c.’: in supplying the ellipse in the other part of the phrase, τῶν αὐτοῦ, we are guided by a similar expression, c. 8 § 7, συμβεβηκότα αὑτῷ (so the MSS here) τῶν αὑτοῦ, ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι αὑτῷ τῶν αὑτοῦ; in both of them the indef. pronoun is omitted, τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ in c. 2. 1, and τινί in the two other places.

τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος3, the last term of the definition, adds to the offence at the slight which provokes anger the consciousness or feeling that the slight is something which is not our due: by a slight the sense of personal dignity is offended: we know that we do not deserve it, and are the more enraged. This is a necessary qualification—a συμβεβηκὸς καθ᾽ αὑτό, and therefore added to the definition—because there may be cases in which an insult or injury arouses no angry feeling, when the person insulted is very far inferior in rank and condition to the offender or of a very abject and submissive temper, or if the power of the aggressor is so great and imposing, that the injured person is terrified and daunted instead of angry, II 3. 10. So at least Aristotle: but I am more inclined to agree with Seneca on this point, who to a supposed objection to his definition, cupiditas ulciscendi, replies thus, de Ira, I 3. 2, Primum diximus cupiditatem esse poenae exigendae, non facultatem: concupiscunt autem komines et quae non possunt. Deinde nemo tam humilis est, qui poenam vel summi hominis sperare non possit: ad nocendum potentes sumus. And anger is apt to be blind and unreasonable. This is an answer to I 11. 9, already referred to.

The definition therefore of anger in full, is as follows: ‘an impulsive desire, accompanied by pain (and also pleasure, as is afterwards added), of vengeance (punishment of, and compensation for, an offence) visible or evident (in its result), due to a manifest (and unmistakeable) slight (consisting, or shewn) in (insults, indignities, wrongs) directed against ourselves, or (any) of our friends, when (we feel that) the slight is undeserved’; or literally, ‘is not naturally and properly belonging to us’, not our due, in consideration of our rank and importance or of our personal merits and qualifications.

Bacon's Essay, Of Anger, has one point at least in common with Aristotle's delineation of it. “The causes and motives of anger are chiefly three. First to be too sensible of hurt; for no man is angry that feels not himself hurt... The next is, the apprehension and construction of the injury offered to be, in the circumstances thereof, full of contempt: for contempt is that which putteth an edge upon anger, as much or more than the hurt itself.” “For raising and appeasing anger in another; it is done chiefly by choosing of times, when men are forwardest and worst disposed, to incense them. Again, by gathering all that you can find out to aggravate the contempt.”

1 This reference of ἐπιθυμία to the class of ὀρέξεις indicates, as Plutarch, de Virt. Mor. c. 3 (ap. Heitz, Verlor. Schrift. Arist. p. 171), has pointed out, a change in the Aristotelian psychology, from the Platonic tripartite division of the human nature, intellectual and moral, which he originally held—ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψεν, i. e. in the lost dialogue περὶ ο̂ικαιοσύνης, according to Heitz: the θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν are actually distinguished, Topic. B 7, 113 a 36—b 3, and Δ 5, 126 a 8—13, where we have the three, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμοειο̂ές, τὸ λογιστικόν (in both passages τὸ θυμοειδές is assigned as the seat of ὀργή); and the division is certainly implied in Polit. IV (VII) 7, 1327 b 36, seq., where the author is criticising the Republic to the views expressed in the de Anima, in which the Platonic division is criticised, condemned, and rejected. Plutarch, l. c., p. 442 B, after the statement above quoted, continues, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ μὲν θυμοειδὲς τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ προσένειμεν, ὡς ἐπιθυμίαν τινὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὄντα καὶ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως.

2 On the manner in which anger vents itself upon all sorts of objects indiscriminately, see Plut. de cohibenda ira, p. 455 D, θυμῷ δ᾽ ἄθικτον οὐδὲν οὐδ̓ ἀνεπιχείρητον: ἀλλ̓ ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ πολεμίοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γονεῦσι, καὶ θεοῖς νὴ Δία, καὶ θηρίοις, καὶ ἀψύχοις σκεύεσι, which is further illustrated by some examples.

3 This appears likewise in the Stoic definition quoted above. I believe it has not hitherto been noticed that the four terms usually employed in Greek to express the notion of duty or obligation may be distinguished as implying four different sources of obligation, and represent appeals to four different principles by which our actions are guided. The four are προσήκει, δεῖ, χρή, πρέπει. The first, τὸ προσῆκον, expresses a natural connexion or relationship, and hence a law of nature, the prescriptions of φύσις; as οἱ προσήκοντες are our natural relations. This, therefore, is the form of obligation that nature imposes upon us, or natural propriety. The second, δεῖ, is of course connected with δεῖν, ‘to bind’, and δεσμός, and denotes the ‘binding nature of an ob-ligation’, which is equally suggested by the Lat. obligatio. τὸ δέον is therefore the moral bond, the binding engagement, by which we are bound to do what is right. The third, χρή, τὸ χρεών, appeals to the principle of utility or expediency, χρῆσθαι, χρεία, by which human conduct is directed as a principle of action, and accordingly expresses the obligation of a man's duty to himself, and the necessary regard for his own interest which the law of self-preservation requires. Besides these, we have πρέπει, τὸ πρέπον; decorum, quod decet, Cic. de Off. 1. 27, quod aptum est in omni vita; the befitting, the becoming; which represents the general notion of fitness or propriety: that principle of ἁρμονία or κοσμιότης (and the κόσμος), of harmony and adaptation, which Dr Clarke selected as the basis of all morality, and styled ‘the fitness of things’. Our English words ought and duty, expressive of moral obligation in general, are both of them borrowed from the notion of ‘a debt,’ which is ‘owed’ in the one case, and ‘due’ from us in the other, to our neighbour; comp. ὀφείλειν, ὤφελον. “Owe no man any thing, but to love one another.”

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