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Top. XVII. Inference from results or consequents to antecedents, parity of the one implies parity or identity of the other1: if, for instance, the admission of the birth of the gods equally with that of their death, leads to the result of denying the eternity of their existence—in the former case there was a time when they were not, as in the other there is a time when they will not be—then the two assertions (the antecedents) may be regarded as equivalent, or the same in their effect, and for the purposes of the argument ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν, because they both lead to the same result or consequent; so that one can be put for the other, whichever happens to suit your argument.

On Xenophanes, see note on I 15. 29, and the reff. On this passage, Müllach, Fr. Phil. Gr., Xenoph. Fragm. Inc. 7, “Hoc dicto veteres poetae perstringuntur, qui quum diis aeternitatem (potius immortalitatem) tribuerent, eos tamen hominum instar ortos esse affirmabant eorumque parentes et originem copiose enarrabant.rdquo; And to nearly the same effect, Karsten, Xenoph. Fr. Rell. XXXIV. p. 85. The saying against the assertors of the birth of the gods is not found amongst the extant fragments, but the arguments by which he refuted this opinion is given by Aristotle (?) de Xenoph. Zen. et Gorg. init. p. 974. 1, seq. and by Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. f. 6 A, ap. Karsten p. 107, comp. p. 109.

For καὶδέ, see note on 1 6. 22.

‘And in fact, as a general rule, we may always assume’ (subaudi δεῖ, χρή, aut tale aliquid) the result of either of two things to be the same with that of the other (ἑκατέρου), (or with ἑκάστου, as A^{c}, adopted by Spengel, the result of anything, i. e. any things, two or more, that we have to argue about) ‘as in the example, “what you are about to decide upon is not Isocrates, but a study and practice, whether or not philosophy deserves to be studied.”’ Whether you decide upon Isocrates or his pursuit and study, the inference or result is the same (ταὐτόν), and can be deduced equally from both. I have here adopted Spengel's emendation of Isocrates for Socrates, “quam emendationem,” as Spengel modestly says, “Victorius si integram vidisset Antidosin nobis non reliquisset”. It is given in his Specim. Comm. in Ar. Rhet., Munich, 1839, p. 37. A comparison of this passage with Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως, § 173, οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἐμοῦ μέλλετε μόνον τὴν ψῆφον διοίσειν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, πολλοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν, certifies the emendation. Even Bekker has accepted it. At the same time the vulgata lectio Σωκράτους, as Victorius interprets it, yields a very sufficient sense, thus more briefly expressed by Schrader, “Socrate damnato simul damnabitur studium sapientiae: Socrate servato servabuntur sapientiae studia;” Socrates and his study or pursuit stand or fall together; to condemn Socrates, is to condemn philosophy: and might even be thought to be confirmed by κρίνειν, which more immediately suggests a judicial decision.

‘And that (the result, effect, consequence of) giving earth and water is the same as, equivalent to, slavery’. The demand of ‘earth and water’ by the Persian monarchs from a conquered prince or state, in token of submission, and as a symbol of absolute dominion or complete possession of the soil—therefore equivalent to slavery, δουλεύειν—is referred to frequently by Herodotus, IV 126, Darius to Idanthyrsus, the Scythian king, δεσπότῃ τῷ σῷ δῶρα φέρων γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ. V 17, the same to Amyntas king of Macedonia, Ib. 18, the same to the Athenians, Ib. 73, VII 131, 133, 138, 163. Plut. Themist. c. 6. Plin. N. H. XXII 4 (ap. Bähr), Summum apud antiquos signum victoriae erat herbam porrigere victos, hoc est terra et altrice ipsa humo et humatione etiam cedere: quem morem etiam nunc durare apud Germanos scio. It appears from Ducange, Gloss. s. v. Investitura, that this custom was still continued in the transmission of land during the middle ages (Bähr).

‘And participation in the general peace (would be equivalent to) doing (Philip's) bidding’. The Schol. on this passage writes thus: Φίλιππος κατηνάγκασε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἵν᾽ εἰρηνεύωσιν μετ̓ αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χῶραι, δὲ Δημοσθένης ἀντιπίπτων λέγει ὅτι τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης μετὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου ἡμᾶς, ὡς καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας, ἐστι τὸ ποιεῖν προστάττει Φίλιππος. Spengel was the first to point out (Specim. Comm. u. s. p. 39) that the κοινὴ εἰρήνη here referred to is the same of which mention occurs several times in a speech περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν—attributed to Demosthenes, but more probably by Hyperides; see the Greek argument, and Grote, H. Gr. [chap. XCI] XII 21 and note— §§ 10, 11, 17, 19, 30. The κοινὴ εἰρήνη, and the συνθῆκαι πρὸς Ἀλέξ. both denote the convention at Corinth of the deputies of all the Greek states, with the exception of the Lacedaemonians who refused to appear, in 336 B. C., “which recognised Hellas as a confederacy under the Macedonian prince (Alexander, not Philip) as imperator, president, or executive head and arm.” Grote, u. s. p. 18. The speech π. τ. π. Ἀλέξ. ς., according to the same authority, p. 21, was delivered in 335. But neither Aristotle's quotation, nor the Scholiast's comment, can refer to this speech, as Spengel himself observes. If the Scholiast is right in describing the opposition of Demosthenes as directed against Philip, it must be referred to a different speech delivered by him against the former agreement of a similar kind with Philip, after Chaeronea, which took place two years earlier than that with Alexander, in 338. Grote, u. s., p. 17. Comp. XI 700. [A. Schaefer, Dem. u. s. Zeit, III 186—193.]

This passage has been already referred to in the Introduction, on the question of the date of publication of the Rhetoric, p. 28; and again, 46 note 2, on the references to Demosthenes in the same work.

‘Of the two alternatives (the affirmative or negative side, whether the result is or is not the same, either may be taken, whichever happens to be serviceable’. Or, as Victorius, ‘of the two alternatives, which though in themselves different, yet in the result are the same, we may always take that which best suits our argument’.

1Von der gleichheit der folgen auf gleichheit des ihnen zu grunde liegenden schliessende.” Brandis [Philologus IV i.].

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