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‘What sort of things, and what persons, are the objects of fear, and how it is manifested, will be plain from what follows’. ἔστω] as before; see note on I 5. 3. ‘Let fear be defined, a pain or disturbance arising from a mental (presentation or) impression (φαντασία, note on I 11. 6) (a vivid presentiment) of coming evil, destructive or painful: for it is not all evils that men are afraid of, as for instance of the prospect of being wicked or dull (slow, stupid), but only those that amount to great pain or ruin: and this too only if they appear to be not far off, but close at hand, so as to be imminent or threatening. For things very remote are not subjects of alarm: for every one knows that he must die, but by reason of death not being actually impending, people care nothing at all for it’. It is the proximity of danger that causes fear. Gaisford quotes a poetical illustration from Pind. Nem. VI 94, τὸ δὲ πὰρ ποδὶ ναὸς ἑλισσόμενον ἀεὶ κυμάτων λέγεται παντὶ μάλιστα δονεῖν θυμόν. On fear, and its proper objects, see Eth. Nic. III 9. At the commencement of the chapter it is said, φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά: διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. But of evil in general, all moral evil is to be shunned, and the fear of it is right, and to be encouraged: in the control of this kind of fear, courage is not shewn. It is in overmastering the sense of danger, in controlling the fears that interfere with the exercise of our duties, and especially the dread of death (the most fearful of all things) in battle, that true courage resides—ὅλως μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβου. τοιαῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς: it is not the anticipation of pain of all kinds, as the pain of envy, of rivalry, of shame, that is entitled to the name of ‘fear’, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ μόναις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις ἔσεσθαι λύπαις φόβος γίνεται, ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν......ὁ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλήσιον ᾖ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς ποιητικόν. φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος ὅταν πλήσιον φαίνηται. Eth. Eudem. III 1, 1229 a 33, which is in exact conformity with Aristotle's definition. Comp. infra § 2, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κίνδυνος, φοβεροῦ πλησιασμός. δύνασθαι, to have the capacity, power, the force, and hence value, of; to amount to; becomes thus equivalent to ἰσχύειν or σθένειν, Elmsley ad Med. 127, οὐδένα καιρὸν δύναται θνητοῖς. Thuc. I 141, τὴν αὐτὴν δύναται δούλωσιν. VI 40, λόγοι ἔργα δυνάμενοι. Similarly it denotes the value of money, Xen. Anab. I 5. 6, ὁ σιγλὸς δύναται ἑπτὰ ὀβόλους καὶ ἡμιοβόλιον Ἀττικούς: or the general force or effect or amount of anything. Rhet. III 14. 5, τὰ τοῦ δικανικοῦ προοίμια ταὐτὸ δύναται ὅπερ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι, ‘amount to much the same’, ‘have much the same effect’. It also expresses in particular the value or meaning, signification, of a word, or anything else (like the Latin valere), Herod. II 30, δύναται τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος οἱ ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς χειρὸς παριστάμενοι βασιλεΐ. Ib. IV 192, τὸ οὔνομα δύναται κατὰ Ἑλλάδα γλῶσσαν, βουνοί. Ib. VI 98. Thuc. VII 58, δύναται δὲ τὸ νεοδαμῶδες ἐλεύθερον ἤδη εἶναι. Aristoph. Plut. 842, τὸ τριβώνιον τί δύναται; (What's the meaning of this thread-bare cloak?). Plat. Protag. 324 A, Crat. 429 D, ἆρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; Euthyd. 286 C, δύναται ὁ λόγος. Xenoph. Anab. II 2. 13. Demosth. de Cor. § 26, τί δὲ τοῦτ̓ ἠδύνατο; ‘What did this mean?’ Arist. Metaph. Γ 6, 1011 a 7, δύνανται δ᾽ αἱ ἀπορίαι αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι τὸ αὐτό.
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