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‘The case of a contrary instance or objection is exemplified by the following, suppose the opponent's enthymeme is this’ (i. e. has for its major premiss, is constructed upon the principle that, derives its conclusion from this), ‘that all good men’ (ὁ ἀγαθός, the definite article marks the class: note on I 7. 13, comp. II 4. 31), ‘or good men invariably, do good to all their friends, the objection may be taken, that the opposite is not true; that bad men don't do harm to all theirs’. “The allegation of contraries,” Poste, Transl. of de Soph. El. Appendix C, p. 197. If it be true that all good men do good to all their friends, the contrary of this, that all bad men do harm to all theirs, must be true likewise. But the latter is known not to be universally true; to some of their friends bad men do harm, to others not: it is not necessary therefore that good men should always help all their friends; they may be good without that. So Victorius. Comp. Top. B 9, 114 b 6 seq. where two other examples are given: σκοπεῖν δὲ...καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον, οἷον ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡδύ: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ κακὸν λυπηρόν: ἢ εἰ τοῦτο, κἀκεῖνο. καὶ εἰ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ ἀδικία ἄγνοια. καὶ εἰ τὸ δικαίως ἐπιστημονικῶς καὶ ἐμπείρως, τὸ ἀδίκως ἀγνοούντως καὶ ἀπείρως. And again B 7, 113 a 1 seq. αἱ μὲν οὖν πρῶται δύο κ.τ.λ....line 8, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα τέτταρα ποιεῖ ἐναντίωσιν. τὸ γὰρ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν τῷ τοὺς φίλους κακῶς ἐναντίον: ἀπό τε γὰρ ἐναντίου ἤθους ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἱρετὸν τὸ δὲ φευκτόν. “But the other four combinations, benefiting a friend, hurting a friend: benefiting an enemy, hurting an enemy: benefiting a friend, benefiting an enemy: hurting a friend, hurting an enemy: are all respectively contraries.” Poste, u. s. p. 201.
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