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So far of the subjects of anger; next of its objects. First, anger is provoked by ridicule (contempt expressed in laughter), mockery, jeering; all of which imply ὕβρις, a wanton unprovoked attack upon a man's feelings and personal dignity. χλευάζειν, probably connected with χεῖλος or χέλος (χελύνη) ‘the lip’ (so Valck.), ‘to shoot out the lips’ in mockery and derision. Compare the analogous ἐρεσχελεῖν which may possibly be ἐρέσοειν χέλος expressing the same action. χλευάζειν, χλευασμός and χλευασία, appear frequently in Demosth. and occasionally in other authors: in Rhet. II 3. 9 we find χλευαστής. In Top. Z 6, 144 a 5, we have καθάπερ οἱ τὸν προπηλακισμὸν ὕβριν μετὰ χλευασίας ὁριζόμενοι: ἡ γὰρ χλευασία ὕβρις τις, ὥστ᾽ οὐ διαφορὰ ἀλλ̓ εἶδος ἡ χλευασία. χλευασία therefore is a ‘kind’ of ὕβρις, which exactly corresponds with the view of it taken here. σκώπτειν, is not easily distinguished from the preceding, except by the greater frequency of its occurrence. It expresses an ill-natured joke, sneering, taunting, gibing at, another, for the purpose of bringing him into ridicule. This is the ‘scornful jest’, which, as Pope says, is ‘most bitter’. σκῶμμα or σκῶψις is therefore opposed to εὐτραπελία, the easy well-bred pleasantry which distinguishes the conversation and compoposition of the accomplished gentleman. The ill-natured intention implied in σκώπτειν appears incidentally in the phrase λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον, which indicates that it is always attended with pain to the object of it, Eth. N. IV 14, 1128 a 7: and again this its ordinary character appears Ib. line 25, seq. πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὁριστέον τῷ λέγειν ἃ πρέπει ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; (neither of which evidently belonged to the ordinary character and operation of the σκῶμμα), and again, line 30, τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τι ἐστίν. I suppose that the difference between this and χλευασμός must be something of this kind: χλευάζειν ‘mockery’ may be conveyed by the gesture or tone of voice or the manner as well as by the actual words, and is therefore the more general expression of contempt as conveyed by language or manner: in σκῶμμα the contempt is conveyed or embodied in a joke or taunting phrase. It occurs, as might be expected, constantly in Aristophanes, who dealt more largely in the commodity itself than most other writers. An examination of the passages where it is used by this author will help to confirm what I have said of the ill-natured use of it; for instance, Pac. 740, ἐς τὰ ῥάκια σκώπτοντας ἀεὶ καὶ τοῖς φθειρσὶν πολεμοῦντας, Nub. 540, οὐδ᾽ ἔσκωπτε τοὺς φαλακρούς, and so of the rest. A second class of persons who are special objects of angry feeling, are ‘those who inflict such injuries as bear upon them the marks of wanton outrage. These must be such as are neither in retaliation (for an injury already inflicted on the aggressor) nor beneficial to those who inflict them; for when this is the case’ (by this time, now at length; note on ἤδη, I 1. 7) ‘then (and not till then) they are thought to be due to a wanton, malicious, unprovoked, intention to offend’—ὕβρις, the worst of the three kinds of ὀλιγωρία by which anger is provoked; §§ 3, 5.
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