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Top. III. ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλλῃλα] The argument, from mutual relation of terms or notions. This is treated, Top. B 8, 114 a 13, under the head of oppositions or opposites, ἀντιθέσεις, or ἀντικείμενα, of which it is one of the four varieties. For example, inferences may be drawn from double to half, and vice versa, from triple to multiple and the converse; from knowing or knowledge ἐπιστήμη, to the thing known τὸ ἐπιστητόν; from sight as a sensation, to the thing seen as an object of sense. The logical objections, ἐνστάσεις, that may be brought against it are also given [Grote's Aristotle I. pp. 423, 424]. “Latina schola vocat relata. Talia sunt ista: facere pati; emere vendere; dare accipere; locare conducere: et nomina ista; pater filius; dominus servus; discipulus magister.” Schrader. He also cites as an example, Cic. Orat. XLI 142, Sin ea non modo eos ornat penes quos est, sed etiam universam rempublicam, cur aut discere turpe quod scire honestum est, aut quod nosse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum docere: a good illustration of the argument from relatives. This topic has occurred before, II 19. 12, as one of the topics of ‘the possible’: where the parallel passages of Cic. Topic. XI 49, and de Inv. I 30. 47, will be found in the note. On the same, Quintilian, Inst. Or. V 10. 78, Illa quoque quae ex rebus mutuam confirmationem praestantibus ducuntur (quae proprii generis videri quidam volunt, et vocant ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, Cicero ex rebus sub eandem rationem venientibus) fortiter consequentibus iunxerim (I should be bold to add to consequents): si portorium Rhodiis locare honestum est et Hermocreonti conducere; et quod discere honestum, et docere (from de Inventione, u. s.). The argument is, ‘If it may be said of one (of the two terms of the relation) that he has done rightly or justly, then the same terms may be applied to what the other has suffered (ποιεῖν and πάσχειν, agent and patient, are relative opposites1); and similarly (κελεύειν is relative to πείθεσθαι) command implies obedience, and the converse (this may be inferred as the ordinary, probable, not a necessary consequence): as Diomedon the taxcollector argued about the taxes (i. e. the farming of them) “If it is no disgrace to you to sell, neither is it to us to buy.” οἷον ὡς] This pleonasm occurs again in § 6, οἷον ὡς Ἰφικράτης. Of Diomedon, nothing is known but what we learn from the passage. ‘And if the terms fairly or justly can be applied to the sufferer, then also to the doer (or perpetrator) of the act; and conversely, if to the doer then also to the sufferer’. If there be any difference between this and the preceding, εἰ γὰρ θατέρῳ—πεπονθέναι, it is that the first is the general expression of the relation between agent and patient, the second is a particular exemplification of it, in the justification of what would otherwise be a crime. ‘But this admits of a fallacy: for though it may be true (in general, or in itself) that deserved suffering involves the justice of the punish ment, yet perhaps (it does not always follow that) you should be the agent of it, that the punishment should be inflicted by you (any particular individual)’. This fallacy is actually illustrated from Theodectes' Orestes, infra c. 24 § 3. The argument is used by Orestes in his trial for the murder of his mother Clytemnestra. In the trial scene of the Eumenides this point is taken into consideration, and the act of Orestes justified by Apollo and Athena on the general ground of the superiority of male to female; the father, the author of his existence, has a higher claim upon the son's affection and duty than the mother, and Orestes was right in avenging his father's death even upon her. Aesch. Eumen. 625 seq., 657 seq., 738—40. Comp. Eur. Orest. 528, where Tyndareus, Clytemnestra's father, says, θυγατὴρ δ᾽ ἐμὴ θανοῦς᾿ ἔπραξεν ἔνδικα: ἀλλ̓ οὐχὶ πρὸς τοῦδ̓ εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτὴν θανεῖν: and Orestes, ib. 546, defends himself on the same grounds as in Aeschylus, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἀνόσιός εἰμι μητέρα κτανών, ὅσιος δέ γ̓ ἕτερον ὄνομα, τιμωρῶν πατρί. 552, πατὴρ μὲν ἐφύτευσεν με κ.τ.λ. 562, ἐπὶ δ̓ ἔθυσα μητέρα, ἀνόσια μὲν δρῶν ἀλλὰ τιμωρῶν πατρί. Electr. 1244, (quoted by Victorius on φησὶ δ᾽ ἀποκρινόμενος—κτανεῖν,) the Dioscuri to Orestes, δίκαια μέν νυν ἥδ᾽ ἔχει: σὺ δ̓ οὐχὶ δρᾷς. The case of Orestes and Clytemnestra became one of the stock examples in the rhetorical books. Auct. ad Heren. I 10. 