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‘Topics of unreal enthymemes are, first, the fallacy that arises from the language’ (παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, as Victorius also notes, is not ‘against’, but ‘along of’, Arnold's Thuc. I 141. 9; like διά, ‘arising from’, ‘shewn in’, as παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, § 2, παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, §§ 3, 9); ‘and of this one part (sort or kind),—as in dialectics, to omit or evade the syllogistic process (that is, to assume without proof) and then in the terms of a syllogistic conclusion to state the result, “therefore it is not so and so (the conclusion of an ἔλεγχος or syllogism of refutation of an opponent's thesis) or, therefore necessarily so and so follows” (conclusion of a demonstrative, constructive, syllogism);—so in enthymemes (Rhetoric) the enunciation of a concise, condensed, well-rounded or turned, periodic’ (συνεστραμμένως, Plat. Protag. 342 E: on ἡ κατεστραμμένη λέξις, Introd. p. 308 seq. on III 9. 3) ‘and antithetical sentence passes for an enthymeme’. The completeness in the structure of the period, which “like a circle returns into itself”, its carefully balanced members, and its antithetical epigrammatic character, have the effect of an argument and supply to the deluded listener the lacking proof. The force of the antithesis and epigram in conversation and discussion is too well known to need further illustration. I have followed Vahlen, who has discussed this sentence at length in his paper, already referred to, zur kritik Arist. Schrift. (Trans. Acad. Vien. Oct. 1861, pp. 136—8), in removing the fullstop at τὸ καὶ τό and reading καὶ ἐν for καὶ τό: or perhaps the simple omission of τό would be sufficient. He apologises for the anacoluthon, and the repetition of ἐνθύμημα at the end of the sentence, and proposes two expedients for getting rid of them; unnecessarily as it seems to me: accepting the two alterations, as I have done, the sense is perfect, and the expression of it quite in character with the author's hasty and careless style. I pass over the attempted explanations of Vater and others. Victorius has given the sense correctly, though his interpretation does not adhere closely to his text. Bekker and Spengel leave the passage unaltered. The words of de Soph. El. 15, 174 b 8 (comp. 18, 176 b 32), τὸ μάλιστα σοφιστικὸν συκοφάντημα τῶν ἐρωτώντων, τὸ μηδὲν συλλογισαμένους μὴ ἐρώτημα ποιεῖν τὸ τελευταῖον, ἀλλὰ συμπεραντικῶς εἰπεῖν, ὡς συλλελογισμένους, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, present an unusually close correspondence in word as well as sense with this parallel passage of the Rhetoric: few I think will agree with Brandis in supposing the dialectical treatise to be the later of the two compositions. ‘For such a style’—this condensed and antithetical, periodic, style, the style of Demosthenes and Isocrates,—‘is the proper seat of enthymeme’. χώρα the region or district, sedes, where enthymemes are to be found; their haunt or habitat: precisely like τόπος, locus, on which see Introd. pp. 124, 5, and the quotations from Cic. and Quint. So Victorius, “sedes et tanquam regio enth.” It cannot possibly be ‘form’, as Vahlen renders it, (if I do not misunderstand him,) u. s., p. 137, die dem Enth. eigenthümliche Form. With the statement compare III 9. 8, of antithesis, ἡδεῖα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη λέξις,...καὶ ὅτι ἔοικε συλλογισμῷ: ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συναγωγὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν. III 18. 4, τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὅτι μάλιστα συστρέφειν δεῖ. ‘A fallacy of this kind seems to arise from the fashion of’ (the style of) ‘language used’, (i. e. the periodical and antithetical construction of the sentences). Such I think must be the interpretation of σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, though it differs in toto from the signification of the phrase in Top. (de Soph. El.) 4, 166 b 10, the 6th of the verbal fallacies (see above). Vahlen, u. s., points out this difference, which is sufficiently obvious. Nevertheless Victorius identifies them. Both of them may no doubt be referred to the head of fallacies of language—in its most general sense; but the dialectical topic is a mistake or misuse of the termination of single words, involving a confusion of categories; the rhetorical is an abuse of language in a totally different application. ‘For the purpose of conveying by the language the appearance of syllogistic reasoning it is serviceable to recite (enumerate) the heads (of the results) of many syllogisms (previous trains of reasoning); “some he saved, and on the others he took vengeance, and the Greeks he set at liberty”’: (this is from Isocr. Evag. §§ 65—9, as Spengel has pointed out, Tract. on Rhet. in Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 22 note. Aristotle has gathered into these three heads of the contents of Isocr.'s five sections. The person of whom this is said is of course Evagoras, the hero of the declamation. The same speech has been already referred to, II 23. 12): ‘for each of these points was already proved from something else, but when they are put together, it seems as if some additional (καί) conclusion might be drawn from them’. κεφάλαια] heads of arguments, in a summary or recapitulation. Plat. Tim. 26 C. Dem. Olynth. Γ § 23 and the foll., de Symmor. § 11, κεφάλαια τῆς δυνάμεως, followed by the enumeration of them. De falsa leg. § 315, ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων. ἓν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν] The second topic of verbal fallacies: probably including the dialectical ἀμφιβολία, ‘ambiguous propositions’, fallacies of language which are not confined to single terms. ‘One (fallacious argument) arising from verbal ambiguitv; as to say that a mouse is a thing of worth (a worthy and estimable creature)—from it at least the most valued (esteemed) of all religious rites is derived; for the mysteries are of all religious rites most esteemed’. This is taken beyond all doubt from Polycrates' panegyrical declamation, ‘the Encomium of mice’, referred to in § 6: see the note there. The ambiguity from which the fallacious inference is drawn is of course the assumed derivation from μῦς instead of μύειν. If mysteries are derived from mice, how great must be the honour due to the little animal. See Whately, Logic, ch. v. § 8, on ambiguous middle. τελετή] is a religious rite, and specially rites into which initiation enters as a preparation—mysteries; sometimes initiation alone. Athen. B. 12, p. 40 D, τελετὰς καλοῦμεν τὰς ἔτι μείζους καὶ μετά τινος μυστικῆς παραδόσεως ἑορτάς. Suidas, s. v., θυσία μυστηριώδης ἡ μεγίστη καὶ τιμιωτέρα. Hesychius, τελεταί: ἑορταί, θυσίαι, μυστήρια. Photius, θυσία μυστηριώδης. Lobeck, Aglaophamus, Lib. II § 8, Vol. I p. 304. Mystic rites, (Arist. Ran. 1032, Dem. c. Aristog. § 11,) ascribed to Orpheus. Comp. Plat. Rep. II. 635 A, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσὶ μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς: μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει. This is said of the Orphic and Musaean rites and mysteries and initiation into them, but will apply equally to the Eleusinian, and all others which had the same object and character. Comp. Protag. 316 D [and Isocr. Paneg. § 28]. ‘Or if one in the encomium of a dog takes into the account the dog in heaven (the dog-star）’. κύων, as the star Sirius, the herald of the dogdays in summer, Hom. Il. XXII 27—29, ἀστέρ᾽ ...ὅν τε κύν̓ Ὠρίωνος ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσιν. Dem. c. Lacrit. § 13, Arist. Hist. An. VIII 15. 9, ἐπὶ κυνί, et alibi, as a mark of the season, like the Pleiads; also ὑπὸ κύνα, μετὰ κύνα, περὶ κύνα, Arist. Theophr. al. Canis, canicula, Hor. Od. III 13. 9; Ep. I 10. 16. Virg. Georg. I 218, Ovid, &c. ‘Or Pan, because Pindar called him “the mighty mother (Cybele)'s manifold dog”’. Pindar, Parthenia, Fragm. 