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A fourth kind is that of, ‘judgments, or decisions proceeding from distinguished men: as for instance, if the enthymeme be, that drunkards should have allowance made for them (and be punished less severely than if they had been in their sober senses), because they sin in ignorance, an objection may be taken, that then Pittacus is no longer commendable (i. e. loses his due credit; is no longer an authority, as he is entitled to be); for (if he had been—on the supposition that the enthymeme objected to is true,) he would not have enacted (as he did) a heavier penalty for an offence committed under the influence of intoxication’. The authority of Pittacus, which is of course maintained by the objector, is urged in opposition to the general principle laid down by the opponent, that indulgence should be granted to those who committed a crime in a fit of intoxication, because they were then out of their senses and had lost all self-control. If this were true, replies the objector, Pittacus, one of the seven “wise men,” would be no authority—which cannot be supposed—for he ruled the direct contrary, that drunkenness aggravated, not extenuated, the offence. The text, with the supplements usually required in translating Aristotle, seems to give a clear and consistent sense. Vahlen however, Trans. Vien. Acad. Oct. 1861, p. 141, objects to αἰνετός on two grounds; first, the word itself, as belonging only to poetry; and secondly as inapplicable here; the meaning required being, that Pittacus is no wise man, for otherwise he would not have made such an enactment: that we must therefore read συνετός for αἰνετός. On the second ground I can see no necessity for alteration; for the first objection, there is more to be said. αἰνετός is a very rare word: only two examples of it are given in Steph. Thes. (this place of Aristotle is strangely overlooked) and both from poets, Antimachus and Alcaeus. Whether this is a sufficient reason for condemning the word in Aristotle I will not take upon me to decide. It is retained by all editors; and Aristotle's writings are not altogether free from irregularities of grammar and expression not sanctioned by the usage of the best Attic writers. For instance, κυντότατον is quoted in Bekker's Anecdota, I 101, as occurring in the περὶ ποιητικῆς—doubtless in the lost part of that work. On this example, see Poste, Trans. of de Soph. El. Appendix C. p. 199. On Pittacus, Diogenes Laertius 1 4. In § 76, ϝόμους δὲ ἔθηκε: τῷ μεθύοντι, ἐὰν ἁμάρτῃ, διπλῆν εἶναι τὴν ζημίαν: ἵνα μὴ μεθύωσι, πολλοῦ κατὰ τὴν νῆσον οἴνου γενομένου, Lesbos to wit, famous for its wine. He was born at Mytilene in 651 B. C., and died in 569 B. C. Mure, Hist. Gr. Lit. III 377. Clinton, F. H. sub anno. Aristotle also refers to this law of Pittacus, Pol. II 12, 1274 b 19 seq., where the reason for enacting it is given. νόμος δ᾽ ἴδιος αὐτοῦ, τὸ τοὺς μεθύοντας ἂν τυπτήσωσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων: διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους ὑβρίζειν μεθύοντας ἢ νήφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγγνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεθύουσιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. Comp. Eth. N. III 7, 1113 b 30 sq. καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια:...κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι. III 2, 1110 b 26. On the appeal to authorities, as μάρτυρες, comp. I 15. 13, 14, 15; and note on II 23. 12. §§ 8, 9. The following two sections, 8 and 9, are a summary repetition of what has been already stated more at length, I 2. 14—19, inclusive: on the materials of enthymemes and their varieties. ‘Enthymemes being derived from four sources, or kinds of materials, probabilities, example, and signs certain and uncertain; in the first enthymemes being gathered (conclusions collected) from things which usually happen or seem to do so, that is, from probabilities; in the next (examples) from induction (by an incomplete inductive process), by means of similar (analogous, parallel) cases, one or more, when you first obtain your universal (the universal major, premiss or proposition, from which the conclusion is drawn) and then conclude (infer) the particular by an example’ (on this process and its logical validity, see the account of παράδειγμα, Introd. pp. 105—107); ‘and (thirdly) by means of’ (through the channel, medium, instrumentality, διά with genit.) ‘the necessary and invariable’ (reading καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντος, ‘that which ever exists’, unchanging, permanent, enduring for ever), ‘by τεκμήριον that is; and (fourthly) by signs, universal or particular’ (see on this, I 2. 16, the two kinds of signs: and the paraphrase of §§ 15—18, Introd. pp. 163—5), ‘whether (the conclusion be) positive or negative (so Vict.); and the probable, (of which all these materials of enthymemes consist— with the solitary exception of the τεκμήριον, which is very rarely used—) not being what is constant and invariable (always occurring in the same way, uniform) but what is only true for the most part; it is plain that (the conclusion is that) all such enthymemes as these can be always disproved by bringing an objection: the refutation however is (very often) apparent and not always real; for the objector does not disprove the probability, but only the necessity, (of the opponent's statement)’. As none of a rhetorician's arguments is more than probable, this can always be done, but in a great many cases it is not fair. The words δἰ ἐπαγωγῆς are put in brackets by Spengel as an interpolation. With the limitation which I have expressed in the translation, it seems to me that ἐπαγωγῆς is quite justifiable, and may be retained: διά is at all events superfluous, and would be better away; Victorius and Buhle had already rejected it. I have followed Vahlen (and Spengel in his recent Ed.) in supposing ἀεί to have been omitted between καὶ and ὄντος in the explanation of τεκμήριον. Vahlen truly observes, Op. cit. p. 141, “that the τεκμήριον rests not upon the necessary and being, but upon the necessary and ever-being,” (the permanent and invariable): referring to ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον in § 10; Phys. B 196 b 13, οὔτε τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀεί, οὔτε τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ: Metaph. E 1026 b 27, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης... τὰ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ̓ ἀεί, ὡς δ̓ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ: Ib. 1064 b 32, πᾶν δή φαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης: 1065 a 2 ff.—which seem quite sufficient to warrant the alteration. ἐάν τε ὄν ἐάν τε μὴ (ὄν）] subaudi ᾖ, a rare ellipse of the subjunctive mood of εἶναι: Eur. Hippol. 659, ἔς τ᾽ ἂν ἔκδημος χθονὸς Θησεύς. Aesch. Agam. 1318, κοινωσώμεθα ἄν πως ἀσφαλῆ βουλήματα (ᾖ). Paley, note ad loc., supplies other examples; and refers to Buttmann (on Mid. § 14, n. 143, p. 529 b, ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἂν ἡ γραφή), who gives two more, Antiphon de caed. Herod. § 32, ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἂν τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς βασάνου; Plat. Rep. II 370 E, ὧν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεία. Victorius offers an alternative translation of the above words, ‘the real or apparent’ sign: but I think his first rendering, which I have followed, is the best. The contents of §§ 8—11 inclusive are paraphrased at length, with an explanation, in Introd on this chapter, pp. 271—4; to which the reader is referred. § 10 (misprinted § 8) is translated on p. 272.
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