17, I 15. 25, 16. 26. Cic. de Inv. I 13. 18, 22. 31. Quint. Inst. Or. III 11. 4, and 11 seq., VII 4. 8. ‘And therefore a separate investigation is required, not only whether the sufferer deserved to suffer, but also whether the doer had a right to do it (as, to inflict the punishment), and then make the appropriate use of either: because sometimes there is a difference in cases of this kind (i. e. both kinds of right are not always found together: the punishment may be just, but you may not be the proper person to inflict it), and there is nothing to prevent (the case being) as it is put in Theodectes’ Alcmaeon (where this ‘division’, διαλαβόντα, is actually made): “And did no mortal abhor thy mother?” This is a question put to Alcmaeon, probably by Alphesiboea (Victorius), whose reply includes the words actually quoted, ἀλλὰ διαλαβόντα χρὴ σκοπεῖν, with, of course, a good deal more about the murder which is omitted. ‘To which (Alcmaeon) says in reply “nay but we must first distinguish, and then consider the case.”’ (The division or distinction here spoken of is well illustrated by the parallel passage, the case of Orestes, II 24. 3.) ‘And when Alphesiboea asks “How?”, he replies, “To her they adjudged death, (i. e. decided that she was justly slain,) but (decided also) that I should not have been the murderer.”’ From this reply it may be gathered that the judges in Theodoctes' play had made the requisite distinction: the death of Eriphyle they agreed was deserved, but it was not for her son to inflict the penalty. “Alcmaeon Eriphylen matrem suam interfecerat, quod haec Amphiarai mariti salutem prodiderat” (Alcmaeon's act, like that of Orestes, was justified by the implied murder of his father—the treachery which caused his death). “Alphesiboea fuit Alcmaeonis uxor.” Schrader. This fragment is quoted by Wagner, Theodect. Fragm. Alcm. I, but without a word of commentary, III 118. On Theodectes of Phaselis, the rhetorician and dramatic poet, the friend of Aristotle, who frequently refers to his compositions in both kinds, and on the rhetorical character of his writings, which is well illustrated here and in II 24. 3, see Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. ch. XXVI § 7, who refers to these passages. Also, Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX Vol. III p. 260 seq.2 To the passages there quoted on this author, add Theopomp. Hist. Phil. Lib. I, Fr. 26, ap. Fragm. Hist. Gr. (Didot) p. 282; and a ref. to his Philoctetes, Eth. Nic. VII 8, 1150 b 9. Two other examples follow, but, as Spengel (Tract on the Rhet. in Trans. Bav. Acad., Munich 1851, p. 46) justly says, they have no connexion with the preceding example from Theodectes, and the division which it exemplifies, but are illustrations of the general topic. Retaining the text (with Bekker) as it stands, we must accordingly understand the words ἔστι δ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ—μὴ κτανεῖν as parenthetical, and suppose that the author, after the insertion of this as a note, proceeds with his exemplification of the general topic. Spengel, u. s., p. 47, suggests that they may have been a later addition by the author himself, a note written on the margin, which has got out of its place. My supposition, of a note, not written on the margin, but embodied in the text as a parenthesis—which is quite in Ar.'s manner—will answer the purpose equally well, and save the text in addition. ‘And, another example, the trial of Demosthenes and those who slew Nicanor; for as they were adjudged to have slain him justly (the act), it was held that his death (the passion or suffering) was just’. This is cited by Dion. Halicarn., Ep. I ad Amm. c. 12, as a proof that Aristotle was acquainted with and quoted the speeches of Demosthenes, referring it to the case (against Aeschines) for the Crown. In doing so he omits περί. Of course ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη cannot have this meaning: and it is most probable that it is not the Orator that is here referred to, but Thucydides' general, or some other person of the name. Neither is anything known of Nicanor and his murderers. On the use of Demosthenes' name in the Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 46, note 2. ‘And again, the case of him that died at Thebes; concerning whom he (the spokesman of the defendants) bade them (the judges) decide whether he (the murdered man) deserved death, since there was no injustice in putting to death one that deserved it’. “In hanc quoque historiam nunquam incidi.” Victorius. Buhle rightly refers it to the case of Euphron, introduced as an episode, and described at length by Xenophon, Hellen. VII 3. There had been one of the usual quarrels between the aristocratical (οἱ βέλτιστοι) and the popular party at Sicyon, of which Euphron took advantage, with the design of making himself master of the city. But knowing that as long as the Thebans occupied the acropolis he had no chance of success, he collected a large sum of money and went to Thebes with the intention of bribing the Thebans to assist him. Some Sicyonian exiles learning this, followed him to Thebes and murdered him in the acropolis. Here the murderers were brought to trial before the magistrates and council, who were already there assembled. The accusation of the magistrates, and the speech for the defence, are both recorded. All the accused with one exception asserted their innocence: one alone admitted the fact, and in justification of it pleaded for himself and the rest the guilt of the man that had been slain, just as Aristotle here describes it. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Θηβαῖοι ταῦτα ἀκούσαντες ἔγνωσαν δίκαια τὸν Εὔφρονα πεπονθέναι. But the Sicyonians (οἱ πολῖται), interpreting the word ‘good’ in the sense of good to them (τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἑαυτῶν), said he was a good man, and buried him in the market-place, and adore him as the (second) founder of their city (ὡς ἀρχηγέτην), like Brasidas at Amphipolis (Thuc. V. 11). The whole of this section, with the exception of the last example, καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος, is quoted by Dionysius l. c. in support of his view that Demosthenes' speeches had been delivered before the composition of the Rhetoric, and were accessible to its author. The difference between the text which he seems to have used and that now received is very great, and apparently unaccountable. Besides minor discrepancies, the entire quotation from Theodectes, ἐνιότε γὰρ—κτανεῖν is omitted; and the clauses preceding and following stand thus, ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογίσασθαι. οὐ γὰρ εἰ δικαίως ἔπαθεν ᾁν, καὶ δικαίως ὑπὸ τούτου πέπονθεν, ὡς ὁ φόνου ἄξια ποιήσας πατήρ, εἰ ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ ἀπάγεται, δεῖ σκοπεῖν χωρὶς......ὁποτέρως ἂν ἁρμόττῃ. ἐνιότε γὰρ διαφωνεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον. ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀλκμαίωνι τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, καὶ οἷον ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη κ.τ.λ. All the alterations seem to be for the worse, and in one of them, ἔπαθεν ἄν for ἔπαθέν τι, the grammatical blunder betrays corruption. The additional example of the father and son introduced by Dionysius is, as Spengel observes, not here in point. The very example for the sake of which the extract was made is mutilated, and the explanation, ἐπεὶ γὰρ— αποθανεῖν, omitted: from which Spengel very justly argues that it could not have been in the MS that he used: if he had read it there, he could not have so absurdly misapplied the example to the case for the Crown: Spengel has reviewed the two passages in connexion in the tract above cited, pp. 44—47. Our text, which is, when properly explained, perfectly consistent and intelligible, is retained by Bekker and seems to require no alteration: at all events none of Dionysius' variations could be advantageously introduced.
1 The relation of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν, agent and patient, action and passion, is well illustrated in the argument between Polus and Socrates, Plat. Gorg. c. 32, 476 B, seq. It is there shewn by analogy—the usual Socratic and Platonic method—that the relation between the two prevails throughout its various applications, and therefore that crime and punishment follow the same law, and that justice or desert in the punishment of the criminal or patient implies the like justice in the infliction of it by the agent, and vice versa.
2 The unwarrantable identification, there supposed, p. 261, of the Theodectea with the Ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον, has been sufficiently corrected in Introd. to Rhet. pp. 55—67, on the Theodectea; where more information will be found about the author and his works.
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