6. “Pan optime in illo carmine audiebat, quo ante Magnae Matris, ubi eius statua, celebrabatur.” Böckh, ad Fragm. Pind., Op. II. 594. By ‘Cybele's dog’ Pindar meant her faithful and constant attendant. This metaphor is converted by some panegyrist of the animal into an argument in his favour, as if the god Pan were really a distinguished member of that fraternity1. ἢ ὅτι τὸ μηδένα κ.τ.λ.] The meaning of this is obscure. Victorius, merely observing that this is another fallacious inference as to the value of a dog, candidly admits that he cannot explain it. Schrader under stands it thus: “ne canem quidem in domo ali sordidum est. Ergo canem esse honorificum est.” He goes on to say that the equivocation lies in the double meaning of κύων, dog and Cynic2. “Cynici enim philosophi Canes appellabantur, qui hac fallacia cognomen istud suum ornare poterant.” The argument is, ‘To have no dog at all is the highest disgrace’ (would this be accepted as probable?); ‘therefore to be a dog (in another sense, a Cynic,) is plainly a mark of distinction.’ ‘And to say that Hermes is the most liberal’ (communicative of good things to others (so Schrader); or ‘sociable’, communicative of himself, superis deorum gratus et imis,) ‘of all the gods; for he alone goes by the name of Common Hermes’. The latter of the two interpretations of κοινωνικόν seems to be right, from the comparison of Polit. III 13, 1283 a 38, where justice is said to be a κοινωνικὴ ἀρετή, ᾗ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς ἄλλας. Eine der bürgerlichen gesellschaft wesentliche tugend, i. e. social, (Stahr). The fallacy lies in transferring the special signification of κοινός in the proverb, and applying it in a general sense to the character of the god. κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς] Hermes is the god of ‘luck’, to whom all ἕρμαια, windfalls, lucky finds, pieces of good fortune, are due. When a man finds anything, as a coin which has been dropt in the street, his companion immediately puts in a claim to ‘go halves’, with the proverbial “Common Hermes”, i. e. luck is common, I am entitled to share with you. Theophr. Char. XXX, καὶ εὑρισκομένων χαλκῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων δεινὸς (ὁ αἰσχροκερδὴς) ἀπαιτῆσαι τὸ μέρος, κοινὸν εἶναι φήσας τὸν Ἑρμῆν. Hesychius, κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῇ τε εὑρισκόντων. Plutarch, Phil. esse cum princ. c. 2, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμουσίᾳ καὶ ἀπειροκαλίᾳ τὸν κοινὸν Ἑρμῆν ἐμπόλαιον καὶ ἔμμισθον γενέσθαι (apud Erasm. Adag. Liberalitas, ‘Communis Mercurius’, p. 1144, ed. 1599), the god of gain, profit, luck, has ceased to be as of old common and liberal, and has taken to commerce and mercenary habits. Lucian, Navig. § 12; Adimantus had spoken of some golden visions, to which Lycinus replies, οὐκοῦν τὸ προχειρότατον τοῦτο, κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς, φασί, καὶ ἐς μέσον κατατίθει φέρων τὸν πλοῦτον (let me, as the proverb κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς has it, share your wealth), ἄξιον γὰρ ἀπολαῦσαι τὸ μέρος φίλους ὄντας. To be κοινός in this latter sense does not entitle a man or god to the epithet κοινωνικός. ‘And, to prove that words’ (speech, rhetoric; this is probably taken from an encomium on the art) ‘are a most excellent, valuable thing; for the reason that the proper reward of good men is, not money, but λόγος (in the double sense of ‘words’, and ‘consideration, estimation’; λόγου ποιεῖσθαι (ἔχειν) τινός, ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ εἶναι, et similia passim); ‘for λόγου ἄξιον is an ambiguous, equivocal expression’ (is used in more than one sense).
1 Can the term ‘dog’ be applied to Pan, in reference to his character of ovium custos, (Virg. Georg. I 17,) as a shepherd's dog? I suppose not.
2 On this name as applied to Antisthenes, compare the epigram in Diog. Laert. VI 1. 10, which interprets it thus, τὸν βίον ἦσθα κύων, Ἀντίσθενες, ὧδε πεφυκὼς ὥστε δακεῖν κραδίην ῥήμασιν οὐ στόμασιν, and to Diogenes, VI 2. 60, 61.
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