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This concludes the first branch of the analysis of shame and its opposite, ποῖα αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀναισχυντοῦσιν, § 1, shameful things. We now proceed to consider the second, πρὸς τίνας, the persons, namely, before whom, in whose presence, this feeling is especially excited (lit. to whom the feeling is, as it were, addressed). These two divisions exhibit the two πάθη in their objective aspect, things and persons. The third, commencing at § 24, gives the subjective view of them, shewing how the persons who feel shame and the reverse are themselves affected by them, and what in them are the signs of its manifestation. ‘Such and such like are the things that men are ashamed of. And as shame is a fancy or mental impression about discredit or loss of reputation (def. § 2), and this on its own account, with no reference to any ulterior results or consequences (of the loss of it), and no one cares for the opinion except on account of those who entertain it, it follows of necessity that the persons to whom shame is addressed are those whom we hold in account (take account of, regard and esteem)’.
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