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Top. VI. This topic, “the retort which turns the point of what has been said against ourselves upon him who said it,” viz. the adverse party in the law-court or assembly, belongs, as Brandis also remarks, u. s., p. 19, exclusively to Rhetoric. “Cum argumentum ducitur ex iis quae ex moribus vitaque ipsorum dicta sunt, admodumque ipsis congruunt, adversus illum ipsum qui dixit: eminet autem, inquit, hic inter alios, ac vim maximam semper habere existimatus est.” Victorius. That κατά in the definition means ‘against’ and not ‘of’ (in respect of) appears from the example. Iphicrates asks Aristophon, who had accused him of taking bribes to betray the fleet, “Would you have done it yourself? No; I am not like you. Well then, as you admit that you, Aristophon, are incapable of it, must not I, Iphicrates, (your superior in virtue and everything else,) be still more incapable of it?” As Ar. adds, the argument is worth nothing unless the person who uses it is conscious of his own moral superiority, and knows that the audience whom he addresses shares his conviction: employed against an ‘Aristides the Just’, it would be simply ridiculous.

διαφέρει δὲ τρόπος κ.τ.λ.] This is interpreted by Spengel, Specim. Comm. u. s., p. 16 [and ed. 1867], “Mores sunt qui in hac re in discrimen vocantur; mores enim et vita eminet et litigantes discernit.” I doubt if τρόπος, standing thus alone, can mean mores: nor, I think, is the mention of character and manners appropriate in this place: further on it would be suitable. Gaisford's explanation and connexion seem to be upon the whole most satisfactory. “Verba οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳεἴπειεν puto esse διὰ μέσου. His certe seclusis belle procedunt omnia. Sententiae nexus hic est; Excellit autem hic modus (vel locus—reading τόπος), Sed ad fidem accusatori detrahendam.” And in that case, Quintilian's words, V 12. 19, Aristoteles quidem potentissimum putat ex eo qui dicit, si sit vir optimus &c., may be a translation of διαφέρει τρόπος. διαφέρειν, if thus understood, denotes ‘pre-eminence, distinction above others’.

οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ] This is no doubt Sophocles' tragedy of that name: of which four fragments (and one doubtful one) still survive. See Wagner, Fragm. Tr. Gr. 1 388, 9. “Quum Ar. ubi poetarum nomina omisit tantummodo clarissimos quosque respexerit, facile inducimur ut eum Sophoclis Teucrum dixisse credamus.” And Spengel, Spec. Comm. u. s., p. 16 [and ed.] “Sophoclis puto; si alius esset, nomen addidisset.” The same play is quoted again, III 15. 9, whence it appears that Ulysses was one of the characters. In an altercation with Teucer, the latter must be supposed to have used a similar argument, or retort, founded upon his own acknowledged superiority in moral character1. See Wagner l. c. who gives a long account of the subject of the play, and compares it with Pacuvius' play of the same name, supposed to be borrowed from Sophocles.

Aristophon was already celebrated as an orator in 403 B. C. (Clinton, F. H., sub anno.) His fame may be inferred from the frequent and respectful mention of him by Demosthenes especially (see for instance, de Cor. § 219, de Fals. Leg. § 339), Aeschines and Dinarchus. See Baiter et Sauppe, Orat. Att., Ind. Nom. s. v., p. 21, Vol. III. He was an Azenian, Ἀζηνιεύς, and thereby distinguished from his namesake of Collytus, de Cor. § 93. The speech to which Iphicrates here replies was delivered in “the prosecution of Iphicrates by him and Chares for his failure in the last campaign of the Social war, Diod. XVI 15. 21,” (Clint. F. H. sub anno,) in the year 355 B. C., at an already advanced age. See also Sauppe, Fragm. Lys. 65, Or. Att. III 190: and note on Rhet. III 10. 6. He died before 330, the date of the de Corona, Dem. de Cor. § 162. On the speech ὑπὲρ Ἰφικράτους προδοσίας ἀπολογία, attributed to Lysias (rejected by Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 12, comp. note on § 6 supra. on that against Harmodius), from which Iphicrates' saying against Harmodius is supposed to have been extracted, see Sauppe, Fragm. Lys. LXV, (Orat. Att. III 190): and comp. ibid. p. 191, Aristid. Or. 49, who quotes the same words somewhat differently, and, like Aristotle, attributes them directly to Iphicrates, and not to Lysias. [A. Schaefer, Dem. und seine Zeit, I 155.]

Quintilian, V 12. 10, borrows this example, referring it however to a different class of arguments, probationes quas παθητικάς vocant ductas ex affectibus, (he means the ἦθος,) § 9. After quoting the nobilis Scauri defensio, (on which see Introd. p. 151, note 1,) he adds, cui simile quiddam fecisse Iphicrates dicitur, qui cum Aristophontem, quo accusante similis criminis reus erat, interrogasset, an is accepta pecunia rempublicam proditurus esset? isque id negasset; Quod igitur, inquit, tu non fecisses, ego feci? Comp. Spalding's note ad locum.

εἰ προδοίη ἄν] εἰ = πότερον; see Appendix, On ἂν with the optative after certain particles [printed at the end of the notes to Book II].

