previous next


Top. V. The consideration of time. This kind of argument, though important in Rhetoric, is inappropriate in Dialectics, and therefore receives only a passing notice in the Topics, B 4, III b 24, ἔτι ἐπὶ τὸν χρόνον ἐπιβλέπειν, εἴ που διαφωνεῖ, where the word ἐπιβλέπειν shews that it is a mere passing glance, a cursory observation, that it requires: and in Cicero's Topics it is altogether omitted [Grote's Ar. I p. 418]. The application of it in Top. B 11, 115 b 11, referred to by Brandis, is different, and indeed unsuited to rhetorical purposes.

On this topic of time, and its importance in Rhetoric, Quintilian, Inst. Orat. V 10. 42 seq., after a preliminary division of time into (1) general (now, formerly, hereafter,) and (2) special or particular time, proceeds, Quorum utrorumque ratio et in consiliis (genus deliberativum) quidem, et in illo demonstrativo (τῷ ἐπιδεικτικῷ γένει) genere versatur; sed in iudiciis frequentissima est. Nam et iuris quaestiones facit, et qualitatem distinguit, et ad coniecturam plurimum confert (contributes very greatly to the establishment of the fact—the status coniecturalis or issue of fact— and especially to the refutation of the assertion of an alleged fact: this is illustrated by the cases following); ut quum interim probationes inexpugnabiles afferat, quales sunt, si dicatur (ut supra posui) signator, qui ante diem tabularum decessit: aut commisisse aliquid, vel quum infans esset, vel quum omnino natus non esset. Further, §§ 45—48, arguments may be readily drawn ex iis quae ante rem facta sunt, aut ex coniunctis rei, aut insequentibus, or from time past, present (instans), and future: and these three are then illustrated. Inferences may be drawn from what is past or present, to the future, from cause to effect; and conversely from present to past, from effect to cause. It seems that the two principal modes of applying the topic of time to Rhetoric are (1) that described by Quintilian, in establishing, or, more frequently, refuting the assertion of a fact, which is the chief use that is made of it in the forensic branch—this is again referred to, II 24. 11, on which see Introd. p. 274—the consideration of probabilities of time in matters of fact: and (2) the καιρός, the right time, the appropriate occasion, which may be employed by the deliberative orator or politician in estimating the expediency, immediate or prospective, of an act or course of policy; and by the panegyrist to enhance the value and importance of any action of his hero, or of anything else which may be the object of his encomium. On this use of καιρός comp. I 7. 32, I 9.38, and the notes. For illustrations, see Top. Γ 2, 117 a 26—b 2.

‘Another from the consideration of time, as Iphicrates said in the case (subaudi δίκῃ) against Harmodius, “Had I before the deed was done laid claim to the statue, provided I did it, you would have granted it me; will you then (the inference) refuse to grant it me now that I have done it? Do not, then, first make the promise in anticipation, and then, when you have received the benefit, defraud me of it.”’ The case, or speech, as it is here called ‘against Harmodius’, is also known by the name of περὶ τῆς εἰκόνος: this was the statue which was granted him in commemoration of the famous defeat of the Lacedaemonian μόρα in B. C. 392. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 243, Ask the judges why they made the presents, and set up the statues, to Chabrias, Iphicrates, and Timotheus. The answer is, Ἰφικράτει ὅτι μόραν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπέκτεινεν. [Dem. Lept. 482 § 84, τιμῶντές ποτε Ἰφικράτην οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν ἐτιμήσατε...ib. § 86, οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμῖν ἁρμόττει δοκεῖν παρὰ μὲν τὰς εὐεργεσίας οὕτω προχείρως ἔχειν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτοὺς τοὺς εὐεργέτας τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνων φίλους, ἐπειδὰν δὲ χρόνος διέλθῃ βραχύς, καὶ ὅσα αὐτοῖς δέδωκατε ταῦτ᾽ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι]. The speech here referred to was attributed by some —as Pseudo-Plutarch vit. Lys. συνέγραψε δὲ λόγον καὶ Ἰφικράτει: τὸν μὲν πρὸς Ἁρμόδιον—to Lysias1, which is denied by Dionysius, de Lysia Iud. c. 12, on two grounds, first the inferiority of the style, which was unworthy of Lysias; and secondly, because Lysias died seven years before the deed for which the statue was granted. Aristotle plainly ascribes it to Iphicrates himself. The speech περὶ τῆς εἰκόνος, is quoted again, § 8. See also Clinton Fasti Hellenici II 113, sub anno 371. It was not till after Iphicrates had resigned his military command, and retired into private life, ἀποδοὺς τὰ στρατεύματα ἰδιώτης γίνεται, that he claimed his statue, μετὰ Ἀλκισθένην ἄρχοντα, i. e. in the archonship of Pharsiclides, B. C. 371. The grant was opposed by Harmodius, a political antagonist.

‘And again to induce the Thebans to allow Philip to pass through their territories into Attica, it is argued that, “had he made the claim (or preferred the request) before he helped them against the Phocians (when they wanted his aid), they would have promised to do so; and therefore it would be monstrous for them now to refuse it, because he threw away his chance (then)’;—behaved liberally or with reckless generosity (so Vict.) on that occasion, and neglected to avail himself of his opportunity, (see the lexicons, s. v. προίεσθαι)—‘and trusted to their honour and good faith’. The former event occurred in B. C. 346, when Philip allied himself with the Thebans and overran Phocis, and so put an end to the Phocian war. An embassy was sent to the Thebans after the capture of Elataea B. C. 339, to request that Philip's troops might be allowed to march through their territory to attack Attica; but was met by a counter-embassy from Athens, proposed and accompanied by Demosthenes, who prevailed upon the Thebans to refuse the request, and conclude an alliance with Athens. κατὰ Λυσιμαχίδην ἄρχοντα, Dionys, Ep. 1 ad Amm. c. 11. On this embassy and the proposals there made, see Demosthenes himself, de Cor. §§ 311, 313, from which it would seem that the words here quoted are not Philip's, but an argument used by his ambassadors. Comp. also § 146, οὔτ᾽ εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐλθεῖν δυνατός... μήτε Θηβαίων διιέντων: and Aesch. c. Ctes. § 151, καὶ γράψειν ἔφη ψήφισμα ( Δημοσθένης)...πέμπειν ὑμᾶς πρέσβεις αἰτήσοντας Θηβαίους διόδον ἐπὶ Φίλιππον, (referred to by Spengel, Specim. Comm. ad Ar. Rhet. Heidelb. 1844, p. 15). In the following year, 338 B. C. ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Χαιρώνδου, was fought the battle of Chaeronea. M. Schmidt (On the date of the Rhet. Halle, 1837, p. 16) uses this passage in fixing the date of Ar.'s work. [See Introd. p. 38.]

Dionys., ad Amm. c. 11, cites the whole of this topic. The only important variations are two manifest blunders; the omission of εἰς before Φωκεῖς, and διέσπευσεν μὴ δώσουσιν for ἐπίστευσε μὴ διήσουσιν.

1 See on this and two other speeches of Iphicrates attributed to Lysias, Sauppe, ad Fragm. Lys. XVIII and LXV. Oratores Attici III 178 and 190; [also Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, p. 335].

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.

An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.

hide Display Preferences
Greek Display:
Arabic Display:
View by Default:
Browse Bar: