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‘The exciting causes of shame and shamelessness, the objects of them, i.e. the persons to whom they are directed, and the dispositions or states of mind that they represent, will be clear from the following analysis’. ποῖα here is generally expressed by ἐπὶ ποίοις, of the exciting causes, which occurs in § 3.

On αἰδώς, as a πάθος, the sense of shame, see Arist. Eth. Nic. II 7, and more at large, IV 15. There, as here, no distinction is made between αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη. On the distinctions which may and may not be made between them, see Trench, N. T. Syn. [§ XIX] p. 73; and on αἰδώς contrasted with σωφροσύνη, ib. § XX. p. 76. They differ as the Latin verecundia (αἰδώς), and pudor (αἰσχύνη): the first is a subjective feeling or principle of honour, Germ. scheu; the second presents this in its objective aspect, as the fear of disgrace (from others, external) consequent on something already done, Germ. schaam and schande. Döderl. Lat. Syn. Vol. III. p. 201. αἰδώς precedes and prevents the shameful act, αἰσχύνη reflects upon its conse quences in the shame it brings with it. This latter conception of αἰσχύνη corresponds to Aristotle's definition here, and in Eth. N. IV 15 init. φόβος τις ἀδοξίας. On αἰδώς, as a principle of action, and νέμεσις, the two primary notions of duty, duty to oneself, and duty to others or justice, see an interesting note of Sir A. Grant, on Eth. N. II 7. 14. In Soph. Aj. 1073—1086, the two fundamental principles, by which human conduct should be regulated, the foundations of law, justice, and military discipline, are αἰδώς or αἰσχύνη, and δεός or φόβος. δεὸς γὰρ πρόσεστιν αἰσχύνη θ᾽ ὁμοῦ σωτηρίαν ἔχοντα τόνδ̓ ἐπίστασο. See Schneidewin's note on line 1079.

Aristotle both here and in the Ethics represents αἰδώς or αἰσχύνη, and consequently the opposite, as πάθη, instinctive emotions; and Bain by classing shame amongst the emotions takes the same view. Eth. N. IV 15, init. περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν: πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἕξει. ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος (which is a πάθος) τῆς ἀδοξίας, ἀποτελεῖται δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον: ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχριῶσιν. σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεταί πως εἶναι ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἕξεως εἶναι. This view of ‘shame’ or ‘modesty’ as a πάθος and not a ἕξις, an emotion and not a moral state or virtue, is commented on and criticized by Alexander Aphrodisiensis in his ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις, Bk. Δ c. κά (21), περὶ αἰδοῦς. The chapter opens with a reference to the two passages of the Nic. Ethics in which the subject is treated, and after an examination and criticism of the definition, he proceeds thus; γὰρ αἰδὼς οὐκ ἔοικεν ἁπλῶς εἶναι φόβος ἀδοξίας, ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρότερον ἀλλοτριότης πρὸς τὰ αἰσχρά, δἰ ἣν οἱ οὕτως ἔχοντες φοβοῦνται τὴν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἀδοξίαν. εἰ δέ ἐστι τοιοῦτον αἰδώς, οὐκ ἔτ̓ ἂν οὐδὲ πάθος ἁπλῶς εἴη, ἀλλ̓ ἕξις τις καὶ διάθεσις, τὸ προειρημένον ἕπεται πάθος.

The character of the ἀναίσχυντος, as depicted by Theophrastus, Charact. c. θ́. περὶ ἀναισχυντίας, has not much in common with the analysis of Aristotle. One common feature appears in § 6 of this chapter, τὸ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ μικρῶν ἀπ᾽ αἰσχρῶν; Theophrastus' definition of ἀναισχυντία being καταφρόνησις δόξης αἰσχροῦ ἕνεκα κέρδους. But the completest portrait of the ἀναίσχυντος that Greek antiquity has bequeathed to us, is doubtless the ἀλλαντοπώλης of Aristophanes' Knights. In this character the ideal of ‘shameless impudence’ seems to be reached, and human nature can go no further.

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