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‘From this assumption the necessary consequence is that a friend is one who sympathizes with us in our joys and sorrows, rejoicing at the good that befals us, and grieved at that which gives us pain, not with any ulterior motive; but solely on our friend's account. For all feel joy in obtaining the object of their wishes, and pain at the reverse, so that the pleasures and pains that they feel are an indication of the nature of their wish’. The pleasure or pain felt on the occasion of a friend's good or bad fortune is the test of the nature of their wishes, and therefore of their friendship or hatred. And also, as every one feels pleasure at his own success and pain at disappointment, so by the rule φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός, ἕτερος αὐτός, ‘a friend is a second self’, (Eth. N. IX 4, 1166 a 31, 9, sub init. et 1170 b 6), the test of friendship is this community of pleasure and pain between friend and friend. Idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum firma amicitia est, says Sallust. This same principle of ‘fellow-feeling’ as the basis of friendship (which is here principally in question) runs through the following sections to § 7. Zeno, the Stoic, ἐρωτηθεὶς, τί ἐστι φίλος; ἄλλος, ἔφη, ἐγώ. Diog. Laert. VII 1, (Zeno) § 23.1

1 The reverse of the medal is presented by the cynical La Rochefoucauld, Maxime 81, “Nous ne pouvons rien aimer que par rapport a nous, et nous ne faisons que suivre notre goût et notre plaisir quand nous préférons nos amis nousmêmes; c'est néanmoins par cette préférence seule que l'amitié peut être vraie et parfaite,” and 83, “Ce que les hommes ont nommé amitié n'est qu'une société, qu'un ménagement réciproque d'intérêts, et qu'un échange de bons offices; ce n'est enfin qu'un commerce où l'amour propre se propose toujours quelque chose à gagner.” The author of the Leviathan takes an equally low view of human nature, and derives from self-love, in some form or other, all our emotions and desires. They are all reducible to ‘appetite’ or ‘desire’. “That which men desire they are also said to love: and to hate those things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire we always signify the absence of the object; by love most commonly the presence of the same.” Hobbes, Leviathan, Pt. 1. ch. 6. For a philosophical analysis of the ‘Tender Emotion,’ its origin and varieties, see Bain, Emotions and Will, Ch. VI [Ch. VII, ed. 1875].

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