previous next

‘Another from consequence’, i. e. from the unduly assumed reciprocal convertibility of antecedent and consequent: just as in the ‘sign’ (q. v.), between which and this there is no real difference. As we saw in § 5, in the de Soph. El. the sign is spoken of as the rhetorical variety of the general topic of consequence: and they ought not to be divided here.

‘As in the Alexander’, i. e. Paris; a declamation of some unknown author, already referred to, c. 23 §§ 5, 8, 12; (it is argued) ‘that he is high-minded, because he scorned the society of many’ (quaere τῶν πολλῶν ‘of the vulgar’) ‘and dwelt alone in Ida’: (the inference being that) ‘because such is the disposition of the high-minded, therefore he might be supposed to be high-minded.’ This is a fallacy, or logical flaw, as Schrader puts it, “quia universalem affirmantem convertit simpliciter, et quia in secunda figura concludit affirmative.” Or rather, as this is an illicit consequence, because here antecedent and consequent are not reciprocally convertible: it does not follow, even supposing that all highminded men dwell apart from others, that all lonely-dwellers are highminded men: and to say that so and so, anybody whatsoever, is highminded for that reason and that alone, is as much as to say that the rule is universal.

‘And again (to argue) that so and so is a dandy and roams at night, and therefore a rake, because such are the habits of rakes’. This, as before, is to say that because (supposing it to be so) all adulterers are smartly dressed and walk at night, therefore all smart dressers and night-walkers are adulterers. This appears also as an example of the sign, the rhetorical form of the topic τὸ ἑπόμενον, de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 9, βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἑπόμενον ἔλαβον, ὅτι καλλωπιστὴς ὅτι νύκτωρ ὁρᾶται πλανώμενος. [See infra III 15. 5.]

καλλωπιστής] Plato Sympos. 174 A. Socrates (going out to dinner) ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην, ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἴω.

‘And another (argument), similar to these (for exalting the condition of poverty and exile), is that beggars sing and dance in the temples, and that exiles are allowed to live where they please’: because, these things (enjoyments) being the ordinary accidents or concomitants of apparent happiness, those who have them may also be supposed to be happy’. Here again there is an illicit conversion of antecedent and consequent: if singing and dancing, or living where one pleased, were coextensive with happiness, the inference would be true and the two convertible. As it is, it does not follow that, because these are indications of happiness, or often accompany (follow) it, all men that sing and dance, or can live where they please, are necessarily happy. This is taken from one of those paradoxical encomiums of poverty and exile to which Isocrates refers, Helen. § 8, ἤδη τινές...τολμῶσι γράφειν, ὡς ἔστιν τῶν πτωχευόντων καὶ φευγόντων βίος ζηλωτότερος τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; such as Alcidamas' πενίας ἐγκώμιον cited above from Menander on § 6. [For an ἀπολογία Πενίας see Arist. Plutus, 467—597, in the course of which a distinction is drawn between πενία and πτωχεία, 552—4.]

διαφέρει δὲ τῷ πῶς: διό κ.τ.λ.] ‘But there is a difference in their manner of doing these; and therefore this topic falls under the head of omission, as well as (καί) that of τὸ ἑπόμενον’. Beggars and exiles do what appear to be the same things as the wealthy and prosperous, they dance and sing in the temples and sacred precincts, and change their place of residence at their pleasure: but there is a difference in the mode and motive of doing these things, which is omitted; and the omission when supplied explains the fallacy. The beggars dance and sing in the temples to amuse the visitors and obtain an alms; the wealthy and prosperous out of wantonness or exultation, to shew that they have the liberty of doing what is forbidden to humbler people (so Victorius, and Schrader who borrows his note: these may however be mere signs of happiness in the εὐδαίμονες). And again, the exiles are obliged to live abroad, and would gladly be at home again; the wealthy and prosperous travel for change of scene, to satisfy their curiosity, or (like Herodotus and Plato) their desire of knowledge. The ἔλλειψις is here of τὸ πῶς, as in § 3, ult. of ὑπὸ τίνος, and in § 9, of πότε and πῶς, which in each case may be applied to explain the fallacy.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.

An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.

hide Display Preferences
Greek Display:
Arabic Display:
View by Default:
Browse Bar: