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The second is as follows. ‘Neither are refutative enthymemes a distinct kind other than the demonstrative (those that prove the affirmative, construct, establish); for it is plain that refutation is effected either by direct proof, or by advancing an objection; and the proof is the demonstration of the opposite (the negative of the opponent's conclusion)—to prove, for instance, if the object was to shew that a crime had been committed, that it has not; or the reverse. And therefore this cannot be the difference, because they both employ the same kind of arguments (steps of proof); for both bring enthymemes to prove one the fact, the other the negation of it (§ 4). And the objection is no enthymeme at all, but, as in the Topics, to state an opinion (a probable proposition) from which it will clearly appear either that the syllogism is defective (the reasoning, logic, is defective) or that something false has been assumed (in the premisses)’. See II 22. 14, 15. II 25. 1, 2, where ἀντισυλλογίζεσθαι stands for ἀνταποδεικνύειν here. It was stated, c. 22. 14, that “there are two kinds of enthymemes,” the δεικτικά and ἐλεγκτικά, founded on the distinction of constructive and destructive, affirmative and negative: in this passage that statement is so far corrected as to deny that this is not a sufficient foundation for a distinction of kinds; the mode of reasoning is the same in both, and therefore as enthymemes they are the same.
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