δεῖ δ᾽ ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ.] ‘But (the person who employs the argument) must have this advantage on his side, that the other (the opponent) would be thought more likely to have done the wrong: otherwise, it would seem absurd, for a man to apply this to an Aristides (the model of justice and integrity) when he brings a charge;—(not so), but only for the discrediting (throwing a doubt upon, making the audience distrust, the credibility) of the accuser: (if ἀλλά be connected with what immediately precedes, to complete the sense, something must be supplied, such as οὐχ οὕτω, ἀλλὰ χρηστέον2), and this, because as a general rule the accuser pretends to be (would be if he could) a better man than the defendant: this (assumption) then always requires confutation’. Should not ἀεί be δεῖ?3

βούλεται] βούλεσθαι like ἐθέλειν frequently implies a tendency, design, intention, or aspiration, real or imaginary—the latter in things inanimate—wants to be, would be, would like to be, if it could; and hence here it denotes the assumption or pretension of superior goodness, ‘he would be better’. Zell, ad Eth. Nic. III 1. 15 (III 2, 1110 b 30, Bk.), Stallbaum ad Phaed. 74 D. Ast ad Phaedr. 230 D, p. 250. Thompson ad eundem locum. Viger, pp. 263, 264, n. 77.

Eth. N. III 2, 1110 b 30, τὸ δ᾽ ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις κ.τ.λ. ‘won't be called’, ‘don't choose to be called’, as if it had the choice. Hist. Anim. I 16. 11 [495 a 32], θέλει γὰρ εἶναι διμερής (wants to be, would be if it could; of a general tendency, intention or plan, not completely carried out) πλεύμων ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτόν: ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. [the Index Aristotelicus does not quote this passage, either under θέλειν or under διμερής, though it is given under πλεύμων]. Ib. VII 3. 4 [583 b 26], αἱ καθάρσεις βούλονται...οὐ μὴν ἐξακριβοῦσί γε κ.τ.λ. (the same); de Part. Anim. IV 10, 29, θελει, Ib. III 7. 2, ἐγκέφαλος βούλεται διμερὴς εἶναι. de Gen. An. II 4, 9, 10 (bis eodem sensu). Ib. V 7. 17, [787 b 19], τὰ δ᾽ ὀστᾶ ζητεῖ τὴν τοῦ νεύρου φύσιν is used in the same sense. This I believe to be a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον, [no instance is given in the Index Aristotelicus, s. v. ζητεῖν, where even the passage just quoted is not cited]). de part. An. IV 2. 10, βούλεται, ‘is designed to be’; so Eth. N. V 7, 1132 a 21, δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον, animated justice, the embodiment of abstract justice—this is what he is intended to be, though he often falls short of it. Ib. c. 8, 1133 b 14, βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. de Anima A 3, 407 a 4, βούλεται, Plato means or intends. Topic. Z 5, 142 b 27, τὸ δὲ γένος βούλεται τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνειν. Ib. c. 13, 151 a 17. Pol. II 6, 1265 b 27, σύνταξις ὅλη β. εἶναι (πολιτεία) ‘is designed, or intended, to be’. Ib. 1266 a 7, ἐγκλίνειν β. πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. Ib. I 5, 1254 b 27, c. 6, 1255 b 3, c. 12, 1259 b 6, et saepe alibi. [“Saepe per βούλεται εἶναι significatur quo quid per naturam suam tendit, sive id assequitur quo tendit, sive non plene et perfecte assequitur.” Index Aristotelicus, where more than forty references are given.]

So Latin velle; Cic. Orat. XXXIII 117, quem volumus esse eloquentem. Hor. A. P. 89, versibus exponi tragicis res comica non vult.

καθόλου δ᾽ ἄτοπός ἐστιν κ.τ.λ.] Und. τρόπος (or τόπος) from above: not as Victorius, who supposes it to mean an absurd man. ‘And in general the use of it is absurd whenever a man censures (taxes) others for something which he does himself, or would do (if he had the opportunity), or exhorts them to do what he does not do now himself, and never would do (under any circumstances)’. The first of these two cases is that of Satan rebuking sin; the second that of one who preaches what he does not practise.

1 Ulysses may be supposed to have accused Teucer of the murder of his brother— comp. Aj. 1012 seq. and 1021, where such a suspicion is hinted at: If you, Ulysses, are shocked at such a crime, do you suppose that I, Teucer, could have been guilty of it? The same argument was employed by Euripides in his Telephus. Fragm. XII, Dindorf, ap. Arist. Acharn. 554. Wagner, II p. 364. Fr. Tel. 24. ταῦτ᾽ οἶδ̓ ὅτι ἂν ἔδρατε (ita Meineke), τὸν δὲ Τήλεφον οὐκ οἰόμεσθα; comp. Valck. Diatr. ad Fr. Eurip. p. 211, “Telephi verba cum Ulysse loquentis.” Ulysses had been making some charge against Telephus, who makes this reply: You would have done so and so: am I not as likely, or still more so, to have done the same? Plut. ἀποφθ. βασιλέων, Alex. II, p. 180 B, Δαρείον δίδοντος αὐτῷ μυρία τάλαντα καὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν νείμασθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπίσης, καὶ Παρμενίωνος εἰπόντος, ἔλαβον ἂν εἰ Ἀλέξανδρος ἤμην, κἀγώ, νὴ Δία, εἶπεν, εἰ Παρμενίων ἤμην.

2 This is the usual way of connecting the parts of the sentence; but I think Gaisford's explanation, quoted above, is certainly to be preferred.

3 [“In cod. abest καὶ post Τεύκρᾠ (p. 252), ‘ego addidi; post φανείη extat εἰ, ego καὶ scripsi: deinde τοῦτό τις, ego τοῦτ᾽ οὔτις; extremo autem loco ἀεὶ, Muretus aliique δεῖ.” Ussing, in Opuscula Philologica ad Madvigium, 1876, p. 1.]

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