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‘We have now stated the moods of mind in which men are inclined to pity; what the objects of pity are, is plain to be seen from the definition: that is, of things which cause pain and suffering all are pitiable that are also destructive, and (in fact) everything that is destructive and ruinous; and all evils of which chance is the cause, provided they be of sufficient magnitude’. On λυπηρὰ καὶ ὀδυνηρά, Victorius and Schrader are agreed, that λυπηρός represents mental, and ὀδυνηρός bodily, pain or suffering. But it is certain that in ordinary usage either of them can be applied to both. That λύπη and λυπηρός include bodily pain appears from the regular opposition of ἡδονή and λύπη expressing pleasure and pain in general: equally so in Aristotle's psychology, where ἡδονή and λύπη are the necessary accompaniments of sensation in all animals; and in Plato's moral philosophy (Gorgias, Phaedo, Philebus, &c.), where they most unmistakably include all kinds of pleasures and pains. ὀδύνη and ὀδυνηρός, though most frequently perhaps applied to pain of body (as especially in Homer, also in Plato and in Soph. Phil. 827, ὀδύνη bodily, opposed to ἄλγος mental, pain), can also be used to express mental suffering, as may be seen by consulting Rost and Palm's Lexicon. Ὀδύνη, proprie corporis......transfertur ad animi dolorem (Ellendt, Lex. Soph. s. v.). The derivation of ὀδύνη from a root ed ‘eat’, ἔδω, ἐσθίω edo, and of λύπη from a root lup ‘to break’, (Curtius, Grundz. der Gr. Etym. I. pp. 218, 240,) throws no light upon the distinction between them: both, according to the natural growth of language, have a physical origin, and are transferred by metaphor to the expression of mental affections. But, read by the light of the explanatory § 8, the difficulty is at once cleared up. Only ὀδυνηρά is repeated, which shews that the difference between this and λυπηρά is—here at all events— one of expression merely and not of conception. This is confirmed by the details of things painful which are enumerated in § 8, all of them evils affecting the body alone. And this is in fact an explanation of the meaning of φαινομένῳ κακῷ in the definition, that being most evident or palpable which is presented immediately to the sense. Comp. note on φαινομένῳ § 1. Of ἀναιρετικά Victorius says that it is not in itself precisely distinguishable in sense from φθαρτικά, but (as I have expressed in the translation) the latter term applies only to some particular cases of λυπηρά and ὀδυνηρά, whilst ἀναιπετικά is extended to all things destructive.
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