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In this section the clause, ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμεν...ἄλλως, should (it seems) be read thus: ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμέν τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέλυται, ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ πλείω πλεονάκις ἄλλως: and the succeeding, ἐάν τε καί... οὕτω, μαχετέον ὅτι κ.τ.λ. The first alteration of the punctuation, and εἰ καὶ πλείω for καὶ τὰ πλείω, appear first in Spengel's reprint of the Rhetoric, in his Rhetores Graeci; the corresponding alteration of punctuation in the second clause occurs in his recent edition. Bekker, who had adopted the altered punctuation in his 2nd ed., has returned to the original one in his 3rd, whether by mere oversight, or intentionally, who can determine? At all events with the punctuation found in all the editions prior to Bekker's 2nd, the sentences appear to be unintelligible. Vahlen, u.s., pp. 142, 3, has adopted the same alterations with the addition of the not improbable but unnecessary one of ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἕν τι. The connexion of the passage thus altered is this: There are two ways of meeting and refuting an opponent's example, the rhetorical substitute for a complete induction: first, if we have an adverse or contradictory instance (οὐχ οὕτω) to bring against his general rule—a case exceptional to the example or examples that he has collected in support of it—this is refuted, at all events so far as to shew that it is not necessary, even though the majority of cases (πλείω καὶ πλεονάκις, ‘more of them and oftener’) of the same kind, or examples, are ‘otherwise’ (ἄλλως, are in another direction, or go to prove the contrary): or, secondly, if the great majority of instances are in conformity with his rule (οὕτως), and (which must be supplied) we have no instance to the contrary to adduce, we must then contend that the present instance (any one of his examples) is not analogous, not a case in point, that there is some difference either of kind and quality, or of mode, or some other, whatever it may be, between the example and that with which he compares it, which prevents its applicability here. The objection to this connexion and interpretation is of course the combination of οὐχ οὕτω with ἐάν; which may perhaps have been Bekker's reason for returning to the original punctuation. But as the sense seems to require the alteration of this, we may perhaps apply to this case Hermann's explanation1 of the conjunction of οὐ, the direct negative with the hypothetical εἰ, which may occur in cases where the negative is immediately connected, so as to form a single negative notion with the thing denied, and does not belong to the hypothesis: so that οὐχ οὕτως being equivalent to ἄλλο or ἕτερον may stand in its place with the hypothetical particle: though no other example of this combination with ἐάν has been produced. In the choice between the two difficulties, the grammar, I suppose, must give place to the requirements of the sense. Neither Vahlen nor Spengel takes any notice of the grammatical irregularity.

With καὶ τὰ εἰκότα in the first clause πρός is to be carried on from πρὸς τὰ παραδειγματώδη.

οὐχ ὅμοιον οὐχ ὁμοίως] represent similarity of quality, τὸ ποιόν, the third category; and similarity of mode, conveyed by the adverbial termination -ως. “Non esse par, aut non eodem modo geri posse.” Victorius.

1 Review of Elmsley's Medea, vv. 87, 348. [Comp. supra Vol. I. Appendix C, p. 301.]

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